如果世界正濒临一场不折不扣的汇率战争，那么可以说，各个阵营过去几周已纷纷出动，调兵遣将。远离战场6年之久的日本央行(Bank of Japan)连续出手干涉，在外汇市场上压低日元汇率。巴西采用了游击战术，将资本流入税提高了一倍，以遏制雷亚尔急剧升值。印度与泰国警告，它们也可能会动用重型武器。
主要交战方——美国与中国——继续在汇率问题上打口水仗。华盛顿（以及布鲁塞尔）认为，人民币等受到低估的货币，是全球宏观经济失衡的主要诱因。北京则反驳称，这种挑衅行为有可能让两大经济强国两败俱伤。
本周一，国际货币基金组织(IMF)总裁多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩(Dominique Strauss-Kahn)表达了自己的担忧："汇率可以用作政策武器的想法显然已开始流行起来。如果这种想法付诸行动，可能会给全球经济复苏带来非常严峻的风险。"
在本周末召开的IMF年会上，这将成为一个无可回避的议题。届时，与会代表将思忖如何巩固步履蹒跚的全球经济，缓解庞大的经常项目失衡。例如，美国（以及大多数经济学家）表示，允许人民币升值是实现再平衡的重要一步，这有助于提高中国的购买力，从而增加中国国内的消费支出，并使美国等贸易逆差国家得以扩大净出口。
由于各国都试图在牺牲他国利益的基础上提振本国的出口，汇率战争会引发外汇市场的剧烈动荡或是针锋相对的保护主义，从而危及全球贸易。这可能会进一步警醒已经焦虑万分的企业与投资者。
如果各国诉诸于新的单边行动，同时中国的许多东亚邻国继续进行市场干涉，那不仅会制造短期紧张局势，还会让美国在11月的首尔20国集团(G20)峰会上协商达成多边和平协定的能力招致怀疑。美国认为，这样的协议已经暗含在以往G20有关汇率的声明中。协议的内容之一便是要求人民币加速升值，而不是按照自今年6月取消钉住美元的汇率制度以来中国政府所允许的速度缓慢爬升。反过来，富国集团将承诺削减赤字，促进经济增长。
华盛顿正在为增强人民币汇率弹性的游说活动寻找盟友——特别是那些对本国的竞争力与波动性问题抱怨不已的新兴经济体。如果与北京单挑，美国难免会背负骂名：只有它站在原告席上，将自己铺张浪费的缺点归咎于一个善意地将钱借给自己的国家——中国持有的美国国债接近1万亿美元。
集结全球联盟，并通过IMF追究人民币汇率问题，会将美国置于维护全球公共利益的道德高地。正如美国财政部长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)周三所言："让美国独自承担……解决这个具有更广泛影响的问题的重任，对世界没有好处。"
然而，尽管美国声称获得了广泛支持，声援似乎却寥寥无几。没错，过去一周欧洲传出了阵阵抱怨之声。结束了与中国总理温家宝不甚和谐的会唔后，欧洲央行(ECB)行长让-克洛德•特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)、由欧元区财长组成的欧元集团的主席让-克洛德•容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)以及欧盟货币事务专员奥利•雷恩(Olli Rehn)全都加入了这个行列。
但一些美国的政策制定者私下里抱怨，来自欧洲的支持显得零零碎碎，往往随着欧元的起落而变化。今年上半年，愈演愈烈的希腊危机压低了欧元，到夏初，欧元汇率比1月份的水平下降了17%。着眼于本地的难处，加之德国出口迅猛增长，欧洲官员认为没什么必要在汇率问题上跟中国作对，也没什么劲头这么做。
"从去年冬天到今年夏天，在欧洲很难找到对欧元走弱感到不安的人，因为这是我们出口繁荣的一个关键因素，"欧洲一位高层政策制定者坦承道。
如今欧元走强了，他们的噪门又变大了。但正如欧盟贸易专员卡洛•德古赫特(Karel De Gucht)所说，欧洲仍然不像美国那么担心人民币问题，这大概是因为，尽管欧盟对中国存在巨额贸易逆差，但欧盟的总体经常账户更趋于均衡。
对于向中国施压能取得什么效果，他本周也表示了怀疑："中国不会迫于外界的巨大压力重估本币，况且，中国总理已经十分清楚地表明了这一点。"
在新兴经济体中，进攻计划似乎就是保持沉默和传递弹药。尽管普遍认为中国的汇率政策似乎造成了扭曲，但各国政府普遍更喜欢单边干预，而非公开叫骂。
的确，今年4月，印度央行和巴西央行行长都抱怨中国在损害他们的出口企业。
但巴西外长塞尔索•阿莫林(Celso Amorim)最近向路透社表示："我认为，对一国施压不是找到解决办法的正确方式。"值得注意的是，他还说："我们和中国有着良好的协作关系，我们一直在和他们对话。我们不能忘记，中国现在是我们最大的主顾。"
事实上，虽然中国企业是巴西等国制造业的激烈竞争对手，但在当今的贸易领域，人们对数量的看重却胜过了价格。2009年，尽管全球经济衰退，巴西本币升值，但在大豆、铁矿石和其他大宗商品的带动下，巴西对华出口却增长了约四分之一。与此同时，巴西对美国出口（主要是制成品）下跌了近一半。2009年，中国取代美国，成为巴西最大的贸易伙伴国，给一段近80年的历史划上了句号。
虽然对华出口是巴西非凡经济活力的重要组成部分，但也有人警告，这可能演变为一种殖民关系：中国吸纳原材料，同时使巴西的制造业成为空洞。圣保罗州工业联合会(Fiesp)的鲁宾斯•巴尔博萨(Rubens Barbosa)表示，巴西政府2004年把中国定性为"市场经济"，这种做法是错误的，它加大了以价格为由阻止进口商品的难度，而政府还对中国产品的"入侵"感到洋洋得意。
谈到巴西将外国资本流入税提高一倍，他表示："政府终于做了早就该做的事。"但他也对直白的游说表示怀疑。"我认为他们不会屈服于压力。中国完全知道自己想要什么，以及自己能做什么。"
与此同时，另一个新兴市场巨头——印度也有自己保持低调的理由。为印度政府提供建议的IMF前高级官员埃斯瓦尔•普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)表示，印度比许多新兴市场更加欢迎资本流入。该国有经常账户赤字，需要从海外借款为其规模庞大的基建项目融资。它还深受高通胀之苦，而卢比升值将有助于平息通胀。
在东亚其它地区，许多政府数年来一直在通过悄悄干预本币升值来抵消人民币汇率操纵的影响。韩国给人们留下了明确的印象：在其11月份主办的G20会议上，它希望不要讨论汇率问题。韩国官员们断然拒绝讨论本国政策，更确切地说，拒绝承认首尔一直在干预汇市，以阻止韩圆升值。
在东南亚，大多数国家一直默不作声——可能只有新加坡是个例外，因为它足够富裕与独立，可以不用随波逐流。从最近对中国渔船与日本巡逻船相撞这一争端的处理上可以看出，中国在东南亚地区的外交政策越来越具侵略性，从而加大了东南亚国家与北京发生公开争执的成本。
迄今为止，压低货币以鼓励出口带给新兴亚洲国家的好处，已经超过了不得不管理资本流入激增的风险。斯坦福大学(Stanford University)的罗伯特•马德森(Robert Madsen)表示："过去5年或10年，这些国家大多让本币钉住人民币或美元汇率，然后任由中国处在风口浪尖上。"他表示，由于全球金融危机，美国及其经济模式在该地区受到质疑，权力与政策真空开始出现，而北京方面填补了这一真空。
由于外交进展前景渺茫，美国和欧洲的外汇政策可能最终需要通过国内货币政策来引导。如果像看似可能的那样，美联储(Fed)、日本央行和欧洲央行为了促进增长而重新采取定量宽松政策，那么它们的货币就有可能走软，就像日本央行本周宣布放松货币政策后，日元曾短暂下跌那样。
但这不太可能缓解汇率方面的紧张态势。新兴市场国家倾向于将定量宽松视为一种外汇干预形式，因为它实质上是在创造美元、欧元或日元，将它们推入全球市场，抵消其它政府购买这些货币的影响。美国传统基金会(Heritage Foundation)的史剑道(Derek Scissors)不无挖苦地指出："削弱美元的最强大力量是美联储，而美元最大的捍卫者是中华人民共和国。"
就连向来乐观的盖特纳也承认，提高汇率弹性的最终协议是一场正在进行的谈判，不会在11月份的G20会议上突然达成。世界或许尚未全面爆发汇率战争，但要议定长久的停战协定，还有很长的一段路要走。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034920
If the world is on the brink of an out-and-out currency war, a variety of battalions has been out on manoeuvres in the past few weeks. The Bank of Japan, after six years off the battlefield, has launched a fusillade of intervention to hold down the yen in foreign exchange markets. Brazil used the guerrilla tactic of doubling taxes on capital inflows to stop the real surging. India and Thailand warned that they too might bring heavy ordnance into play.
The main combatants, the US and China, continued to exchange rhetorical salvos. Washington (and Brussels) identified undervalued currencies such as the renminbi as a prime cause of global macroeconomic imbalances. Beijing retorted that such aggression risked bringing mutual destruction upon the great economic powers.
On Monday Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, voiced his concern. "There is clearly the idea beginning to circulate that currencies can be used as a policy weapon," he said. "Translated into action, such an idea would represent a very serious risk to the global recovery."
The issue will hang over the IMF annual meeting this weekend as delegates ponder how to strengthen the stuttering global economy and reduce huge current account imbalances. For example, the US – along with most economists – says that allowing the renminbi to appreciate is an important part of the rebalancing, helping to increase consumer spending within China by raising purchasing power and allowing deficit countries such as the US to expand net exports.
A currency war – resulting in high volatility in foreign exchange markets or tit-for-tat protectionism as countries try to boost their exports at the expense of others, endangering world trade – could further alarm already anxious businesses and investors.
The resort to fresh unilateral actions, along with continued market intervention by many of China's east Asian neighbours, does more than create short-term tension. It also casts doubt on the ability of the US to negotiate a multilateral peace treaty at November's Seoul meeting of the Group of 20 leading nations. Such a deal, which the US says was implicit in previous G20 declarations on currencies, would include a faster appreciation in China's exchange rate than the upwards crawl Beijing has allowed since unpegging from the dollar in June. In return, the rich world would commit to reduce deficits and boost growth.
Washington is looking for allies – particularly among the emerging economies, who complain about their own competitiveness and volatility problems – in its campaign for exchange rate flexibility. Trying to take on Beijing single-handed makes the US vulnerable to the charge that it is a lone complainant blaming its own profligate shortcomings on the country that is kind enough to lend it money, holding the best part of $1,000bn in US Treasury bonds.
Assembling a global coalition and pursuing the issue through the IMF would enable America to claim the moral high ground of world public interest. As Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, said on Wednesday: "It is not good for the world for the burden of solving this broader problem . . . to rest on the shoulders of the United States."
Yet despite US claims of broad support, backing appears sporadic. True, there has been a flurry of European complaints in the past week. Following discordant meetings in Europe with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, Jean-Claude Trichet, European Central Bank governor, Jean-Claude Juncker, chairman of the eurozone finance ministers' group, and Olli Rehn, European Union monetary affairs commissioner, all weighed in.
But some US policymakers privately complain that European backing is patchy and tends to go up and down with the euro. In the first half of the year the euro was pushed lower by the gathering Greek crisis, by early summer falling 17 per cent below its January level. Focused on local difficulties, and with the German export machine powering ahead, European officials saw little need to take on Beijing over currencies and had little energy to do so.
"It was very difficult to find anyone in Europe last winter, spring and summer who was upset about the weakening of the euro because it was a critical factor in the export boom we experienced," a senior European policymaker conceded.
Now the single currency is stronger, their voices are raised once more. But as Karel de Gucht, EU trade commissioner, says, the renminbi remains less of a concern in Europe than in the US – possibly because, though the EU runs a large bilateral deficit with China, its overall current account has been much closer to balance.
He also cast doubt this week on what could be achieved. "It's not [because of] high pressure from the outside that the Chinese are going to revalue their currency – and, by the way, the prime minister made that very clear," he said this week.
Across the emerging economies, the plan of attack seems to be to keep quiet and pass the ammunition. Despite widespread recognition of the distortions China's exchange rate policy appear to be causing, governments have generally preferred unilateral intervention to a public slanging match.
True, in April the governors of the Reserve Bank of India and the Central Bank of Brazil complained that Beijing was hurting their exporters.
But recently Celso Amorim, Brazil's foreign minister, told Reuters: "I believe that this idea of putting pressure on a country is not the right way for finding solutions." Significantly, he added: "We have good co-ordination with China and we've been talking to them. We can't forget that China is currently our main customer."
Indeed, while Chinese companies are proving fierce competitors to the manufacturing industries of countries such as Brazil, volume today trumps price on the trade front. Despite the global recession and the rise in its exchange rate, Brazilian exports to China rose by about a quarter in 2009, led by soya beans, iron ore and other commodities. Meanwhile exports to the US – mainly manufactured goods – fell by nearly half. In 2009 China overturned nearly 80 years of history by replacing the US as Brazil's largest trading partner.
Though exports to China have been an important part of Brazil's remarkable economic resilience, some warn the relationship could become a colonial one, with China sucking up raw materials while hollowing out manufacturing. Rubens Barbosa of Fiesp, a São Paulo business group, says the government was wrong to designate China a "market economy" in 2004 – making it harder to block imports for being underpriced – and has been complacent about the "invasion" of Chinese products.
As for the doubling of duty on foreign capital inflows: "The government is finally doing what it should have done a long time ago," he says. But he too is sceptical about explicit lobbying. "I don't think they will bow to this pressure," he says. "China knows exactly what they want and what they can do."
New Delhi, meanwhile, another emerging market behemoth, has its own reasons for soft-pedalling. Eswar Prasad, a former senior IMF official who has advised the Indian authorities, says India is more welcoming to capital inflows than are many emerging markets. The economy runs a current account deficit and needs to borrow from abroad to finance its huge infrastructure programmes. It also suffers from high inflation, which a stronger exchange rate will help to quell.
In the rest of east Asia, many governments have for several years offset the effect of renminbi manipulation by quietly intervening against their own currencies. South Korea has given the distinct impression that it would prefer exchange rates not be discussed at the G20 meeting it is hosting in November. Officials refuse point-blank to discuss their policy or indeed to admit that Seoul has been intervening to stop appreciation.
In south-east Asia – possibly excepting Singapore, rich and independent enough to go its own way – most countries have been silent. China's increasingly aggressive diplomacy in the region, evinced by its handling of the recent spat over the collision of a Chinese trawler with Japanese coastguard vessels, has raised the costs of a public dispute with Beijing.
So far, the benefits to emerging Asia of encouraging exports by holding down currencies have outweighed the risks from having to manage surges in capital inflows. "Over the past five or 10 years, most of these countries have tied their currencies to the renminbi or the dollar and allowed China to take the heat," says Robert Madsen of Stanford University. With the US and its economic model discredited in the region because of the global financial crisis, he says, a power and policy vacuum has begun to open up that Beijing has filled.
W with the prospect of diplomatic progress limited, currency policy in the US and Europe may end up being conducted through domestic monetary policy. If, as seems possible, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank return to quantitative easing in order to boost growth, their currencies are likely to weaken – as the yen briefly did after the Bank of Japan's announcement of looser monetary policy this week.
But this is unlikely to defuse tension over currencies. Emerging market countries have a tendency to regard QE as a form of foreign exchange intervention, since it essentially creates dollars, euros or yen, and pushes them out into the global markets to offset those being bought by other governments. As Derek Scissors of the conservative Heritage Foundation in the US wryly notes: "The biggest force undermining the dollar is the US Federal Reserve, and the dollar's biggest defender is the People's Bank of China."
Even the perennially optimistic Mr Geithner accepts that a definitive agreement to allow more exchange rate flexibility is an ongoing negotiation that will not suddenly be achieved at November's G20. The world may not yet have descended into all-out currency war but it is a very long way from having negotiated a lasting armistice.
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