中国是全球投行最孜孜以求的市场，谁要是不信，只需看看今年10月友邦保险(AIA)首次公开发行(IPO)牵头银行的名单，就会打消疑虑。
友邦保险在香港的IPO由11家银行共同运作，包括九家华尔街银行，以及中国工商银行(ICBC)和马来西亚的CIMB，阵容之大创历史纪录。他们共同分享相当于融资额1.75%的佣金费用。友邦保险是经营失败的美国保险公司美国国际集团(AIG)的亚洲业务，从此次IPO中融资178亿美元。
表面上看，此次佣金费用数额庞大，每家银行平均进账2800万美元。但这跟大投行习以为常的水准（不管是在当今的西方市场，还是在前些年的中国市场）相去甚远。事实上，从各投行在这样一笔交易中投入的人力时间来说，他们拿到的报酬堪称微薄。
许多银行家可能正在自问：这个曾经大有盼头的市场，最终会不会破坏他们在世界其它地区玩转多年的高利润业务模式？中国市场上的激烈竞争，会不会催生一套利润较低的全球投行业务收费标准？
参与中国农业银行(ABC)7月份IPO的西方银行家以不无埋怨的敬佩语气说，如今交易佣金微薄，主要要归功——或说归咎——于一个人：潘功胜。2006年工行IPO时，潘功胜是工行的董事会秘书，后来调到农行任副行长，负责上市事宜。农行从IPO中融资221亿美元，创历史新高。
利用参与工行IPO获得的经验，他在谈判中能够寸步不让，致使争相参与这起全球空前浩大IPO的外资银行们形成"鹬蚌相争"之势。农行IPO是个显著的例子，说明形势已经变了：中国如今作为全球交易撮合行业的一个亮点，它的官员自然能够在交易中争取到投行的让步。
这让外资银行的境况变得比意想的更为艰难，与金融危机前相比更是差了很多。"这些委托是辛苦了多年才拿到的，"高盛亚洲(Goldman Sachs Asia)董事长迈克•埃文斯(Mike Evans)表示。
在金融危机中，许多已在中国打下根基的华尔街银行财力和声誉双双受损，而中国本土竞争对手的快速成长，更是进一步削弱了他们的地位。中国本土银行日益受到本国企业青睐。它们即使是在前往海外攻城略地，进行融资和收购的时候，也日益喜欢与本土银行合作。
农行IPO就是个很好的例子。华尔街银行和中国券商一起争夺运作这起IPO的委托，最终拿到委托的只有四家全球性投行，高盛是其中之一，此外还有五家中国机构，以及澳大利亚的麦格理集团(Macquarie)。
高盛近五年前就开始"追求"农行，决意在中国四大国有银行最后一家的上市中扮演主要角色。埃文斯负责这项工作，不时会请身在纽约的集团首席执行官劳埃德•布兰克费恩(Lloyd Blankfein)到中国露露面，以示对这笔交易的重视。
几个月后，摩根大通(JPMorgan)亚太区董事长兼首席执行官戈比•阿伯德鲁(Gaby Abdelnour)不甘人后，也决定出手。于是，历来和中国银行(BoC)走得比较近的摩根大通，开始在从衍生品到贸易融资的广泛领域，与农行发展更紧密的关系。及至农行准备挑选投行为其IPO护航时，总共有二十多家银行参与了竞争。
把发展重点放在亚洲，尤其是中国，是完全可以理解的。随着亚洲在全球经济增长中所占比重逐渐上升，其在全球资本市场及金融咨询市场中所占的份额也不断扩大。事实上，亚洲交易规模和数量的增长速度甚至经常超出GDP的增速。
根据汤森路透(Thomson Reuters)的数据，2010年前9个月，在新兴市场国家宣布的并购交易总额超过4800亿美元，同比增长63%。中国是第一大目标市场，期内共达成逾2300起交易，总额856亿美元。"要是不在亚洲立足，你就成不了世界领先者，"巴克莱资本亚洲(Barclays Capital Asia)的玛特•金斯伯格(Matt Ginsberg)在香港表示。
但仔细分析一下就会发现，这些交易的规模虽然大增，但其利润的增长前景也许并没有那么好。这预示着，亚洲投行业可能会重蹈许多中国国企的命运，包括可能连续多年出现无利润增长。
假如农行交易"发生在两年前，佣金就会是现在的两倍"，某大型国际银行驻香港的地区投行业务联席主管表示。"现在市场上有很多新进入者，意味着佣金受到了挤压，他们或许拿不到很多业务，但他们会对利润率造成影响。"
一般来说，投行在亚洲地区索取的IPO运作费用只有英美的一小部分。然而亚洲地区的经营环境可能要比英美艰难得多。比如，农行要求高盛和摩根士丹利等主要安排行把承销费降低7500万美元，理由是农行是自己出面跟企业投资者洽谈的。
并购业务收入也很微薄。今年前9个月，来自中国的收益仅3.28亿美元。高盛仅在8月为瑞士诺华制药(Novartis)收购爱尔康(Alcon)提供咨询服务，就赚了估计6100万美元，由此观之，上述收入实在微不足道。某银行估计，按占市值的百分比计算，中国的佣金水平不到欧洲的一半。
华尔街银行之间的竞争十分激烈。过去许多年，领先的高盛和摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)都是跟花旗集团(Citigroup)、瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)、德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)和瑞银(UBS)等争夺生意。如今，摩根大通重新把旗帜插到了这个地区。巴克莱资本正从各竞争对手处延揽明星人才，为亚洲业务招兵买马。
美国银行(Bank of America)——美银的一位前投行家透露，这个名称有其缘故，该行过去在国际上飘忽不定——在吞并美林(Merrill Lynch)后，如今已卷土重来。日本的野村证券(Nomura)从未离开，但在收购了雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的亚洲业务后，更加不容小觑。渣打(Standard Chartered)正在加大马力，麦格理亦是如此。
许多竞争对手携雄厚的资产负债而来，对传统上主攻顾问业务的投行形成更大挑战。摩根士丹利力图利用三菱UFJ(Mitsubishi UFJ Bank)的资产负债（危机后，三菱UFJ成为摩根士丹利的股东）。以不愿利用自身资产负债为交易提供资金而著称的高盛，估计将越来越多地通过提供资金来获得交易，而在过去，该行不用提供这种甜头也能轻松获得业务。
然而，更让银行家们担心的是，中国金融机构对本土交易的竞争正在迅猛加强，而且，这些中国金融集团日后可能会追随其国家冠军企业，走向海外。
今年迄今为止，在除日本以外的亚洲地区，前十大投行的排名中仍然只有两家中国机构：中行和中金公司(CICC)。但也许很能预示未来走向的一个情况是，排名11到20位的主要是中国金融机构，包括中信集团(Citic)、中国银河证券(China Galaxy Securities)、国泰君安证券(Guotai Junan Securities)，以及工行、交通银行和农行等的证券部门（农行得益于亲自参与运作自己的IPO）。"国际公司将（逐渐）把市场份额输给中国公司，"摩根大通的阿伯德鲁表示。"形势正在转变。"
随着竞争加剧，前些年还占据市场主导地位的华尔街银行正眼看着市场迅速流失。例如，随着中国本土银行不断发展壮大，在今年前9个月完成的交易中，高盛所占的份额已下滑到2.9%，而其2006年的份额曾为6.3%。
由于竞争激烈导致佣金下降，加上中国本土银行向来有收费低的传统，有些人认为，全球投行业务的费用结构可能受到重大影响。
尽管如此，许多西方银行家目前并没有太把中国本土金融集团放在眼里。一些中国金融机构，尤其是国有银行的分公司，在薪酬上都有正式规定的限额。它们母公司总裁的年薪极少超过25万美元，所以在香港竞选所谓的"造雨人"(rainmaker，即知名经纪商)时，他们只能旁观。
但也正是因为付给员工的薪水相对较低，中资机构才能以如此低的佣金提供服务。市值居中国券商之首的中信证券(Citic Securities)，薪酬支出仅占总收入的20%，不到美国同行的一半。
中信的零售证券业务利润丰厚，但其董事长王东明颇负国际雄心，他愉快地告诉来客，他对日本券商进行了细致研究，以探求它们大多未能成功转型为国际机构的原因。
迄今所有的迹象都表明，不论是在国内还是在海外，王东明及中国其他投行人士都很有希望获得更大的市场份额。这可能意味着，不管在哪个市场，西方银行将进入利润下降的时期，或许就连西方银行家的奖金，也将不如以往丰厚。这也许表明，华尔街银行急于打入中国市场，却收获了事与愿违的苦果。
英国《金融时报》吉密欧(Jamil Anderlini)，帕特里克•詹金斯(Patrick Jenkins)，丽娜•塞格(Lina Saigol)，汉妮•桑德尔(Henny Sender)报道
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035895
For anyone in doubt that China is the market the world's investment banks are most desperate to make their own, just take a look at the roster of the groups that last month led the initial public offering of AIA.
The Hong Kong flotation of the Asian unit of AIG, the failed US insurer, was run by a record tally of 11 banks – nine of them Wall Street names. Along with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Malaysia's CIMB, they shared a fee pool worth 1.75 per cent of the $17.8bn deal.
On the face of it, that is a vast sum of money, leaving each bank with an average $28m. Yet it is a far cry from the levels that the big banks have become used to, both in the western markets of today and in the China of a few years ago. Indeed, for the personnel hours involved in working on such a deal, it is a relatively scant reward.
The question many bankers are asking themselves now is whether the market that promised so much could end up undermining the lucrative business model they have enjoyed for so long elsewhere in the world. Could the cut-throat competition in China set a new, less profitable baseline for investment banking fees worldwide?
Western bankers involved in the July flotation of Agricultural Bank of China – which raised a record $22.1bn – say with grudging respect that much of the credit, or blame, for the meagre fees of today's deals should go to one man: Pan Gongsheng. Mr Pan served as board secretary for ICBC when it carried out its own IPO in 2006, before being brought in as senior vice-president in charge of ABC's giant listing.
He was able to use his experience working on the ICBC deal to drive a hard bargain and play the foreign banks off against one another as they scrambled to be part of the world's largest-ever public listing. The ABC deal was a striking example of how the tables have turned – how China's position today as a bright spot on the global dealmaking landscape allows its mandarins to extract concessions on individual deals.
That is making life more difficult than expected for the foreign banks, and certainly tougher than it was prior to the financial crisis. "These mandates take years of hard work," says Mike Evans, chairman of Goldman Sachs Asia.
While the crisis weakened the finances, and reputations of many of the Wall Street names with an established presence in China, their status has been further eroded by fast- growing domestic competitors. Local banks are increasingly being favoured by Chinese companies, even in their forays offshore to raise money and make acquisitions.
The ABC flotation was a case in point, with Wall Street banks and Chinese brokerages competing for mandates to run the deal. Goldman, which ended up as one of only four global investment banks on the transaction, sat alongside five Chinese institutions and Australia's Macquarie.
Goldman began its courtship of ABC nearly five years ago, determined to secure itself a leading position in listing the last of China's big four state-owned banks. Mr Evans led the effort, occasionally bringing in Lloyd Blankfein, group chief executive, from New York to show the Chinese side how important the deal was.
Months later, Gaby Abdelnour, JPMorgan Chase's Asia-Pacific chairman and chief executive, decided his bank needed to play catch up. The bank, though historically close to the rival Bank of China, began developing a stronger relationship with ABC in a wide range of areas, from derivatives to trade finance. By the time ABC was ready to select investment banks to shepherd its market debut this year, about two dozen banks were competing for the privilege of participating in the record-beating deal.
The focus on Asia, and on China in particular, is understandable enough. The region has been driving an increasing share of the world's capital markets and financial advisory businesses, as it accounts for an increasing share of the world's economic growth. Indeed, the size of the deals and the volumes of the deals in many cases even outpace the speed of gross domestic product growth.
Mergers and acquisitions activity in emerging markets announced during the first nine months of 2010 exceeded $480bn – a 63 per cent increase on the equivalent period of 2009, according to Thomson Reuters. China was the most targeted market during the period, with more than 2,300 deals worth a combined $85.6bn. "You can't be a leader in the world if you are not in Asia," Matt Ginsberg of Barclays Capital Asia in Hong Kong declares.
But a closer look at the transactions suggests that the growth of the business might also outpace the profitability of the operations. That suggests that investment banking business in Asia may be coming to resemble the fate of many Chinese state enterprises, including the prospect of years of profitless growth.
Had the ABC transaction "happened two years ago, the fees would have been twice what they were", says the co-head of regional investment banking at one big international bank in Hong Kong. "There are lots of new entrants, which means that fees have become compressed. They may not win a lot of business but they have an impact on margins."
T ypically, the fees that banks can command for IPO work in Asia are a fraction of what they are in the US and UK. Even then, the operating environment can be notably more harsh. ABC, for example, demanded a $75m underwriting fee discount from its lead arrangers, which included Goldman and Morgan Stanley, on the grounds that it handled talks with corporate investors itself.
M&A pickings have been slim, too. For the first nine months of the year, the contribution generated by China was $328m. Put that in context of the estimated $61m Goldman earned in Switzerland advising Novartis on its acquisition of Alcon in August and the fees look paltry. One bank calculates that fees as a percentage of market capitalisation are less than half of what they are in Europe.
The competition is fierce enough among the Wall Street names. In past years, frontrunners Goldman and Morgan Stanley found themselves vying for deals with Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS. Now JPMorgan has replanted its flag in the region. Barclays Capital is recruiting stars from rivals for its Asian effort.
Bank of America – which is called that for a reason, notes one of its former investment bankers, citing BofA's past erratic international presence – is back, having swallowed Merrill Lynch. Nomura of Japan never left but, following its acquisition of Lehman Brothers' Asian operations, it is being taken more seriously. Standard Chartered is ramping up, as is Macquarie.
Many competitors come with big balance sheets – a further challenge to the traditional advisory-focused investment banks. Morgan Stanley tries to leverage the balance sheet of Mitsubishi UFJ Bank, its shareholder since the crisis. Goldman, famously reluctant to commit to financing deals on its own balance sheet, is expected increasingly to offer funding to secure the deals that used to come its way without that sweetener.
But what worries bankers more is the fast-rising presence of local competition on Chinese deals – and the threat that those financial groups will follow their national champions on ventures abroad.
The year-to-date rankings of deal-making banks across Asia, excluding Japan, still contain only two Chinese names – Bank of China and China International Capital Corporation – in the top 10. But in a likely sign of things to come, the next 10 names are dominated by China: they include Citic, China Galaxy Securities, Guotai Junan Securities and the securities arms of ICBC, Bank of Communications and ABC, thanks to work on its own IPO. "International firms will [gradually] lose market share to Chinese firms," says JPMorgan's Mr Abdelnour. "The mix is changing."
Wall Street names have seen a market they dominated until only a few years ago quickly slipping away, as competition for mandates intensifies. Goldman, for example, has seen its share of deals in the first nine months of this year fall to 2.9 per cent, compared with 6.3 per cent in 2006 as local banks increase their presence.
With the lower fees that come with such competition, and the cheaper pricing traditions of local Chinese banks, some believe there could be a powerful influence on the fee structures for global dealmaking.
Nonetheless, many western bankers for the time being do not take local Chinese financial groups seriously. Some of them, particularly the arms of state-owned banks, have official limits on salaries. The presidents of their parents rarely receive more than $250,000 a year, which leaves them on the sidelines when it comes to bidding for so-called rainmakers, the big-name deal brokers, in Hong Kong.
But it is precisely because they pay their bankers moderately that these local operators can afford to charge far lower fees. At Citic Securities, which has the largest market capitalisation of all the Chinese securities firms, pay absorbs just 20 per cent of revenues – less than half the proportion of their American counterparts.
Citic has a lucrative retail brokerage operation. But Wang Dong Ming, its head, has international ambitions, and happily tells visitors that he has studied Japan's securities houses closely to see why they largely failed to make the transition from being Japanese to being international.
All the signs so far suggest that Mr Wang and his fellow Chinese investment bankers are well placed to secure an ever bigger slice of business both at home and abroad. That could spell less profitable times ahead for western banks, wherever they operate – and perhaps even lead to a less lucrative bonus system for western bankers. It would suggest that Wall Street's rush into China had been painfully counterproductive.
Reporting by Jamil Anderlini, Patrick Jenkins, Lina Saigol and Henny Sender
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