关于20国集团(G20)高度重要性的各种陈词滥调如波起云涌，如果说有哪个观点始终如一，那就是该组织让大型新兴市场在谈判桌前获得了他们期盼已久的席位。
因此，当最重要的新兴市场国家之一印度认为，上述谈判桌前的对话目前主要是毫无建树的分歧，而不是建设性辩论时，让人感到非常不安。而巴西准备让自己的席位空着，就更让人坐不住了。
本周，曼莫汉•辛格(Manmohan Singh)政府的高级官员向英国《金融时报》表示，G20陷入了"严重困境"，对于诊断结果无法达成一致。巴西财长吉多•曼特加(Guido Mantega)——就是那个大胆指出汇率战争已经爆发的人——决定不出席本周在韩国举行的G20财长与央行行长会议。周三，土耳其副总理阿里•巴巴詹(Ali Babacan)也加入进来，表达了他对G20各方立场正逐渐退化到最低共同标准的担忧。
巴西政府强调，曼特加将陪同巴西总统路易斯•伊纳西奥•卢拉•达席尔瓦(Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva)出席11月中旬的G20政府首脑峰会。但对准备阶段就没有多少信心，对于正式峰会的信心又能强到哪里去呢。
如果G20真的失去了巴西和印度的信任，就会陷入极大的麻烦。正如一位美国财政部官员所言："巴西和印度官员属于……可以从G20获益最多的，而且一直是最坚定的支持者。"
印度规模庞大，渴望成为中国在发展中世界势均力敌的对手，这使得G20成为印度政府推行政策的天然工具。不到十年前刚从走向国家破产的死亡漩涡中摆脱出来的巴西，将正统的宏观经济政策与扶贫结合起来，以成为新兴市场中最新兴的国家之一。作为一个力争获得联合国安理会常任理事国席位的国家、一个全球贸易和气候变化谈判中强硬而坚定的谈判对手，巴西是大多数重大国际谈判的重要组成部分。如果一个论坛不能让巴西相信它是可信的，那它将难以让其它任何国家相信。
G20的情况开始越来越像多哈回合贸易谈判——几乎没有什么对比比这更具侮辱性了。两者都是在造成混乱的危机后立即推出的。《多哈发展议程》(Doha Development Agenda)——多哈回合贸易谈判的全称——始于2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击之后。G20成立于1997-98年亚洲金融危机之后，最初是财长级会议，在2008年雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产后升级为政府首脑会议。两者都本应致力于新兴市场在世界经济中的需求，让巴西和印度参与到谈判的核心之中。
但两者都夸大了自己的潜在影响力。那些以夸大多哈谈判促进增长和减少贫困的潜力为事业的人，如英国前首相戈登•布朗(Gordon Brown)，只是为G20修改了那套言辞，宣称它预示着国际合作进入新时代。但各国的所作所为降低了这些言辞的可信度。各方屡次声称多哈谈判即将缔结协议，同时却寻求缔结双边贸易协议，尤其是美国和欧盟。同样，一个又一个新兴市场国家——巴西、泰国和印度——最近诉诸单边行动以抑制货币升值，表明它们对多边进程可促使中国提高汇率弹性缺乏信心。
多哈谈判和G20的问题在于，它们的推出基于自己希望成为什么样子的一般想法，但是对于自己想做什么没有清晰的认识，对于如何实现目标也明显缺乏共识。无论是在贸易如何能帮助减少贫困，还是在汇率弹性对减少全球失衡的重要性方面，两者都没有成功弥合各方观点的显著差异。在遇到考验的时候，空洞的合作言辞已消散无踪，只剩下一座明显不再那么能打动人的大厦。
译者/何黎
If there is one consistent cliché in the cloud of platitudes that billows forth about the tremendous importance of the G20, it is that the grouping gives big emerging markets their long-awaited seat at the table.
So it is more than a little disturbing that India, one of the most important of such governments, thinks said table conversation is marked more by sterile dissent than constructive debate. It is even more disturbing that Brazil is prepared to leave its chair empty.
Top officials from Manmohan Singh's government told the Financial Times this week that the G20 was in "serious difficulties", with no agreement on diagnosis. Guido Mantega, Brazil's finance minister, the man who had the courage to call a currency war a currency war, decided not to attend this week's meeting of ministers and central bank governors in South Korea at all. And on Wednesday Ali Babacan, Turkey's deputy prime minister, weighed in with his own concerns that the positions taken by the grouping were sinking to a lowest common denominator.
Brasília insists that Mr Mantega will accompany his boss, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the president, to the heads of government summit in mid-November. But showing such little faith in the planning stage does not inspire confidence in the main event.
If the G20 really is losing credibility with Brazil and India, it is in serious trouble. As a US Treasury official put it: "Brazilian and Indian officials are among those . . . that have the most to gain from the G20, and have been its strongest supporters."
India's size, and its desire for a counterweight to China in the developing world makes the grouping a natural vehicle for New Delhi to pursue policy. Brazil, having pulled itself out of a death spiral towards sovereign bankruptcy less than a decade ago, has combined orthodox macroeconomic policy with poverty reduction to become one of the most emergent of the emerging markets. An aspirant permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a tough and determined negotiator in global trade and climate change talks, Brazil is an essential part of most serious global conversations. If a forum cannot persuade Brazil it is credible, it will struggle to convince anyone else.
More and more, the story of the G20 is beginning to resemble that of the Doha round of trade negotiations, and there can be few more insulting comparisons. Both were launched in the immediate aftermath of dislocating crises. The Doha Development Agenda, to give its full title, began in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks. The G20 started as a finance ministers' grouping after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and became a heads of government affair after the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers. Both were supposed to address the needs of emerging markets in the world economy, and had Brazil and India as participants in the inner core of negotiations.
But both had exaggerated claims made for their potential impact. Those, such as Gordon Brown, the former UK prime minister, who made a career out of overstating the potential for Doha to boost growth and reduce poverty, simply adapted that rhetoric to the G20, suggesting it heralded a new age of international co-operation. But what countries did reduced the credibility of what they said. Repeated protestations from all sides that Doha was on the brink of a deal were belied by the simultaneous pursuit of bilateral trade deals, particularly by the US and European Union. Similarly, the recent resort to unilateral actions by a string of emerging markets – Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia – to stem currency appreciation betrays a lack of faith that the multilateral process can induce China to increase exchange rate flexibility.
The problem with Doha and the G20 is that they were launched with a general idea of what they wanted to be but a woollier view of what they wanted to do and a conspicuous lack of consensus about how they were going to get there. Neither has managed to bridge stark differences of opinion, whether on how trade can help reduce poverty or on the importance of exchange rate flexibility to reducing global imbalances. When it came to the test, the frothy rhetoric of co-operation has been blown away, and what remains standing is a considerably less impressive edifice.
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