原
重庆市委书记薄熙来颜面尽失地下台之后，中国西南大都市重庆的经济被外界放到"显微镜"下仔细研究。从2007年至今年3月，薄熙来曾主政重庆。2011年重庆GDP超过人民币1万亿元（约合1,585亿美元），这意味着重庆经济在全国经济总量中的占比刚刚超过2%。但庞大的人口数量（最近一次统计数据显示重庆人口超过2,900万人）以及重庆作为中国西部门户的战略地位都让这座城市显得特别重要。
那么重庆经济是如何运转的？人们在谈到"重庆模式"时到底想表达什么意思？以下为回答这些问题的图表数据：
薄熙来主政重庆的五年时间，重庆GDP年均增速达到15.8%，同期中国经济年均增速仅有10.5%。就算这一数据可能被地方政府部分夸大，但这一增速还是给人留下了深刻印象。
工业在其中起到了突出作用，其在经济产出中的占比达到55%，高于全国平均水平47%。服务业所占比重则被挤占，其在产出中占比仅有36%，而全国平均水平为43%。
重庆经济也开始向投资倾斜。从2002年到2010年，固定资产投资年均增幅为28%。
而从固定资产投资在总产出中的占比看，2010年这一比例达到84%，高于薄熙来到重庆主政前一年62%的比例，远远高于66%的全国平均水平。
分析师担心，重庆经济过度向工业和投资倾斜意味着较高的环境成本，以及资本配置不当所造成的浪费。这令经济的快速增长难以为继。
不断改善的基础设施、较低的工资水平以及政府的实干精神吸引了鸿海精密工业股份有限公司(Hon Hai Precision Industry)、福特汽车(Ford Motor)以及领先的化工企业巴斯夫(BASF)等主要制造类企业。
2011重庆出口同比增幅超过160%，而全国增幅只有20%。
2010年重庆的年均工资水平约为人民币3.47万元，接近沿海制造业枢纽广州2005年的水平，这增加了重庆在成本意识强烈的出口企业眼中的吸引力。
农民的土地权以及为农村移民提供城市教育、医疗保健和养老金的措施加快了城市化进程。重庆市政府的数据显示，在重庆2,920万人口中，目前有1,610万人为城市居民。
米勒(Tom Miller)是一本即将出版的新书的作者，该书主要讨论中国城市化进程。他说重庆为城市化所付出的种种努力可谓是中国国内户籍制度（也被称为"户口"）改革最雄心勃勃的代表。
而在保障房建设一事上，重庆也位居国内前列。重庆计划在2012年开工建设1,350万平方米的保障房，这样重庆政府离4,000万平方米保障房的建设目标又近了一步。
公共服务支出增长迅速。薄熙来主政前一年，教育支出在GDP中占比仅为2.3%，2011年这一比例上升至3.2%。
到目前为止，拉动重庆经济增长的主要是工业和投资。但随着时间的推移，随着城市化住房政策和公共服务政策逐渐发挥效果，居民收入应该会随之上升，从而拉高消费水平。
投资和经济高速增长的背后是不断上升的债务水平。银行贷款激增，未偿还银行贷款占GDP的比例从2006年的112%上升至2011年的131%。
重庆高速公路集团(Chongqing Expressway Group)和重庆市水利投资(集团)有限公司(Chongqing Water Investment)等重庆政府拥有的投融资平台对重庆的发展非常关键，这些平台因为重庆基础设施建设提供资金而积累了大量债务。
而政府在平衡资产负债表另一侧的资产规模的同时还能继续推动经济快速增长，这意味着政府的偿债能力不太可能成为问题。但薄熙来下台后有关部门打算开始清理投资项目。
今年4月，重庆农村商业银行股份有限公司(Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank)的股价曾在两天内暴跌14%，原因是投资者担心该行的信贷质量存在风险。
政府对重庆楼市投机现象的打击意味着房产销售速度已经放缓，房价开始回调。今年3月重庆房价同比下降约3%，这和全国趋势一致。
瑞信(Credit Suisse)地产业分析师杜劲松说，最近在和重庆地产开发商交流探讨之后他发现，今年3月全国人大会议召开后房地产销售速度可能已经下降。
房地产销售速度下滑以及房价下跌降低了土地出让价格，今年3月土地出让价格同比下跌48%。对于重庆市政府下面的投资平台而言，这可能是一个坏消息，因为投资平台将土地作为抵押向银行申请贷款。
经济快速增长以及革新的社会政策令薄熙来受到重庆当地民众的欢迎。在薄熙来下台后，重庆经济能否维持快速增长，社会政策是否又能得以延续还有待观察。
Tom Orlik
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
The fall of disgraced former Communist Party high-flier Bo Xilai has put the economy of Chongqing, the southwestern mega-city he ruled from 2007 until March this year, under the microscope.
A gross domestic product that nudged past 1 trillion yuan ($158.5 billion) in 2011 means Chongqing's economy accounts for just over 2% of the national total. But a massive population (more than 29 million at last count) and strategic position as gateway to China's west give it an outsize importance.
So just how does Chongqing's economy work? And what do people mean when they talk about a 'Chongqing model?' Here are the charts:
In the five years when Mr. Bo held the reigns, Chongqing's GDP growth sizzled at an average 15.8%, compared to 10.5% for China as a whole. Even accounting for a bit of local exaggeration in the data, that's impressive.
Industry plays an outsize role, accounting for 55% of output, compared to 47% nationally. Services have been squeezed out, accounting for 36% of the total compared to 43% nationally.
The economy is also slanted toward investment. From 2002 to 2010, growth in fixed asset investment averaged 28% a year.
As a percentage of total output, it came in at 84% in 2010, up from 62% the year before Mr. Bo arrived, and far higher than the national figure of 66%.
Analysts fear that an extreme tilt toward industry and investment in the economy means high environmental costs, and wasteful misallocation of capital -- making rapid growth difficult to sustain.
Improving infrastructure, low wages, and a can-do attitude from the government attracted major manufacturers like Hon Hai Precision Industry, Ford Motor and leading chemical company BASF.
Exports soared more than 160% year-to-year in 2011, compared to 20% growth for China as a whole.
Average wages around 34,700 yuan a year in 2010 were close to those found in the coastal manufacturing hub of Guangzhou back in 2005 -- increasing the appeal of Chongqing for cost conscious exporters.
Land rights for farmers, and access to urban education, healthcare and pensions for rural migrants, accelerated the pace of urbanization. According to the Chongqing government, 16.1 million of the municipality's 29.2 million residents are now urbanites.
Tom Miller, author of a forthcoming book on China's Urban Billion, said Chongqing efforts to urbanize represent the most ambitious reform of the residence system -- known as the hukou - taking place anywhere in the country.
Chongqing was also the forefront of national efforts to build affordable housing. Plans to start 13.5 million square meters of housing in 2012 will take the government toward its 40 million square meter target.
Spending on public services rose rapidly. The year before Bo Xilai took charge, spending on education was 2.3% of GDP. In 2011, it was 3.2%.
Chongqing's growth so far has been driven by industry and investment. But over time, progressive policies on urbanization housing, and public services should raise household income -- and drive higher consumption.
Behind high levels of investment and growth lay rising debts. Bank lending surged. The ratio of outstanding bank loans to GDP rose to 131% in 2011 from 112% in 2006.
Government owned investment vehicles like Chongqing Expressway Group and Chongqing Water Investment were central to the city's development, and amassed significant liabilities funding the build out of the city's infrastructure.
Matching assets on the other side of the balance sheet, and continued rapid growth, mean solvency is unlikely to be an issue, but after Mr. Bo's exit authorities are looking to cleanup investment projects.
Shares in Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank plummeted 14% in two days in April as investors feared fall out for the major local lender.
A crackdown on speculators in Chongqing's property market means sales have slowed, and prices have started to correct, down around 3% year-on-year in March -- in line with the national trend.
Du Jinsong, property analyst at Credit Suisse, says his recent visit and discussions with developers in Chongqing suggest property sales may have fallen after the meeting of the National People's Congress in late March.
Slower property sales and lower prices have dented land prices, which are down 48% year-to-year in March. That could be bad news for the city investment vehicles, which use land as collateral for their loans.
Rapid growth and progressive social policies made Mr. Bo popular with the Chongqing locals. How long either will stay in place after his departure, remains to be seen.
Tom Orlik
A gross domestic product that nudged past 1 trillion yuan ($158.5 billion) in 2011 means Chongqing's economy accounts for just over 2% of the national total. But a massive population (more than 29 million at last count) and strategic position as gateway to China's west give it an outsize importance.
So just how does Chongqing's economy work? And what do people mean when they talk about a 'Chongqing model?' Here are the charts:
In the five years when Mr. Bo held the reigns, Chongqing's GDP growth sizzled at an average 15.8%, compared to 10.5% for China as a whole. Even accounting for a bit of local exaggeration in the data, that's impressive.
Industry plays an outsize role, accounting for 55% of output, compared to 47% nationally. Services have been squeezed out, accounting for 36% of the total compared to 43% nationally.
The economy is also slanted toward investment. From 2002 to 2010, growth in fixed asset investment averaged 28% a year.
As a percentage of total output, it came in at 84% in 2010, up from 62% the year before Mr. Bo arrived, and far higher than the national figure of 66%.
Analysts fear that an extreme tilt toward industry and investment in the economy means high environmental costs, and wasteful misallocation of capital -- making rapid growth difficult to sustain.
Improving infrastructure, low wages, and a can-do attitude from the government attracted major manufacturers like Hon Hai Precision Industry, Ford Motor and leading chemical company BASF.
Exports soared more than 160% year-to-year in 2011, compared to 20% growth for China as a whole.
Average wages around 34,700 yuan a year in 2010 were close to those found in the coastal manufacturing hub of Guangzhou back in 2005 -- increasing the appeal of Chongqing for cost conscious exporters.
Land rights for farmers, and access to urban education, healthcare and pensions for rural migrants, accelerated the pace of urbanization. According to the Chongqing government, 16.1 million of the municipality's 29.2 million residents are now urbanites.
Tom Miller, author of a forthcoming book on China's Urban Billion, said Chongqing efforts to urbanize represent the most ambitious reform of the residence system -- known as the hukou - taking place anywhere in the country.
Chongqing was also the forefront of national efforts to build affordable housing. Plans to start 13.5 million square meters of housing in 2012 will take the government toward its 40 million square meter target.
Spending on public services rose rapidly. The year before Bo Xilai took charge, spending on education was 2.3% of GDP. In 2011, it was 3.2%.
Chongqing's growth so far has been driven by industry and investment. But over time, progressive policies on urbanization housing, and public services should raise household income -- and drive higher consumption.
Behind high levels of investment and growth lay rising debts. Bank lending surged. The ratio of outstanding bank loans to GDP rose to 131% in 2011 from 112% in 2006.
Government owned investment vehicles like Chongqing Expressway Group and Chongqing Water Investment were central to the city's development, and amassed significant liabilities funding the build out of the city's infrastructure.
Matching assets on the other side of the balance sheet, and continued rapid growth, mean solvency is unlikely to be an issue, but after Mr. Bo's exit authorities are looking to cleanup investment projects.
Shares in Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank plummeted 14% in two days in April as investors feared fall out for the major local lender.
A crackdown on speculators in Chongqing's property market means sales have slowed, and prices have started to correct, down around 3% year-on-year in March -- in line with the national trend.
Du Jinsong, property analyst at Credit Suisse, says his recent visit and discussions with developers in Chongqing suggest property sales may have fallen after the meeting of the National People's Congress in late March.
Slower property sales and lower prices have dented land prices, which are down 48% year-to-year in March. That could be bad news for the city investment vehicles, which use land as collateral for their loans.
Rapid growth and progressive social policies made Mr. Bo popular with the Chongqing locals. How long either will stay in place after his departure, remains to be seen.
Tom Orlik
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