我在2010年4月加入中国人民银行货币政策委员会时，知道自己准备不足，尽管我已经在美国和香港教授经济学近20年。实际上，极少有人能做好准备：中国经济规模巨大、情况复杂，各项制度也还处在起步阶段。金融危机让我的任务更加困难，因为它暴露了传统宏观经济理论的缺陷。
我在货币政策委员会完成自己的任期后，得到三项根本的收获。这些收获对试图理解货币政策如何制定（尤其是在中国）的读者可能有用。
首先，央行的独立性是一种没有帮助的迷信。理论上，独立性是抵御面对竞选连任的政治人物的压力的有效手段。中国人民银行在中国国务院的控制之下，而不是由自主的银行职员管理，这似乎意味着中国官员会受到政治冲动的极大影响。或许如此，但中国领导人通常在任时间长达10年，他们会像长期任职的央行行长，如艾伦•格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)那样，重视自己的政策遗产。
实际上，与单纯的独立模式相比，中国央行与经济机关之间的紧密合作能够更强有力地抵御地方政府、股票投资者和房地产开发商的压力——这些角色都要求实行宽松的货币政策。货币政策委员会中不仅包括央行官员，还有来自财政部，以及银行、证券和保险监管机构的官员。
即便如此，当中国总理最近表示，只有腐败和通胀两个因素可能动摇他的政府时，我还是有些震惊。他对这两个因素，当然都有一定的影响力。
我的第二个收获是，对于价格型工具的力量，不要抱有太大的信心。价格信号在货币体系内可能不会足够快地产生效果。以贸易平衡为例，它取决于进口方和出口方之间现有的合同，这些合同不会对汇率变动快速做出反应。减少贸易顺差或许是一项政策目标，但让人民币对美元快速升值，很可能导致进一步升值的猜测，进而产生类似泡沫的汇率变动。
我的第三个收获是，要尊重投资者情绪，但要平稳且耐心地逆投资者情绪而动。这实际上是经济波动最重要的驱动因素。
对于央行官员来说不幸的是，我估计货币政策至多能影响到50%的投资。央行官员必须尊重投资者情绪，这并非因为投资者是正确的，而是因为他们的动量特别大，就像一艘巨型油轮一样。我们应如何改变这样一艘巨轮的航向呢？要及早且平稳地转向，同时要有耐心，别指望政策立竿见影。
2008年8月至2009年6月，中国投资者普遍感到悲观。当时，货币政策的目的就是通过降低利率和银行存款准备金率，微妙地改变投资者的想法。然而，到了2010年年中，投资者情绪已摆向另一个极端——年产出增长率达到10%。于是，央行又追求紧缩政策，同时对银行和房地产行业实施更严格的市场监管。到2011年年中，投资者情绪终于企稳。
展望未来，中国央行官员面对的最重要问题是什么？我认为，最重要的问题是如何降低中国巨额的人民币广义货币存量——其总额达到14万亿美元，相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的190%。其中有30%被锁定在中国央行，使其成为全球资产负债表规模最大的央行。这么多的货币是持续存在的破坏整体经济稳定的力量，且受到储户情绪的摆布。
中国需要进行改革，必须扩大证券市场、尤其是债券市场的规模，以便把银行存款吸引过去。中国也必须采用银行贷款证券化，即把一些优质银行贷款转换成债券，以使银行筹集到资本，变得更为稳健。
在采取这些措施之前，中国的资本账户不可能实现完全兑换，汇率不可能实现完全自由化，人民币也不可能成为一种名符其实的国际货币。
本文作者是清华大学(Tsinghua University)经济学教授和中国人民银行(PBoC)货币政策委员会前委员
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001044503
When I joined the People’s Bank of China’s Monetary Policy Committee in April 2010, I knew I was unprepared, despite teaching economics for nearly 20 years in the US and Hong Kong. In fact, few people could have been prepared: China has a large and mixed economy and its institutions are still young. The financial crisis made my task harder still, since it exposed the deficiencies in traditional macroeconomic theories.
Following my term on the committee, I think I have learnt three fundamental lessons, which may be useful for those trying to understand how monetary policy is made, not least in China.
First, central bank independence is an unhelpful superstition. In theory, independence is a good defence against pressures from politicians facing re-election. The PBoC is under the control of the state council, and not run under by autonomous bank staff. This may suggest that Chinese officials are subject to strong political whims. Perhaps, but Chinese leaders often stay in office for as long as 10 years and are as concerned about their legacy as long-serving central bankers such as Alan Greenspan.
In reality, China’s close co-operation with economic agencies is a stronger defence against local governments, equity investors and property developers – all of whom push for easy money policies – than a pure independence model. The MPC consists of officials not only from the central bank, but also from the finance ministry, and the banking, securities and insurance agencies.
Knowing this, I was nevertheless shocked when the Chinese premier recently said that only two factors had the potential to undermine his government: corruption and inflation. He does, of course, have some influence over these factors.
My second lesson: do not be overconfident in the power of price instruments. Price signals in the monetary system may not work quickly enough. Take the trade balance. It depends upon existing contracts between importers and exporters, which cannot quickly respond to exchange rate changes. It might be a policy objective to reduce the trade surplus but a fast appreciation of renminbi against the dollar is likely to cause speculation of further appreciation, creating bubble-like exchange rate dynamics.
My third lesson: respect investor sentiments but work steadily and patiently against them. These are actually the most important drivers of economic fluctuations.
Unfortunately for central bankers, I estimate that monetary policies can influence, at most, 50 per cent of investments. A central banker must respect investor sentiments, not because they are correct but because they have an overwhelming momentum, like a huge oil tanker. How do you change the direction of such a huge tanker? Steer early and steadily, while staying patient and not expecting instant response.
Between August 2008 and June 2009, Chinese investors were largely pessimistic. Monetary policies were then aimed at delicately changing investors’ minds through cuts in interest rates and deposit reserve ratios. By mid-2010, however, investor sentiments had swung in the other direction – annual output growth was running at 10 per cent. Tighter policies were then pursued, together with stronger banking and property market regulations. By mid-2011 sentiments finally stabilised.
Looking to the future, what is the most important question for China’s central bankers? In my opinion, it has to be how to lower China’s huge stock of broad based-money in renminbi – equivalent to $14tn or 190 per cent of gross domestic product. Thirty per cent is locked up at the PBoC, giving it the largest central bank balance sheet in the world. An amount this large is a perennial destabilising force for the entire economy, which is at the mercy of the mood of the depositors.
China needs reform. It must enhance the size of its securities markets, especially the bond markets, in order to lure bank deposits. China must also implement bank loan securitisation, ie convert some of the good quality bank loans into bonds so that banks can raise capital and become more robust.
Until these steps are taken the capital account cannot be fully convertible, the exchange rate cannot be fully liberalised and the renminbi cannot be a genuinely international currency.
The writer is a professor of economics at Tsinghua University and a former member of the People’s Bank of China Monetary Policy Committee
没有评论:
发表评论