2010年9月24日

欧洲领导人在做白日梦 Europe daydreams its way to Japanese irrelevance

 

上上周我在布鲁塞尔。当时,若泽•曼努埃尔•巴罗佐(José Manuel Barroso)刚刚发表完“洲情咨文”。这位欧委会主席谈到欧洲要成为全球参与者与领导者,并将其称作这一代政治家的主要抱负。但我感觉,这座大陆的未来正向小国滑去。

或许,我是受到了自己作为特邀嘉宾出席的一个活动的影响。卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)召集了一群最聪明的学者,一起讨论中国的问题。这家美国智库正大张旗鼓地建立全球影响力。

这不同于我们熟悉得可怕的那些会议:每个人都不遗余力地预测,中国到底多快会挤掉美国,成为世界第一大国。相反,此次交流提醒我们,实力的强弱通常取决于旁观者怎么看。相比于北京那些正艰难应对社会压力和经济变革压力的政界人士与决策者,在外人眼中,中国的崛起要快得多,也平稳得多。

这就是说,很少有人怀疑发展的趋势。欧洲的问题在于,它给所有人留下的印象都是一个旁观者。我不禁联想到了日本淡出世界舞台。尽管在全球排名中,中国最近已超过了日本,但日本仍然是一个经济强国。不过,在对世界事务的讨论中,日本早就差不多是不见踪影,顺从地接受了改变接受者的角色,而不是塑造者。

为此,在塑造全球新秩序(或者也有可能是全球新紊乱)的过程中,美国和中国成为了关键角色。不久前,最流行的论点激发了人们对于世界将由这个两国集团(G2)主导的预期。北京与华盛顿做出的决策与达成的协定,将会作为金科玉律直接向世界其它地区传达。

这个观点永远只能是幻想。现状与修正主义势力存在太多的利益冲突。更有可能的结果是,全球体系中的最终平衡点——多极与多边、竞争与合作——将取决于美中管理不可避免的摩擦的效率。

较之几个月前,巴罗佐眼下更有理由感到乐观。春季时,在债务负担沉重的政府和紧张的债券市场的压力下,欧元似乎将会崩溃。如今形势平静了下来。欧洲央行(ECB)行长让-克洛德•特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)本周一直向英国《金融时报》表示,欧元的弹性被大大低估了。

或许吧。鉴于欧元区的财政赤字与经济失衡,现在就判断危险已经过去,将是愚蠢之举。另一方面,蹒跚走近悬崖边缘之后,欧元区各国政府(特别是德国)领会到了什么才是性命攸关的。欧元崩溃,欧盟(EU)也将随之崩溃。

巴罗佐及其同事最为轻信的是,认为欧盟可以从几年前止步的地方重新开始,与中美两大力量较量全球影响力。正如他们所说的,旅行队已经开拔!

这不应该怪罪(如果我们应该这么说的话)巴罗佐,甚至不是最近刚刚接受任命、饱受诟病的欧盟外交事务高级代表凯瑟琳•阿什顿(Catherine Ashton)。欧盟机构能够施加多少影响力,完全要看欧洲各国政府的赞助者允许它们发挥多少影响力。眼下,这种影响力并不是太多。

如果欧洲觉得自己变小了,那是因为欧盟主要成员国的地位明显下降了。当欧洲国家领导人自信满满时,他们会随时准备推介欧盟。而像现在这样,当他们陷入困境时,他们会寻找替罪羊——布鲁塞尔就是其中之一。

 

当然,法国永远不会放弃自己的国际权力。就在几天前,尼古拉•萨科齐(Nicolas Sarkozy)还宣称,法国明年出任20国集团(G20)主席国,将会为全球经济秩序彻底重建创造条件。事实上,法国宏伟抱负的拥护者,正在迅速减少。

英国新的联合政府似乎打算一声不吭地退出竞赛。首相戴维•卡梅伦(David Cameron)对海外兴趣不大。外交官们已变成了销售代表。卡梅伦正计划大力削减国内军力建设支出。当英国领导人开始将英联邦作为影响力的衡量标准,很显然,它们正在撤退。

德国以前试穿过强国的外衣。这一灼人经历留下的伤疤仍在。经济实力是一回事,但安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)的政府想要平静的生活。武力投射及扩大地缘政治影响,最好留给他人去做。

在本世纪头十年一份引人注目的外交与安全政策分析报告*中,诺贝尔研究所(Nobel Institute)学者阿什勒•托耶(Asle Toje)总结称,由于欧盟有限的影响力与法英德受到限制的权力并存,欧洲展示出了一个小国——或者更确切地说,一系列小国——的所有特征。

一些人会对此感到满足。尽管麻烦缠身,但欧洲拥有一个让世界其他大部分地区艳羡不已的社会与政治模式。僵化(Sclerosis)是相对的:欧洲人均收入仍是中国的10倍。而且在处理一些小的外交政策事务方面,欧洲可以表现得非常高效,尤其是与其邻国的外交事务。

树立一个榜样没什么错——政治学家称之为“规范性强权(normative power)”。在巴罗佐发表演讲之际,希拉里•克林顿(Hillary Clinton)制定了一项结盟策略,来应对权力天平的转变。这位美国国务卿记起了迪安•艾奇逊(Dean Acheson)的名言:“吸引他人支持的能力与支配他人的能力同等重要 ”。

美国政府的外交政策招致了许多批评——在国内,共和党人指责它对美国的敌人太过于手软;在国外,欧洲人抱怨巴拉克・奥巴马(Barack Obama)对他的朋友漫不经心。但希拉里提醒我们,华盛顿一直在认真思考世界将如何变化。美国已经研究出了一套如何将软硬实力相结合的理论。欧洲却似乎满足于白日做梦。

*《欧盟是小国》(The European Union as a Small Power);作者:阿什勒•托耶,Palgrave Macmillan出版,伦敦

译者/何黎

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034762

 

 

I was in Brussels this week. Jose Manuel Barroso had just delivered his state of the union address. The Commission president talked about Europe as a global player and leader. He called it a key ambition for this generation of politicians. My sense is of a continent slipping into a small-power future.

I was influenced perhaps by the event at which I was a guest. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a US think tank that has been spreading its wings to build a global presence, had assembled a group of its smartest scholars to talk about China.

This was not one of those drearily familiar sessions at which everyone trips over themselves trying to predict just how quickly China will elbow aside the US as the pre-eminent nation. Instead the exchanges were a reminder that power often lies in the eye of the beholder. China’s ascent often looks a lot faster and smoother to those on the outside than to the politicians and policymakers in Beijing grappling with the social stresses and strains of economic transformation.

That said, few doubt the direction of travel. The problem for Europe is that it gives every impression of being a bystander. The parallel that springs to mind is with Japan’s absence from the world stage. For all that it has recently been overtaken by China in global rankings, Japan remains an economic powerhouse. Yet it has long been more or less invisible in debates on world affairs, meekly accepting the role of a taker, rather than a shaper of change.

This leaves the US and China as the pivotal players in moulding the new global order – or, as it might turn out to be, disorder. A little while ago the most fashionable thesis evoked the prospect of a world in thrall to this G2. Decisions made and bargains struck in Beijing and Washington would be handed down to the rest of us as tablets of stone.

The idea was always fanciful. Status quo and revisionist powers have too many colliding interests. Much more plausible is that the eventual point of balance in the system – between multipolarity and multilateralism, competition and cooperation – will be determined by how effectively the US and China manage the inescapable frictions.

Mr Barroso has more reason to be sanguine than a few months ago. During the spring it seemed the euro would fracture under the pressure of heavily-indebted governments and nervous bond markets. Things have calmed down. Jean Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, has been telling the FT this week that the euro’s resilience was much underestimated.

Maybe. Given the combination of fiscal deficits and economic imbalances in the single currency area, it would be foolish to suggest the danger has passed. On the other hand, having staggered to the edge of the precipice, governments (especially Germany) have grasped just what is at stake. A broken euro would break the European Union.

Where Mr Barroso and his colleagues stretch credulity is in the assumption that the Union can pick up where it left off a few years ago, measuring its global influence against the two big players. The caravan, as they say, has moved on.

The blame - if that is what we should call it - does not rest with Mr Barroso, or indeed with the recently-appointed and much-criticised Catherine Ashton, the Union’s high representative for foreign affairs. The Brussels institutions can project only as much influence as their sponsors in national capitals allow them. For now, that is not very much.

If Europe feels small it is because the EU’s leading members are much diminished. When national leaders are confident, they are ready to promote the Union. When, as now, they are in trouble they look for scapegoats – Brussels is one of them.

 

France, of course, will never surrender its global pretensions. Only the other day Nicolas Sarkozy was explaining how his country’s presidency next year of the G20 nations would be the stage on which to unfurl a radical re-ordering of the global economic order. In reality, the audience for France’s grandiose initiatives has been shrinking fast.

Britain’s new coalition government seems intent on bowing out without so much as a whimper. David Cameron is not much interested in abroad. Diplomats have been turned into sales representatives. The prime minister is planning swingeing cuts in the country’s military capabilities. When British leaders fall back on the Commonwealth as a measure of influence, you know they are in retreat.

Germany has tried on the clothes of a great power once before. That searing experience still leaves its mark. Economic strength is one thing, but Angela Merkel’s government wants the quiet life. Power projection and geopolitical strutting are best left to others.

In a striking analysis* of foreign and security policy during the opening decade of the century, Asle Toje, a scholar at Norway’s Nobel Institute, concludes that Europe has been showing all the characteristics of a small power – or rather of a series of small powers as the limited influence of the Union co-exists with the constrained power of France, Britain, and Germany.

Some will be content with this. For all its troubles, Europe has a social and political model to be envied in much of the rest of the world. Sclerosis is relative: per capital incomes are still 10 times the level seen in China. And the Union can be diligently effective in doing small foreign policy things, notably in its own neighbourhood.

There is nothing wrong in setting an example - political scientists call it “normative power”. As Mr Barroso gave his address, Hillary Clinton was setting out an alliance-building approach to the shifting power balance. The secretary of state recalled the words of Dean Acheson: “The ability to evoke support from other” is “quite as important as the capacity to compel”.

The US adminstration’s foreign policy has drawn criticism – at home from Republicans arguing it is too soft on America’s enemies and, abroad, from Europeans complaining Barack Obama is inattentive towards his friends. But Mrs Clinton reminded us that Washington has been thinking hard about the world as it is becoming. The US has developed a theory about how to marry hard and soft power. Europe seems content with daydreams.

*The European Union as a Small Power. by Asle Toje, Palgrave Macmillan, London

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034762/en

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