面
对日益强势的中国，美国开始向印度敞开怀抱。和美国一样，印度是一个民主国家，一个开放的、多元化的社会。华盛顿的军事决策者不像对中美冲突那样担心和印度的战争。服务业发达的印度经济也不像中国的制造业巨人一样对美国构成挑战。
Cambridge University Press
别急着下结论──这是新书《中国和印度的战略行为》（Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior）的观点。该书作者为某国际能源公司驻中国首席代表吉尔博伊（George Gilboy）和兰德公司（RAND Corporation）高级政治科学家赫金博瑟姆（Eric Heginbotham），该书认为，认为印度处于华盛顿决策圈内的乐观看法可能只是种幻想，这种看法更多地源于美国对中国的不安全感，而非基于对印度实打实的评估。两位作者认为，如果不再通过中国这面棱镜看印度，那么情况就会大相径庭。在从贸易投资到伊朗及武器扩散的很多对华盛顿至关重要的问题上，印度的看法与中国惊人的相似。
该书的一大要点是：印度不仅不是对中国的"制衡力"，它的崛起对华盛顿可能还意味着"双重麻烦"。《华尔街日报》中国主编班安祖（Andrew Browne）近期与两位作者进行了访谈。以下是编辑后的访谈摘录：
《华尔街日报》：是什么促使你们写这本书的？
吉尔博伊：写这本书的初衷是想了解中国和印度力量的崛起对美国的利益意味着什么。人们总是有这么一种印象：中国正成为一个不可避免的挑战者和潜在敌人，印度正成为一个天然同盟。这种看法有待调查研究，一个方法就是问有关这两个国家的同样的问题。
赫金博瑟姆：如果你只是问"中国何以是挑战者？"和"印度能帮上什么忙？"，那么就不可能了解到这两个国家的另一面。我们的真正目的是以结构化的方式提出同样的问题，并对实际行为的经验数据进行研究。
《华尔街日报》：那结论是什么呢？
赫金博瑟姆：我们的主要结论是，这两个国家的崛起对我们可能意味着双重麻烦。两国都会对美国构成挑战。与此同时，在很多不同的问题上我们都将能够与两国合作。这是一种更为复杂的局面──比我们以为普遍公认的局面要微妙得多。
吉尔博伊：中国和印度都有可能针对争议地区提出领土和领海要求，他们也都有可能在国际争端中使用武力，他们的军力在GDP中的比重也基本相当。两国都有突出的领土和政治争端，不仅隐藏在领土问题中，还隐藏在国家合法性和国家认同的问题当中：中国的台湾问题，印度的克什米尔问题。所以两国的问题都很难解决。造成的一个结果就是，两国都在联合国及其他安全机构争取将一个议题列入议事议程，即国家主权的严格解释以及对不干预他国事务原则的保护。这有助于我们理解为何印度在从利比亚到叙利亚到伊朗的所有问题上都是这样一个不情不愿的盟友。印度也坚定地认为西方不应对这些国家进行军事干预。
赫金博瑟姆：对主权的严格解释不是一个学术问题──它有实实在在的后果。我们看了联合国的投票记录，发现印度和中国对伊朗、苏丹、缅甸和大规模杀伤性武器问题的看法有着高度的趋同性。在这些对美国至关重要的问题上，中国和印度的立场十分接近。
《华尔街日报》：那你们怎么看"民主国家是更好的合作伙伴"这种说法？
赫金博瑟姆：显然这取决于看问题的角度，但现实主义对国际关系的看法是，国家追求各自的利益，这与它们是否是民主国家无关。在冷战期间，民主的印度经常与苏联结盟，而中国时常跟美国合作以制衡苏联。
吉尔博伊：在国际关系文献中，有很少的一部分人认为民主国家之间不会打仗。但问题在于，有些决策者似乎将这种"民主国家不会起内讧"的说法进行了衍伸，变成了即便民主制度迥异，地区和战略形势有着巨大差异，民主国家也会以同样的方式看待世界。这是一个应该仔细考量的问题，真的是这样吗？
《华尔街日报》：你们如何看待印度和中国的军事政策？
吉尔博伊：和大多数现代军队一样，他们都强调防卫。但中国有一个高度集权化的单一机构──中央军委──负责管理军事政策和对中国军事战略政策赋予强大的战略凝聚力。印度则更多元化。印度文职政府对军队有着很强的控制力，但军队本身会追求并发展他们自己的军事学说和自己的现代化要务。
《华尔街日报》：中国和印度存在闹不和的危险吗？
赫金博瑟姆：在安全方面存在一种对抗情绪。在印度感受要强烈得多，但这种情绪也正在中国滋生。有人认为中国和印度之间的紧张会牵制中国从而使美国受益，但对抗也会有消极影响。在核武器和导弹领域，我们看到印度正在向前冲，现在两国都在说要发展多弹头（MIRVS）。两国在导弹防御方面至少都有研发。核问题对两国来说都越来越重要。目前世界还没出现多边的核动态，也没有看到在多边基础上解决核问题的必要性。在这方面的对立有可能会严重影响美国战略核武器控制的努力。
吉尔博伊：中国是一个力量强得多的军事大国；中国经济规模是印度的四倍左右。两国存在一个难以解决的边境争端。他们在海洋安全方面的看法也存在分歧，特别是在印度洋。但总的来说，中国和印度都希望互相保持良好关系，而且我认为，两国都很清楚他们有着一些共同的重要诉求。其中包括在国际机构和组织赢得更大的影响力，以及在弱化美国过强的力量方面获得共识。
《华尔街日报》：贸易和投资方面呢？
吉尔博伊：美国和中国的贸易规模是和印度贸易的十倍，尽管美印贸易正在迅速增长。这表明存在更大的共同利益。当我们研究这些国家存在的贸易争端类型时，我们发现在世界贸易组织（WTO），尽管中国的贸易规模是印度的四到五倍，但两国却在WTO面临着相同数量的贸易投诉，投诉类型也差不多：市场准入和倾销案。两国的知识产权损失与其经济规模基本成正比。在直接投资方面，如果查看世界银行（World Bank）的调查，你会发现两国都有严重的问题，比如在合约执行方面。两国国内都有严重的腐败问题。在合约执行和腐败问题上，中国排得比印度略微靠前。所以让我们好好想想，如果我们在两个国家面临相似的挑战，随着美国与印度关系的加深，也许这些问题的严重程度也会加深。这就又回到了前述的双重麻烦的问题了。
我们研究了各国与流氓政权的对外投资和能源投资。结果发现，在我们能确认的那些所谓的流氓政权──伊朗、苏丹、叙利亚、缅甸、古巴──都有印度公司和中国人。这是类似于国家主导投资的模式，国有企业以国家外交和部长级访问为后盾进行访问，直接或间接地仰仗国家融资。所以根本就不存在什么真正的分歧。
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
Faced with an increasingly assertive China, the United States is embracing India.
Like America, India is a democracy -- an open, pluralistic society. Military planners in Washington don't spend time fretting about war with India, the way they do about conflict with China. India's economy, with its vibrant services sector, doesn't pose nearly the same the challenge to the U.S. as China's manufacturing juggernaut.
In short, to U.S. policy-makers worried about the long-term threat from China, India looks like a useful counterbalance.
Not so fast, says a newly published book by George Gilboy, the chief representative of an international energy firm in China and Eric Heginbotham, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. 'Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior' argues that the benign view of India in Washington policy-making circles may be an illusion, rooted more in U.S. insecurity about China than a hard-nosed assessment of India. When you stop looking at India through the prism of China, the authors argue, the picture looks very different. On many issues of key concern to Washington, from trade and investment to Iran and arms proliferation, India's view of the view of the world is strikingly similar to China's.
One of the book's big takeaways: Far from being a 'balancer' to China, the rise of India could mean 'double trouble' for Washington. The Wall Street Journal's China editor Andrew Browne recently sat down with the authors. Edited excerpts below:
What motivated you to write this book?
Gilboy: The original objective is really to understand what rising Chinese and Indian power means for U.S. interests. There's an impression out there that China is emerging as an inevitable challenger and potential enemy, and India is emerging as a natural ally. And that ought to be investigated, in part by just asking the same question of each power.
Heginbotham: When you just ask 'How is China a challenger?' and 'How might India help?' you're not likely to get the reverse of the coin on either one of those countries. The real purpose here was to ask the same questions in a structured way and look at the empirical data on actual behavior.
So what's the conclusion?
Heginbotham: The punchline here is that what we may be facing with the rise of these two powers is double-trouble. Both are going to present challenges to the United States. At the same time, we'll be able to partner with both of them on various issues. It's a much more mixed bag -- a much more nuanced picture than we think is generally recognized.
Gilboy: Both China and India are equally likely to pursue their territorial and maritime claims over disputed areas, they're equally likely to use force in international disputes, and they spend roughly the same share of GDP on military power. Both of them have an outstanding territorial and political dispute that's wrapped up not only in territorial questions but also questions of state legitimacy in both countries, and also of national identity: Taiwan for China; Kashmir for India. So they're equally difficult to resolve. Partly as a result, both pursue a common agenda at the U.N. and other security bodies.a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and a protection of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. This helps us understand why India is such a reluctant ally on questions all the way from Libya to Syria to Iran. India is just as committed to this idea of not having Western military interventions in these states.
Heginbotham: The strict interpretation of sovereignty isn't an academic issue -- it has real consequences. We looked at UN voting records and there's a very high level of convergence between Indian and China on Iran, Sudan, Burma, WMD issues. On these issues of importance to the U.S., the Chinese and Indian positions are very close.
What about the argument that democracies make better partners?
Heginbotham: Obviously that depends on perspective, but the realist view on international relations is that states pursue their interests, and that's irrespective of whether they're democracies. During the Cold War democratic India often aligned with the Soviet Union while China sometimes cooperated with the U.S. in balancing the Soviets.
Gilboy: There is a very limited idea out there in the international relations literature about how democracies don't fight wars with each other. But the problem is that some policymakers seem to extend that 'democracies don't fight each other' claim into another argument, which is that democracies are going to see the world in the same way even if they are very different democracies and in very different regional and strategic circumstances. That's a question that ought to be asked. Is it true?
How do you compare Indian and Chinese military doctrine?
Gilboy: They both emphasize offense, like most modern militaries. But in China you have a single, strong centralized institution -- the Central Military Commission -- that governs military policy and imposes a great deal of strategic cohesion on Chinese military and strategic policies. In India there is much more diversity. There's a very strong civilian control of the military, but the military services themselves pursue and develop their own military doctrines and their own modernization priorities.
Is there a risk of a blow-up between China and India?
Heginbotham: There is an active rivalry on the security side. It's felt a lot more keenly in India although the sentiment is growing in China as well. Some people think China-India tensions could benefit the U.S. by constraining China, but rivalry can also have negative effects. In the nuclear and missile arena, we see India charging ahead, and now both countries are talking about developing MIRVS (multiple warheads). Both have at least some R&D on missile defense. The nuclear issue is becoming more important to both. The world has not seen a situation where you have multilateral nuclear dynamics and the need to address nuclear issues on a multilateral basis. Rivalry in that realm has the potential to severely complicate U.S. strategic arms control efforts.
Gilboy: China is a much more powerful military power; the Chinese economy is about four times the size of India. There is a border dispute that is difficult to resolve. They also have some divergence of ideas over maritime security, particularly in the Indian Ocean. But overall both China and India want good relations with each other and both of them, I think, are pretty clear that they have some important agenda items in common. These include gaining more influence in international bodies and institutions and common views on diluting what they see as the excesses of U.S. power.
What about trade and investment?
Gilboy: U.S. trade with China is ten times its trade with India, although India trade is growing rapidly. That is an indicator of much greater mutual interest. When we looked at the kinds of trade disputes these countries have, we found that at the WTO, even though China's trade is four to five times larger than India's trade, they face about the same number of trade complaints at the WTO and they are on the same kind of issues: market access, dumping cases. IPR losses in the two countries are roughly proportional to the size of their economies. On direct investment, both countries, if you look at surveys from the World Bank, have serious problems with contract enforcement, for instance.They both have very serious problems domestically with corruption. On enforcement of contracts and corruption, China is ranked slightly ahead of India. So, hang on a second, if we face similar challenges in both countries, as the U.S. relationship with India grows in size, perhaps the significance of those problems will grow as well. That leads you back to the double trouble thing.
We looked at outward investment and energy investment with rogue regimes. It turns out that in all of the so-called rogue regimes that you can identify -- Iran, Sudan, Syria, Myanmar, Cuba -- India companies are there with the Chinese. It's a similar pattern of state-led investment where state-owned companies are doing the visits, backed by state diplomacy and ministerial visits, and backed directly or indirectly by state financing. So there's no real divergence there.
Like America, India is a democracy -- an open, pluralistic society. Military planners in Washington don't spend time fretting about war with India, the way they do about conflict with China. India's economy, with its vibrant services sector, doesn't pose nearly the same the challenge to the U.S. as China's manufacturing juggernaut.
In short, to U.S. policy-makers worried about the long-term threat from China, India looks like a useful counterbalance.
Not so fast, says a newly published book by George Gilboy, the chief representative of an international energy firm in China and Eric Heginbotham, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. 'Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior' argues that the benign view of India in Washington policy-making circles may be an illusion, rooted more in U.S. insecurity about China than a hard-nosed assessment of India. When you stop looking at India through the prism of China, the authors argue, the picture looks very different. On many issues of key concern to Washington, from trade and investment to Iran and arms proliferation, India's view of the view of the world is strikingly similar to China's.
One of the book's big takeaways: Far from being a 'balancer' to China, the rise of India could mean 'double trouble' for Washington. The Wall Street Journal's China editor Andrew Browne recently sat down with the authors. Edited excerpts below:
What motivated you to write this book?
Gilboy: The original objective is really to understand what rising Chinese and Indian power means for U.S. interests. There's an impression out there that China is emerging as an inevitable challenger and potential enemy, and India is emerging as a natural ally. And that ought to be investigated, in part by just asking the same question of each power.
Heginbotham: When you just ask 'How is China a challenger?' and 'How might India help?' you're not likely to get the reverse of the coin on either one of those countries. The real purpose here was to ask the same questions in a structured way and look at the empirical data on actual behavior.
So what's the conclusion?
Heginbotham: The punchline here is that what we may be facing with the rise of these two powers is double-trouble. Both are going to present challenges to the United States. At the same time, we'll be able to partner with both of them on various issues. It's a much more mixed bag -- a much more nuanced picture than we think is generally recognized.
Gilboy: Both China and India are equally likely to pursue their territorial and maritime claims over disputed areas, they're equally likely to use force in international disputes, and they spend roughly the same share of GDP on military power. Both of them have an outstanding territorial and political dispute that's wrapped up not only in territorial questions but also questions of state legitimacy in both countries, and also of national identity: Taiwan for China; Kashmir for India. So they're equally difficult to resolve. Partly as a result, both pursue a common agenda at the U.N. and other security bodies.a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and a protection of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. This helps us understand why India is such a reluctant ally on questions all the way from Libya to Syria to Iran. India is just as committed to this idea of not having Western military interventions in these states.
Heginbotham: The strict interpretation of sovereignty isn't an academic issue -- it has real consequences. We looked at UN voting records and there's a very high level of convergence between Indian and China on Iran, Sudan, Burma, WMD issues. On these issues of importance to the U.S., the Chinese and Indian positions are very close.
What about the argument that democracies make better partners?
Heginbotham: Obviously that depends on perspective, but the realist view on international relations is that states pursue their interests, and that's irrespective of whether they're democracies. During the Cold War democratic India often aligned with the Soviet Union while China sometimes cooperated with the U.S. in balancing the Soviets.
Gilboy: There is a very limited idea out there in the international relations literature about how democracies don't fight wars with each other. But the problem is that some policymakers seem to extend that 'democracies don't fight each other' claim into another argument, which is that democracies are going to see the world in the same way even if they are very different democracies and in very different regional and strategic circumstances. That's a question that ought to be asked. Is it true?
How do you compare Indian and Chinese military doctrine?
Gilboy: They both emphasize offense, like most modern militaries. But in China you have a single, strong centralized institution -- the Central Military Commission -- that governs military policy and imposes a great deal of strategic cohesion on Chinese military and strategic policies. In India there is much more diversity. There's a very strong civilian control of the military, but the military services themselves pursue and develop their own military doctrines and their own modernization priorities.
Is there a risk of a blow-up between China and India?
Heginbotham: There is an active rivalry on the security side. It's felt a lot more keenly in India although the sentiment is growing in China as well. Some people think China-India tensions could benefit the U.S. by constraining China, but rivalry can also have negative effects. In the nuclear and missile arena, we see India charging ahead, and now both countries are talking about developing MIRVS (multiple warheads). Both have at least some R&D on missile defense. The nuclear issue is becoming more important to both. The world has not seen a situation where you have multilateral nuclear dynamics and the need to address nuclear issues on a multilateral basis. Rivalry in that realm has the potential to severely complicate U.S. strategic arms control efforts.
Gilboy: China is a much more powerful military power; the Chinese economy is about four times the size of India. There is a border dispute that is difficult to resolve. They also have some divergence of ideas over maritime security, particularly in the Indian Ocean. But overall both China and India want good relations with each other and both of them, I think, are pretty clear that they have some important agenda items in common. These include gaining more influence in international bodies and institutions and common views on diluting what they see as the excesses of U.S. power.
What about trade and investment?
Gilboy: U.S. trade with China is ten times its trade with India, although India trade is growing rapidly. That is an indicator of much greater mutual interest. When we looked at the kinds of trade disputes these countries have, we found that at the WTO, even though China's trade is four to five times larger than India's trade, they face about the same number of trade complaints at the WTO and they are on the same kind of issues: market access, dumping cases. IPR losses in the two countries are roughly proportional to the size of their economies. On direct investment, both countries, if you look at surveys from the World Bank, have serious problems with contract enforcement, for instance.They both have very serious problems domestically with corruption. On enforcement of contracts and corruption, China is ranked slightly ahead of India. So, hang on a second, if we face similar challenges in both countries, as the U.S. relationship with India grows in size, perhaps the significance of those problems will grow as well. That leads you back to the double trouble thing.
We looked at outward investment and energy investment with rogue regimes. It turns out that in all of the so-called rogue regimes that you can identify -- Iran, Sudan, Syria, Myanmar, Cuba -- India companies are there with the Chinese. It's a similar pattern of state-led investment where state-owned companies are doing the visits, backed by state diplomacy and ministerial visits, and backed directly or indirectly by state financing. So there's no real divergence there.
没有评论:
发表评论