过去的一年，欧元区一直存在一个令人非常头疼的争论：欧元区危机是否会催生出一个“德国的欧洲”？在欧洲大部分地区，这一争论仍未得出结论。但对中国的很多官员和分析人士来说，结论却是显而易见的。他们看到的是一个日趋强大的德国、一个受到削弱的法国、以及一个被边缘化的英国。
最近去北京访问的时候，一位中国官员告诉我们：“如果想在布鲁塞尔办成什么事，去趟柏林就行了。”
在很大程度上，欧中关系将取决于中德之间正在形成的“特殊关系”。去年6月，中国总理温家宝率13位部长访问德国并举行联合内阁会议，这标志着中德特殊关系上升到一个新的高度。
过去十年，中德贸易、特别是德国对华出口的迅猛增长，为这一政治关系奠定了基础。德国占欧洲对华出口的将近一半，占欧洲自华进口的将近四分之一。中国的汽车和机械需求则对德国迅速走出经济危机做出了重要贡献。
目前，中德两国经济之间存在一种共生关系：中国需要技术，德国需要市场。中国人认为德国可帮助他们走向经济发展的下一阶段，因而大谈“互利互惠”关系（尽管两国之间也存在潜在矛盾——随着中国沿价值链逐渐攀升，它带给德国的不止是市场，还包括竞争）。
2008年以来，中德这两个拥有高储蓄率和巨额盈余的出口国，在全球经济辩论中往往站在相同的立场上，并且一直受到美国的批评。中国一些分析人士认为，正在崛起为地区领袖的德国与正在崛起为世界领袖的中国之间存在相似之处。经济危机使得世人对两国的期望值都有所提高。
对欧洲来说，这一形成中的“特殊关系”既是一种机会也是一种风险。一方面，德国对华投资的规模使得欧洲对中国拥有更大的影响力。另一方面，德国将利用其与中国的密切关系来谋求自己的经济利益、而不是整个欧洲的战略利益。
对中国来说，提升对德关系的努力，发生在美国将重心转向亚洲的更宏大的战略背景下。去年3月，德国在联合国安理会(UN Security Council)对利比亚动武的表决中投了弃权票，此举受到中国的欢迎。在中国人看来，德国不愿动用武力的立场与他们自己奉行的不干涉原则存在某种吻合。中国想看到的是一个能够直面美国的欧洲，它或许认为，德国能助它实现这一愿景——换句话说，助它分裂西方。
目前，中国需要技术；这意味着，德国仍可对中国施加某种有限的影响。但德国官员明白，长期来看，德国自身没有足够的力量来影响一个拥有13.5亿人口的崛起中的超级大国。“归根结底，我们只有8000万人，而且还在不断减少，”一位德国官员说道。
德国一直在努力寻求确立统一的欧洲对华政策立场，但这一努力以失败告终，其中很重要的一个原因是德国的经济利益。一些德国官员现在很有挫败感（这可以理解），甚至开始怀疑欧盟对华采取共同立场的可行性。
无论是对德国还是对欧洲来说，这都是一种危险的局面。今年2月，也就是欧洲峰会之后和欧中峰会前夕，德国总理安哥拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)访问了中国。当时，她似乎是在代表欧洲与中国对话，这就让北京方面更加认为，柏林已取代了布鲁塞尔的位置。
德国决不能对欧洲采取共同立场与中国打交道丧失信心。而其他欧洲国家也必须尽快找到办法，帮助德国代表欧洲与中国建立友好关系。否则，当德中双边关系取代了正在萌芽期的欧中“战略合作伙伴关系”时，他们或许只能靠边站了。
本文的两位作者分别是欧洲对外关系委员会(European Council on Foreign Relations)的编辑主任和高级政策研究员
译者/王慧玲
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001044744
Over the past year there has been much agonised debate in the eurozone about whether a “German Europe” is emerging from the eurozone crisis. In much of Europe the jury is still out. But for many officials and analysts in China the conclusion is clear. They see a Germany that is increasingly powerful, a France that is weakened and a UK that is marginalised.
“If you want something done in Brussels,” a Chinese official told us on a recent visit to Beijing, “you go to Berlin”.
Europe’s relationship with Beijing will largely be determined by the emerging “special relationship” between China and Germany, which was upgraded to a new level last June when Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, travelled to Berlin with 13 ministers and held a joint cabinet meeting.
The basis for this political relationship is the explosion in trade between China and Germany over the past decade and in particular German exports to China. Nearly half of all EU exports to China come from Germany, while nearly a quarter of all EU imports from China are destined for Germany. Demand from China for automobiles and machinery played a big part in Germany bouncing back from the economic crisis so quickly.
At the moment there is a type of symbiosis between the Chinese and German economies: China needs technology and Germany needs a market. The Chinese think Germany can help them move to the next stage of their economic development and talk about a “mutually beneficial” relationship (though there is also potential for conflict as China moves up the value chain and provides not just a market but also competition for Germany).
Since 2008, China and Germany, both exporters with high levels of savings and surpluses, have often been on the same side in debates about the global economy and have been criticised by the US. Some Chinese analysts see parallels between emerging German leadership at a regional level and emerging Chinese leadership at a global level. The economic crisis has raised the world’s expectations of both countries.
This emerging “special relationship” is both an opportunity and a danger for Europe. On the one hand, the scale of German investment could give Europe greater leverage over China. On the other hand there is a risk that Germany will use its close relationship with China to pursue its own economic interests rather than Europe’s strategic interests.
For China, the upgrading of the relationship with Germany takes place in the larger strategic context of the US pivot towards Asia. The Chinese welcomed Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council on the use of military force in Libya last March – which they see as indicative of an overlap between Germany’s reluctance to use military force and their own principle of non-interference. China wants a Europe that is prepared to stand up to the US and may see Germany as a way of achieving that goal – in other words as a way of splitting the west.
At the moment, China’s need for technology means that Germany still has some limited leverage. But German officials are aware that, in the long term, they do not have sufficient weight on their own to influence an emerging superpower with a population of 1.35bn. “In the end we’re 80m and shrinking,” says one German official.
Not least because of its economic interests, Germany has tried hard to develop a comprehensive European approach to China, but this came to nothing. Some German officials are now understandably frustrated and sceptical about the possibility of a common EU approach to China.
This is a dangerous situation for both Germany and Europe. When Chancellor Angela Merkel visited China in February – after the European summit and right before the EU-China summit – she appeared to speak for Europe, which reinforced the impression that Berlin had replaced Brussels in Beijing.
Germany must not give up on a European approach to China. But the rest of Europe must also urgently find ways to help Germany be a good European in its relationship with China – or risk being cut out of the loop as Germany’s bilateral relationship with China replaces Europe’s embryonic “strategic partnership” with China.
The writers are the editorial director and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
没有评论:
发表评论