现在是否已经到了与中国打一场汇率战争的时候？答案似乎越来越倾向于是肯定的。攻击中国汇率政策的政治及经济理由越来越充分。这种观点无疑令人深感不安。但我已不再认为，我们还有其他的选择。
我们必须回答下面四个问题。中国是“汇率操纵国”吗？如果是，此事的影响大不大？我们可以合理地要求中国采取哪些措施？最后，其它国家能否在附带伤害有限的前提下，改变中国的政策？
第一个问题最容易回答。如果决定把本国一半的国内生产总值(GDP)都投资于外汇储备还不算汇率操纵，那什么才算？此外，通过冲销此举造成的货币影响，中国政府还阻碍了固定汇率制度的调整机制。伟大的苏格兰哲学家大卫•休谟(David Hume)在18世纪阐明了这一机制（见下表）。
现在我们来看第二个问题：此事的影响大吗？答案之一是：这是一种保护主义政策。通过压低人民币实际汇率，中国为其出口商品及进口替代品的生产提供了补贴。由于中国目前是全球最大的出口国，这就必然给世界贸易造成严重扭曲。
中国的经常账户盈余决非造成美国经常账户赤字的唯一原因。但以下情况同样是事实：中国的汇率政策已成为其它国家汇率政策的驱动因素；资本输入型高收入国家无法有效利用新兴国家的过剩储蓄；资金从穷国净流入富国完全有悖于常理。
还有，如果美国等高收入国家想拥有更加审慎的家庭部门、并在财政方面更加自律，它们就必须经历巨大的投资热潮或转向经常账户盈余。更有可能的情况是，它们两者都需要。
此外，考虑到德国、日本和其它若干高收入国家持续存在的储蓄盈余，全球经济若想恢复稳定增长，作为一个整体，那些遭受重创的高收入国家就必须转向可观的经常账户盈余。中国是最具活力、偿债能力最强的新兴国家，同时拥有全球最大的经常账户盈余。如果所有转向赤字的抵偿性转变发生在实力弱得多的新兴经济体，那么最终结果很可能是又一轮金融危机。而中国却可以在近乎毫无风险的情况下，从目前的经常账户盈余向赤字转化，规模为每年3000亿美元。
这就把我们带到了第三个问题上：我们可以合理的要求中国采取哪些举措？调整名义汇率既非不是世界经济恢复平衡的必要条件，也非充分条件：说它并非必要，是因为通胀抬头也可引发相对价格的改变；说它并不充分，是因为若想实现再平衡，还必须提高国内消费相对于产出的比率。所以，调整名义汇率充其量只是一套更广泛必要调整的助推因素之一。
因此，中国政府的可选举措可能包括：停止干预汇市，停止冲销干预造成的货币影响，把实际国内需求、家庭消费和经常账户当作目标。与此同时，中国应要求其它方面——特别是美国——采取互补性行动。
在任何此类讨论中，人们都必须化解中方对如下问题的担心：让人民币大幅升值，不仅会损害出口行业，还可能让中国陷入类似于日本上世纪90年代所遭遇的“失去的十年”。日本当年出现那种局面，主要是该国在1985年后运用货币政策来抵消日元升值对净出口的负面影响所致。中国自然不希望落入同一个陷阱。但正如朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的加布里埃尔•斯坦(Gabriel Stein)在6月份发表的一篇论文中所主张的，中日两国的情况有着天壤之别：中国当前的高速增长潜力，要比上世纪80年代末的日本大得多，因为日本那时的人均GDP（以购买力平价计）已接近美国，而中国现在还不到美国的五分之一；最重要的是，中国有很大潜力提高消费率。就长久提高国内消费率而言，积极信贷扩张可谓一步险棋。若想提高消费率，还必须对经济进行结构性调整。但是，这些举措非常符合中国人民的利益。
这就引出了最后一个问题：如何诱使或迫使中国改变政策？谈判仍是一种存在希望的选择。20国集团(G20)里的其余国家应团结一致，呼吁中国做出改变。但是，如果谈判始终不见成果，我们就必须考虑替代方案。进口附加税是一种可能的选择。彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute)的弗雷德•伯格斯滕(Fred Bergsten)本周在英国《金融时报》呼吁，实施反制性汇率干预；欧洲政策研究中心(Centre for European Policy Studies)的丹尼尔•格罗斯(Daniel Gros)则建议资本账户互惠：受影响国家可阻止他国购买自己的金融工具，除非后者向它们提供本国金融市场的互惠准入。这个主意还会让伯格斯滕的计划变得更为有效。
我认为，干预资本市场的主意，远比那些涉及反贸易行动的主张更具吸引力——美国众议院上周提出的就是后一种主意。首先，针对贸易的举措肯定带有歧视性：我们没理由只为改变中国的行为，就对所有进口进行打击。但此举几乎肯定会违反世贸组织(WTO)规则。贸易战将是非常危险的。相反，坚决要求中国在对资本流入实施严格管控之时，停止购买他国债务，则是有的放矢和恰如其分的——最重要的是，这还会推动全球走向市场开放。
有些人担心，中国停止购买美国国债会引发崩盘。考虑到全球私营部门的巨额财务盈余以及美元继续扮演的角色，没有什么比这种担心更不靠谱的了。不过，如果美元因此走软，那将是有益的，而不是有害的。
只要全球最具活力的经济体仍扮演全球最大资本输出国的角色，后危机时代的世界经济就无法有效运转。此外，中国为自己购买的“保险”已远远超出了“够用”的程度。奉行一套把中国转变为净进口国的政策，既有利于中国人民，也有利于全球其余地区。现在已经到了“动手”而不只是“动口”的时候。我们亟需采取行动。
译者/汪洋
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034919
Has the time for a currency war with China arrived? The answer looks increasingly to be yes. The politics and economics of an assault on Chinese exchange rate policy are increasingly convincing. The idea is, of course, deeply disturbing. But I no longer believe there is an alternative.
We have to address four questions. Is China a “currency manipulator”? If it is, does it matter? What might China reasonably be asked to do? Finally, can other countries shift China’s policies, with limited collateral damage?
The first question is the easiest. If a decision to invest half a country’s gross domestic product in currency reserves is not exchange rate manipulation, what is? Moreover, by sterilising the monetary effects, the Chinese government has also thwarted the mechanism of adjustment in a fixed-rate regime, which was explained by the great Scottish philosopher, David Hume, in the 18th century (see chart below).
Now turn to the second question: does this matter? One answer is that it is a protectionist policy. By keeping its real exchange rate down, China subsidises production of its exports and import substitutes. Since China is now the world’s biggest exporter, this has to be a significant distortion of world trade.
The Chinese current account surplus is far from the only explanation for the US current account deficit. Yet it is also true that China’s currency policies have driven those of other countries; that capital-importing high-income countries are unable to make productive use of the surplus savings of the emerging countries; and that the net flow of funds from the poor to the rich is altogether perverse.
Moreover, if high-income countries such as the US are to have more prudent household sectors and more fiscal discipline, they must either enjoy a big investment boom or a shift into current account surplus. More plausibly, they need both.
Given, in addition, the continued savings surpluses of Germany, Japan and a number of other high-income countries, a return to stable growth in the world economy requires the battered high-income countries, as a group, to move into sizeable current account surplus. China is the most dynamic and solvent emerging country. It also runs the world’s largest current account surplus. If all the offsetting shift towards deficit is in much weaker emerging economies, the ultimate result is likely to be another round of financial crises. Yet China could move today’s current account surplus towards deficit, by $300bn a year, at negligible risk.
This leads us to the third question: what might China reasonably be asked to do? An adjustment in the nominal exchange rate is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rebalancing of the world economy: not necessary, because higher inflation could bring about changes in relative prices, instead; not sufficient, because it would still require an increase in domestic spending, relative to output. At most, therefore, an adjustment in the nominal exchange rate is a facilitator of a wider set of desired adjustments.
Thus the menu of possible options for the Chinese authorities could include a cap on the intervention, an end to sterilisation of the monetary consequences and targets for real domestic demand, household consumption and the current account. Meanwhile, China should demand complementary actions elsewhere, notably in the US.
In any such discussions, one would have to address Chinese concerns that letting the exchange rate appreciate significantly would not only damage export industry, but risk a “lost decade” similar to that of Japan in the 1990s. What happened to Japan was largely the result of using monetary policy after 1985 to offset the negative impact of the rising exchange rate on net exports. Naturally, China does not wish to enter the same trap. But, as Gabriel Stein of Lombard Street Research argues in a paper released in June, the two situations are very different: China has far greater potential for fast growth than Japan did in the late 1980s, because Japan’s GDP per head (at purchasing power parity) was already close to that of the US, while China’s is less than a fifth; and China, above all, has huge potential for higher consumption rates. Aggressive credit expansion is a dangerous way to achieve a permanent rise in domestic spending relative to output. That will also require structural changes in the economy. But these are very much in the interest of the Chinese people.
This leads to the final question: how might China be cajoled or coerced into changing its policies? Negotiation remains a hope. The rest of Group of 20 leading countries should unite in calling for these changes. But if negotiation continues to fail, alternatives must be considered. Import surcharges are one possibility. Fred Bergsten of Washington’s Peterson Institute called for countervailing currency intervention in the FT this week; and Daniel Gros of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels recommends capital account reciprocity: affected countries could prevent other countries from purchasing their financial instruments, unless the latter offered reciprocal access to their financial markets. This idea would also make the Bergsten plan more effective.
I find ideas for intervention in capital markets far more attractive than those involving action against trade, as the US House of Representatives proposed last week. First, action on trade would have to be discriminatory: there is no reason to attack all imports, merely to change Chinese behaviour. But this would almost certainly be a violation of the rules of the World Trade Organisation. A trade war would be very dangerous. Insisting that China stop purchasing the liabilities of other countries so long as it operates tight controls on capital inflows is, instead, direct and proportionate and, above all, moves the world towards market opening.
Some fear that a cessation of Chinese purchases of US government bonds would lead to a collapse. Nothing is less likely, given the massive financial surpluses of the private sectors of the world and the continuing role of the dollar. If it weakened the dollar, however, that would be helpful, not damaging.
The post-crisis world economy will not work so long as its most dynamic economy is also its largest capital exporter. Moreover, China has insured itself to a vastly more than adequate extent. Adopting a set of policies that would turn China into a net importer would benefit both its own people and the rest of the world. The time has come to move beyond rhetoric. Action is urgent.
没有评论:
发表评论