上周末，八国集团(G8)领导人发表了一份声明，对石油市场出现供应中断的可能性发出悲观警告。显然，他们误解了这个市场，因为这份声明根本没有抓住重点。
鉴于西半球非常规油气资源的新发现，供应中断的威胁实际上在减弱。这些发现将降低价格和供应的波动性。它们还将“重置”并极大地改善国际关系。石油输出国组织（Opec，简称欧佩克）这个卡特尔组织的日子已经屈指可数。局势动荡的石油国家——从伊拉克到委内瑞拉——将被边缘化。G8发布的有关石油的声明本应是乐观的。
科技带来了能源供应革命。先进的地震技术和复杂的钻探方法开启了以前不为人知或无法获取的矿藏。因此，美国现在的天然气供应可以维持100年。在石油方面，美国、加拿大、巴西可能还包括墨西哥的产量预计都将大幅增长。所有这些国家在未来20年可能会位居全球七大能源生产国之列。西方世界的石油产量自1952年以来首次有望满足需求。
这将为更稳定的油气市场的形成做好准备。市场将变得更庞大、更深化、更稳固。地缘政治因素造成的供应中断将不会再产生那么大的影响，而且将变得不那么普遍。石油禁运将不会像1973年阿拉伯国家或1979年伊朗实施的禁运那样造成严重破坏。国内冲突（如在伊拉克和利比亚发生的冲突）引发的石油产量下降也将不至于产生严重后果。简单来说，稳定产油国的名单将变得更长，这将让任何一个流氓国家的影响变得更为有限。
石油市场深化也应意味着，中长期而言，日常价格波动将降低。毕竟，石油在交易中日益具有金融工具的特征，而全球最具深度的金融市场（例如美国国债）往往波动性最小。此外，交易员成功操纵市场的可能性将因为能源市场的巨大规模而减小。
这种从供应层面解决问题的方式，还将推动全球政治秩序重组和改善。首先，随着中东产油国的实力和重要性达到顶峰并走上下坡路，该地区在地缘政治中的核心地位将会减弱。一、二十年后，伊拉克的石油日产量是否会达到100万桶的意义并不大。只有沙特阿拉伯的石油产出将不可或缺。欧佩克作为一个卡特尔组织（已在衰落）的想法将走向尾声。这将导致该地区的安全部署出现变化。
美国长期以来部署在海湾地区的军力（一直具有争议）将减弱。美国政府在那里的唯一优先事务将是沙特阿拉伯和以色列的稳定，这两个国家都已高度军事化。另外，美国政府今后的预算紧缩将支持削减这样的国防支出。
其次，俄罗斯等其它渴望获得权力的石油国家在全球的影响力也将减弱。西方国家和印尼等国石油产量的不断飙升，将导致这些国家被边缘化。例如，随着美国成为液化天然气出口国，俄罗斯切断对欧洲能源供应的能力将减弱。这一点，再加上俄罗斯人口不断减少且经济疲弱，将让俄罗斯进一步衰落。
第三，美国能源政策将越来越着重于在西半球的关系。特别的，巴西可能会成为全球最强大的经济和金融参与者之一。这种着重很有可能会在整个美洲地区促成一个自由贸易区。
第四，中国将受到很大影响。中国的石油日进口量预计将从400万桶增至1200万桶。中国80%的能源需求可能最终不得不依靠进口。但中国已是中东和非洲石油的最大客户，这些地区一直不稳定。随着西方对中东的保护减弱，中国将承继美国留下的脆弱性。
二战后，西方曾在能源生产方面引领世界。随着西方石油生产陷入停滞，这种状况消失了。西方的消费量飙升，中东的产量增加，不稳定性也随之而来。能源从东方向西方输出。如今，这种流动即将逆转，市场将会改善，G8应该感到高兴。
本文作者是Evercore Partners的董事长、前美国财政部副部长
译者/梁艳裳
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001044696
Last weekend the leaders of the G8 issued a statement warning darkly of oil market disruptions. Apparently, they misunderstand this market because their statement missed the point by a wide margin.
The threat of disruptions is actually diminishing, given new finds of unconventional oil and gas in the western hemisphere. These discoveries will reduce price and supply volatility. They will also reset and profoundly improve international relations. The days of Opec, the oil producers’ cartel, are numbered. Unstable oil states, from Iraq to Venezuela, will be marginalised. The G8 statement on oil should have been optimistic.
Technology has led to a revolution in energy supply. Advanced seismic techniques and complex drilling methods have opened previously unknown or inaccessible deposits. As a result, the US now has a 100-year supply of natural gas. On the oil side, production in the US, Canada, Brazil and possibly Mexico is projected to grow sharply. All of these nations might rank among the world’s seven largest energy producers within the next 20 years. Oil production could match consumption across the western world for the first time since 1952.
This will provide for more stable oil and gas markets. They will become larger, deeper and less vulnerable. Geopolitically driven disruptions will have less impact and will be less common. No embargo, such as the one that Arab states imposed in 1973 or Iran enforced in 1979, will be severely disruptive. Nor will output losses triggered by conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Libya, have such effects. Put simply, the list of stable producers will be longer, making the impact of any rogue state more limited.
Deeper oil markets should also mean less day-to-day price volatility over the medium to long term. After all, oil is increasingly traded like a financial instrument, and the world’s deepest financial markets, such as US Treasury bonds, tend to exhibit the least volatility. Further, the potential for traders to engage successfully in manipulative behaviour will be diminished by the sheer size of the energy markets.
This supply resolution will also realign the global political order for the better. First, the geopolitical centrality of the Middle East will wane. That is because the power and relevance of its oil producers have peaked and are heading down. Whether Iraq is producing a million barrels of oil more or less is not going to mean much in 10 or 20 years. Only Saudi Arabia’s output will be indispensable. The idea of Opec as a cartel, already fading, will be over. This will lead to different security arrangements in the region.
The longstanding US military presence in the Gulf, always a lightning rod, will be reduced. Washington’s only remaining priorities there will be the stability of Saudi Arabia and Israel, both already heavily militarised. Moreover, the coming budget austerity in Washington will support such defence cuts.
Second, the global leverage of other power-hungry oil states, such as Russia, will also weaken. These nations will be marginalised by surging oil production in the west and in countries such as Indonesia. For example, Russia’s capacity to shut off energy supplies to Europe will diminish as America becomes an exporter of liquefied natural gas. This, together with its falling population and weak economy, will put Russia into further decline.
Third, US energy policy will increasingly be preoccupied with relations in the western hemisphere. Brazil, in particular, may emerge as one of the world’s strongest economic and financial players. This focus could well result in a free-trade zone throughout the Americas.
Fourth, the implications for China are serious. Its oil imports are projected to rise from 4m barrels a day to 12m b/d. The country may eventually have to import 80 per cent of its energy. But China is already the biggest customer for Middle Eastern and African oil and historically these have been unstable regions. As western protection for the Middle East diminishes, China will step into the vulnerability that the US is leaving behind.
After the second world war the west led the world in energy production. That disappeared as the west’s production stagnated. Its consumption soared and Middle East production rose, bringing instability along with it. Exports flowed from east to west. Now this flow is reversing, markets will improve and the G8 should be cheering.
The writer is chairman of Evercore Partners and a former US deputy Treasury secretary
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