美
元对世界各国货币大范围贬值，一场新的货币大战或隐或现。美国国会正不断给北京施压，要求人民币升值。与此同时，美国财政部要求国际货币基金组织(IMF)进行干预，以促使中国实施灵活的汇率政策。巴西、日本和其它亚洲经济体的各央行也已为稳定本国货币而出手干预。经济学家和学院派人士则在鼓吹从资本市场限制到贸易制裁等各种措施。
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可惜到目前为止，这还不是20国峰会的努力方向。从一开始，20国集团就将全球经济再平衡作为政策目标，但从未确定如何实现该目标。其前身──五国集团(Group of Five)，1985年签署过旨在通过强迫日圆和马克兑美元升值而减少全球不平衡的《广场协议》(Plaza Accord)，但成效一般。日圆汇率从1985年的250日圆兑1美元飙至1995年中期的80日圆兑1美元，然而尽管如此，日本的贸易顺差并没有消失。同样，经通货膨胀因素调整的美元汇率在过去30年中起起伏伏，但美国的贸易逆差依旧节节攀升。
与早年的《广场协议》一样，新的《广场协议》将要求中国、日本、德国和石油出口国等贸易顺差大国大幅升值其本国货币。但从政治角度来说，下月首尔峰会签署新协议的可能性非常小。美国或许是新协议强有力的支持者，但在欧盟内部，英国等贸易逆差大国和德国等贸易顺差大国，立场却有不同。日本因为有前车之鉴，应该不愿签署这样一个协议。而中国则绝不会听任美国摆布，强迫人民币大幅升值。20国集团中其它亚洲成员，如韩国和印度尼西亚，也是贸易顺差国，因此也不太可能支持该协议。
除利用20国集团签署新《广场协议》之外，美国还有其它一些可选方案，但从经济角度看均不尽人意。加征进口关税和对资本市场设限等贸易保护措施执行起来不仅不切实际，还会顺道赶走美国自己颇为需要的外国投资，抬高进口商品价格，加剧通胀压力。特别是加征进口关税，还可能引发世界贸易组织(WTO)框架下的争端。美国民众并不愿面对上述情况，在这些措施没有对就业产生积极影响时，尤其如此。
美国单边干预外汇也不太可能奏效。美国不能在汇市上卖出美元，以抵消中国的干预，因为中国实行资本账户控制，而且美国不可能买入足够多的人民币。即使美国禁止中国在一级市场上买入美国国债，但美国没有有效方式阻止中国进入二级市场。更重要的是，中国和日本均占美国国债市场20%以上的份额。鉴于美国财政问题不断加剧，它真有这样的胃口吞下这副药吗？
如果美国不采取单边行动，那么20国集团会议确实像一个调整汇率的好机会，而且在一定程度上它也应该这样做。汇率对贸易平衡具有一定影响：汇率低估可以促进出口，抑制进口，改善汇率低估国的贸易平衡状况。那些贸易失衡的经济体将因更具弹性的汇率机制而受益。
但汇率不能完全解决全球失衡问题，正如《广场协议》(Plaza Accord)的经验所证实的那样。20国集团最好聚焦于以所有成员国结构性改革为中心的综合一揽子方案，汇率应是该一揽子方案的重要部分。例如，为了降低美国的经常项目赤字，美国人不得不储蓄更多，仅仅使美元贬值，不足以达到这一目标。同样的，中国经常项目盈余是由国内经济广泛扭曲导致的，扭曲范围从国家分配信贷到人为压低利率，不一而足。改变中国对外贸易失衡状况，需要消除所有这些扭曲因素。
好消息是，全球再平衡已经在实现的过程中。美国经常项目赤字和中国盈余在各自在国内生产总值（GDP）中所占比例已从金融危机前的高峰水平分别下降一半。这部分是因为美国消费者已储蓄更多，中国也进行了结构调整，其中包括允许工资快速上涨，这提高了消费者购买力和最终消费。中国政府还降低了石油、天然气、水和其他资源的扭曲程度。
这些才是下月20国集团会议议程应该关注的转变类型，而不是关注货币战。货币战中没有赢家，只有输家。
（编者按：作者黄益平是北京大学国家发展研究院/中国经济研究中心教授。）
（更新完成）
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
A new currency war is looming as the dollar devalues versus the world's currencies. In the United States, Congress is putting pressure on Beijing to revalue the yuan, while Treasury calls for International Monetary Fund intervention to promote flexible exchange rates. Abroad, central banks in Brazil, Japan and other Asian economies have stepped in to stabilize their currencies. And the chattering classes of economists and academics are advocating everything from capital-market restrictions to trade sanctions.
The upcoming Group of 20 summit in Seoul could become a battlefield of this new conflict. But it doesn't have to be. Rather than focus on currency manipulation, all sides would be better served to zero in on structural reforms. The effects of that would be far more beneficial in the long run than unilateral U.S. currency action, and more sustainable.
That isn't the direction the G-20 has taken to date. From its outset, the group identified global rebalancing as a policy goal, but never decided how to address the problem. Its predecessor organization, the Group of Five, signed the Plaza Accord in 1985 to reduce global imbalances by forcing the yen and the mark to appreciate versus the dollar. It wasn't very effective. The yen rose to 80 versus the greenback in mid-1995, from 250 in 1985. Yet Japan's current-account surpluses did not disappear. Likewise, the dollar's inflation-adjusted exchange rate fluctuated during the past three decades, but the U.S. current account deficit continued to climb.
Like its predecessor, a new Plaza Accord would demand substantial appreciation of currencies in major surplus economies like China, Japan, Germany and oil-exporting countries. Yet politically, that is highly unlikely to happen in Seoul next month. The U.S. may be a strong supporter, but positions within the European Union vary from large deficit countries like Britain to large surplus countries like Germany. Japan would be reluctant to sign up, given its prior experience. China will never let the U.S. force a sharp yuan revaluation. Other Asian members of the G-20 like South Korea and Indonesia are also running current account surpluses and unlikely to support such a deal.
The U.S. has other options outside of the G-20, but none of them are economically palatable. Protectionist devices likes import tariffs and capital-market restrictions are impractical to implement and would drive away much-needed investment, raise consumer prices on imported goods and add to inflationary pressures. Tariffs in particular risk a World Trade Organization dispute. The U.S. public isn't prepared to accept these consequences, especially without any beneficial effect on employment.
U.S. unilateral monetary intervention is unlikely to work either. The U.S. can't sell dollars to offset China's intervention in foreign-exchange markets because China has capital-account controls, and it would be impossible to source enough yuan. Even if the U.S. were to ban China from buying Treasury bills in the primary market, it has no effective way of stopping China from accessing to the secondary markets. More importantly, China and Japan each account for more than 20% of the Treasury market. Does the U.S. really have stomach for this prescription given its yawning fiscal problems?
If the U.S. shouldn't take unilateral action, then the G-20 does look like a good forum in which to tinker with exchange rates, and it should do so-to a degree. Exchange rates do have an effect on trade balances: An undervalued currency promotes exports, inhibits imports and improves the trade balance of the nation that has it. Economies that suffer trade imbalances would benefit from a more flexible exchange rate.
But exchange rates don't hold all keys to fixing global imbalances, as the experience of the Plaza Accord proved. It would be much better for the G-20 to focus on a comprehensive package centered on structural reforms in all countries. Exchange rates should be an important part of that package. For instance, to reduce the U.S. current-account deficits, Americans have to save more. But simply devaluing the dollar would not be sufficient for that purpose. Likewise, China's current-account surpluses were caused by a broad set of domestic economic distortions, from state-allocated credit to artificially low interest rates. Correcting China's external imbalances requires eliminating all of these distortions.
The good news is that global rebalancing is already occurring. The U.S. current account deficit and Chinese surplus, as shares of their respective GDPs, have both halved from their respective pre-crisis peaks. This has happened, in part, because U.S. consumers have saved more. China has also made structural improvements, including allowing rapid wage growth, which improves consumer purchasing power and end-consumption. The government also reduced distortions in prices for oil, gas, water and other resources.
These are the types of changes on which the G-20 agenda next month should focus, rather than on a currency war. No one wins the latter-there are only losers.
Yiping Huang
Mr. Huang is a professor of economics at the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.
The upcoming Group of 20 summit in Seoul could become a battlefield of this new conflict. But it doesn't have to be. Rather than focus on currency manipulation, all sides would be better served to zero in on structural reforms. The effects of that would be far more beneficial in the long run than unilateral U.S. currency action, and more sustainable.
That isn't the direction the G-20 has taken to date. From its outset, the group identified global rebalancing as a policy goal, but never decided how to address the problem. Its predecessor organization, the Group of Five, signed the Plaza Accord in 1985 to reduce global imbalances by forcing the yen and the mark to appreciate versus the dollar. It wasn't very effective. The yen rose to 80 versus the greenback in mid-1995, from 250 in 1985. Yet Japan's current-account surpluses did not disappear. Likewise, the dollar's inflation-adjusted exchange rate fluctuated during the past three decades, but the U.S. current account deficit continued to climb.
Like its predecessor, a new Plaza Accord would demand substantial appreciation of currencies in major surplus economies like China, Japan, Germany and oil-exporting countries. Yet politically, that is highly unlikely to happen in Seoul next month. The U.S. may be a strong supporter, but positions within the European Union vary from large deficit countries like Britain to large surplus countries like Germany. Japan would be reluctant to sign up, given its prior experience. China will never let the U.S. force a sharp yuan revaluation. Other Asian members of the G-20 like South Korea and Indonesia are also running current account surpluses and unlikely to support such a deal.
The U.S. has other options outside of the G-20, but none of them are economically palatable. Protectionist devices likes import tariffs and capital-market restrictions are impractical to implement and would drive away much-needed investment, raise consumer prices on imported goods and add to inflationary pressures. Tariffs in particular risk a World Trade Organization dispute. The U.S. public isn't prepared to accept these consequences, especially without any beneficial effect on employment.
U.S. unilateral monetary intervention is unlikely to work either. The U.S. can't sell dollars to offset China's intervention in foreign-exchange markets because China has capital-account controls, and it would be impossible to source enough yuan. Even if the U.S. were to ban China from buying Treasury bills in the primary market, it has no effective way of stopping China from accessing to the secondary markets. More importantly, China and Japan each account for more than 20% of the Treasury market. Does the U.S. really have stomach for this prescription given its yawning fiscal problems?
If the U.S. shouldn't take unilateral action, then the G-20 does look like a good forum in which to tinker with exchange rates, and it should do so-to a degree. Exchange rates do have an effect on trade balances: An undervalued currency promotes exports, inhibits imports and improves the trade balance of the nation that has it. Economies that suffer trade imbalances would benefit from a more flexible exchange rate.
But exchange rates don't hold all keys to fixing global imbalances, as the experience of the Plaza Accord proved. It would be much better for the G-20 to focus on a comprehensive package centered on structural reforms in all countries. Exchange rates should be an important part of that package. For instance, to reduce the U.S. current-account deficits, Americans have to save more. But simply devaluing the dollar would not be sufficient for that purpose. Likewise, China's current-account surpluses were caused by a broad set of domestic economic distortions, from state-allocated credit to artificially low interest rates. Correcting China's external imbalances requires eliminating all of these distortions.
The good news is that global rebalancing is already occurring. The U.S. current account deficit and Chinese surplus, as shares of their respective GDPs, have both halved from their respective pre-crisis peaks. This has happened, in part, because U.S. consumers have saved more. China has also made structural improvements, including allowing rapid wage growth, which improves consumer purchasing power and end-consumption. The government also reduced distortions in prices for oil, gas, water and other resources.
These are the types of changes on which the G-20 agenda next month should focus, rather than on a currency war. No one wins the latter-there are only losers.
Yiping Huang
Mr. Huang is a professor of economics at the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.
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