长久的等待已经结束，现在开始了交接。本周一，朝鲜媒体首次提到了金正银(Kim Jong-eun)的名字。在时隔44年召开党代会前夕，朝鲜任命了五位新的大将，金正银就是其中之一。
得到提升的还有金敬姬(Kim Kyong-hui)。一位是涉世不深的27岁青年，一位是中年女性轻工业部长，这样的人物获得“四星大将”军衔是很稀罕的事。但他们不是姓金的普通人。金正银是疾病缠身的朝鲜领导人金正日(Kim Jong-il)第三子。金敬姬则是金正日的妹妹，其夫张成泽(Jang Song-taek)多年来一直是“敬爱领袖”的得力臂助。
说起来就是一家子。名义上，朝鲜劳动党控制着军队，可从这些新颁发的肩章可以看出，哪一个权力结构真正有分量。这可算不上共产主义，而更多是一种军事化的、对外乞讨的君主政体——而且已到了山穷水尽之时。
朝鲜今后将何去何从？撰写本文之际，新任的年轻大将尚未公开露过面，更别说讲话了。朝鲜政治这一通常精心编排的戏剧这回看上去有点零乱。党代会为什么推迟？金正日为什么突然跑到中国，在4个月内第二次访华？
会议推迟可能有三个原因：水灾致使代表们出行不便；金正日的健康问题；或者政治内斗。而中国之行是为了争取中方对朝鲜交接班安排的认可，并为劳动党筹措经费。不然，厌倦而挨饿的朝鲜人民可能再也无法忍受这些严厉而无用的领导人。
获得中方认可必须付出代价。据报道，中国国家主席胡锦涛坚持要求朝鲜推行耽搁已久的市场改革。知名改革派人物、朝鲜前总理朴凤柱(Pak Pong-ju)近期复出，让人产生希望。国际社会的另一项要求——弃核——则要更长时间才有可能实现。但中国会要求朝鲜停止核试验作为一个开始。
朝鲜虽然高呼自力更生，但老路已经到了尽头。要保住权力，金氏家族别无选择，只能躲在中国的羽翼之下。这是一味苦药。党内、军内和第一家庭内部未必人人都受得了。
稳定远非板上钉钉。权力斗争、政策分歧（鹰派对鸽派）以及国际上可与谁结盟这三大问题，都可能导致精英阶层分裂。对朝鲜及其邻国乃至全世界来说，这都是一个令人焦虑的时刻。任何事情都可能发生，包括政权瓦解。
19世纪末期愚昧而固步自封的朝鲜王朝（当年的“隐士王国”）瓦解时，周边强国在废墟上争战不休，使得局势更加恶化。当年，日本赶走俄罗斯，而中国也在衰落过程中。
围绕朝鲜半岛的强国争战不太可能重演。六方会谈没能说服朝鲜放弃核武器，但增进了其他五方（美国、中国、韩国、日本和俄罗斯）相互之间的了解。美国和韩国已制定了应对朝鲜政权瓦解的多套应急预案，而中国也另有对策。目前各方迫切需要悄悄通气；对手争抢金氏不受严密控制的核武器，这种局面简直不堪想象。
不过，竞争的可能性要大于发生冲突的可能性，而赢家已显而易见。出于各种不同的原因，五方中已有四方认输。苏联造就了朝鲜，但当今的俄罗斯无心扶植金氏家族（仍欠着苏联时期遗留的数十亿债务）。日本过去也和朝鲜有大量接触，但近期日本对朝鲜出台大量制裁，实际上退出了在朝鲜树立影响力的竞争。
韩国目前也是同样的做法。李明博总统(Lee Myung-bak)对朝鲜的强硬立场，葬送了十年“阳光政策”所取得的成果。今年3月朝鲜用鱼雷击沉韩国“天安”舰，是一个恶毒的报复行为，难免让双方都耿耿于怀。远隔着太平洋的美国若无盟友韩国相助，在朝鲜问题上很难有所作为。
如此一来，只有中国（亚太地区正在崛起中的强国，一如一个世纪前的日本）有动机和能力拯救朝鲜脱离困境。中方正在朝鲜多处港口和矿场进行投资。这里不存在占领的问题，但是否属于渐进式的“附庸国化”就另当别论了。
理论上，这种情形让人懊恼，尤其是对韩国来说。不过，假使中国悄然把朝鲜控制于掌中，拔下这只凶恶小恐龙的尖牙，相关各方大概都会松一口气。
本文作者是利兹大学(Leeds University)社会学与现代朝鲜领域的荣誉高级研究员
译者/杨远
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034876
The long wait is over; the transition has begun. On Monday North Korean media for the first time uttered the name of Kim Jong-eun, as one of five new generals gazetted on the eve of a very rare meeting of party activists; the last such was 44 years ago.
Also promoted is Kim Kyong-hui. Four-star general is a rare rank for an untried youth of 27, as it is for a middle-aged female director of light industry. But these are not just any old Kims. Jong-eun is the third son of Pyongyang’s ailing leader, Kim Jong-il. Kyong-hui is his sister. She is married to Jang Song-taek, long the Dear Leader’s right-hand man.
So it is all in the family. And although the Workers’ Party of Korea nominally controls the army, all those new epaulettes show which power structure counts. Communism this is not; more a militarised but mendicant monarchy, now on its uppers.
Where does North Korea go from here? At the time of writing the new young general has yet to be seen, much less heard. For once the well-choreographed theatre that passes for politics in Pyongyang is looking wobbly. Why was this meeting postponed? And why did Kim Jong-il suddenly scuttle off to China, his second visit in under four months?
The postponement may have had three reasons: floods preventing delegates from travelling; Kim Jong-il’s health; or political in-fighting. The China trip was to win approval for the succession and cash to finance the party. Otherwise a fed-up and unfed populace may finally lose patience with such harsh but useless rulers.
That imprimatur will have had a price. Hu Jintao, China’s president, reportedly insisted on long-overdue market reforms. The recent return of ex-premier Pak Pong-ju, a known reformer, is hopeful here. The world’s other demand, denuclearisation, will take longer. But China will demand and end to nuclear tests, for starters.
For all its shrill boasts of self-reliance, the old game is up for North Korea. To hold on to power the Kim family has no choice now but to shelter under China’s wing. That is a bitter pill to swallow. Not everyone in the party, the army or the first family necessarily accepts it.
Stability is far from guaranteed. Three major faultlines – struggles for power, policy disputes (hawks versus doves), and who if anyone to align with internationally – may yet see the elite fractured. This is an anxious moment for North Korea, its neighbours and the world. Anything is possible, including regime collapse.
Last time a benighted and introverted Korean dynasty crumbled – the “hermit kingdom” of the late 19th century – this was exacerbated as neighbouring powers fought over the corpse. Then, Japan saw off a Russia and China themselves also in decline.
Fresh great-power conflict over the peninsula is unlikely. The six-party talks did not disarm North Korea, but enabled the other five – the US, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – to understand each other better. But Washington and Seoul have contingency plans for various collapse scenarios – and so, separately, does Beijing. Quiet liaison is urgent; the prospect of rival races to nab Kim’s loose nukes hardly bears thinking about.
Yet competition is likelier than conflict, and the winner is already clear. For various reasons, four of the five have thrown in the towel. The USSR created North Korea, but Russia today – still owed billions in Soviet-era debts – barely bothers to cultivate the Kims. Japan too had substantial contacts with Pyongyang but has recently piled on sanctions, in effect ruling itself out of the running for influence.
Now Seoul has done the same. President Lee Myung-bak’s hard line has lost ground gained during a decade of the “sunshine” policy. The North’s torpedoing of the corvette Cheonan in March was a vicious bite in reprisal, which will be very hard for either side to move on from. The US, far across the Pacific, has scant ability to act independently of its Korean ally.
That leaves China alone – now the region’s rising power, like Japan a century ago – with the means and motive to save North Korea from itself. Already Beijing is investing in ports and mines. There is no question of occupation, but creeping “satellisation” is something else.
In theory that is galling, especially for Seoul. Yet if China quietly takes North Korea in hand and defangs this fierce little dinosaur, all concerned might breathe a sigh of relief.
The writer is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University
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