中
国与欧洲主权债务危机之间是否有关联？
AFP/Getty Images
2010年12月1日，北京夜晚下班高峰期。
中国担心银行信贷规模激增会导致泡沫和引发通货膨胀，因而采取措施为经济刹车。受此影响，中国股市整体回落了25%。希腊主权债务问题正是在此期间浮出水面，希腊国债收益率飙升，并呈现出向整个欧元区蔓延的势头。而到了今年夏初，中国政府担心国内股市大跌会引发更大范围的经济滑坡，于是为提振经济又踩下了油门。与此同时，欧洲对希腊的大规模救助计划也缓解了欧元区的主权债务危机。
然而，随着通胀压力的上升，中国政府被迫再次采取行动给经济降温。尽管大多数措施是以调控物价为目的，但中国也由此开启了加息进程。而自中国政府采取新经济降温措施以来，中国股市已累计下跌10%左右。
巧合的是，欧洲的债务问题也在此期间死灰 燃。在欧元区所有外围国家都有可能被拖下水的情况下，这次欧洲不得不向爱尔兰伸出援手。
诚然，这种联系可能站不住脚。但这之间存在直接联系的可能性肯定是有的，而且传递这种联系的机制或许就是亚洲储蓄严重过剩。美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve，简称美联储)认为，正是这一机制导致了过去15年来全球经济失衡。
如果说在资产泡沫盛行的年代，是过剩的亚洲储蓄压低了各类资产的收益率，并导致美国出现极其庞大的经常项目赤字，那么在这些过剩的储蓄被释放时，自然也会破坏原来的平衡。
不幸的是，虽然全球经济再平衡的最终结果是让国家经济变得更健康，但过程将是曲折而痛苦的。其副作用之一便是主权债务压力增加，换句话说，就是政府举债的成本变得更高。
一些国家已处于破产的边缘，如欧元区外围国家。利率稍有上升都可能将他们推下悬崖。一旦发生这种情况，这些国家的债券将被投资者抛弃，收益率将随之大幅飙升。
若果真是这套机制在发生作用，中国和德国等拥有盈余的国家会发现，手中的外国债券将让他们损失惨重。拿德国来说，这种损失可能来自于免除爱尔兰、希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙的部分债务。至于中国，这种损失更有可能以美元贬值的形式出现。
无论如何，这些国家在全球失衡时代积累的财富的价值将比他们所想的要少得多。
Alen Mattich
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
Is there a China link to Europe's sovereign debt problems?
James Hamilton, an economics professor at the University of California, San Diego, has drawn an intriguing connection on his Econbrowser blog. During the spring, he noted, the spike in Greek yields that triggered the initial sovereign debt crisis was associated with China's early efforts to tighten its overheating economy.
Concerned that a huge expansion of bank credit would trigger bubbles and generalized inflation, China put the brakes on. This was followed by a 25% correction in Chinese equity prices. It was during this period that the Greek sovereign debt problems surfaced, sending yields on Greek government bonds rocketing, and threatening contagion across the euro zone. By early summer, the Chinese government, worried that slump in domestic equities would portend a wider economic crash, tapped on the accelerator again. Meanwhile, Europe's huge rescue plan for Greece eased pressure on euro-zone sovereign debt.
But with inflation pressure on the rise, the Chinese government has once again been forced into taking action. Although most of its efforts have been aimed at price controls, they've started to turn the screw on interest rates as well. Chinese equities have dropped around 10% since.
Is it a coincidence that the European debt problems have blown up again, this time forcing a rescue of Ireland with the risk that it'll spread across the whole of the euro zone's periphery?
To be sure, the connection could be spurious. But the likelihood must be that there is a direct relationship, probably through the same mechanism that the Federal Reserve has blamed for the global imbalances of the past 15 years or so: the Asian savings glut.
If excess Asian savings pushed down yields across asset classes during the bubble years, and prompted the U.S.'s very large current account deficit, then an unwinding of excess savings ought to unwind these balances.
Unfortunately, a global rebalancing is unlikely to be a smooth and painless process, even if the end result is healthier national economies. One of the drawbacks could well be upward pressure on sovereign debt. In other words more expensive government borrowing.
Some countries, such as those across Europe's periphery, are already on the cusp of insolvency. Any modest increase in interest rates could well tip them over the edge. Once that happens yields rocket as bond investors go on strike.
If this mechanism is in fact the case, surplus countries like China and Germany may well find themselves having to take considerable losses on the foreign debt they hold. In Germany's case, these losses could come in the form of forgiving Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain some of their debts. In China's they are more likely to come in the form of a dollar devaluation.
Whatever happens, the savings these countries have built up during the era of global imbalances will be worth considerably less than these countries think. The pain will be shared widely.
Alen Mattich
James Hamilton, an economics professor at the University of California, San Diego, has drawn an intriguing connection on his Econbrowser blog. During the spring, he noted, the spike in Greek yields that triggered the initial sovereign debt crisis was associated with China's early efforts to tighten its overheating economy.
Concerned that a huge expansion of bank credit would trigger bubbles and generalized inflation, China put the brakes on. This was followed by a 25% correction in Chinese equity prices. It was during this period that the Greek sovereign debt problems surfaced, sending yields on Greek government bonds rocketing, and threatening contagion across the euro zone. By early summer, the Chinese government, worried that slump in domestic equities would portend a wider economic crash, tapped on the accelerator again. Meanwhile, Europe's huge rescue plan for Greece eased pressure on euro-zone sovereign debt.
But with inflation pressure on the rise, the Chinese government has once again been forced into taking action. Although most of its efforts have been aimed at price controls, they've started to turn the screw on interest rates as well. Chinese equities have dropped around 10% since.
Is it a coincidence that the European debt problems have blown up again, this time forcing a rescue of Ireland with the risk that it'll spread across the whole of the euro zone's periphery?
To be sure, the connection could be spurious. But the likelihood must be that there is a direct relationship, probably through the same mechanism that the Federal Reserve has blamed for the global imbalances of the past 15 years or so: the Asian savings glut.
If excess Asian savings pushed down yields across asset classes during the bubble years, and prompted the U.S.'s very large current account deficit, then an unwinding of excess savings ought to unwind these balances.
Unfortunately, a global rebalancing is unlikely to be a smooth and painless process, even if the end result is healthier national economies. One of the drawbacks could well be upward pressure on sovereign debt. In other words more expensive government borrowing.
Some countries, such as those across Europe's periphery, are already on the cusp of insolvency. Any modest increase in interest rates could well tip them over the edge. Once that happens yields rocket as bond investors go on strike.
If this mechanism is in fact the case, surplus countries like China and Germany may well find themselves having to take considerable losses on the foreign debt they hold. In Germany's case, these losses could come in the form of forgiving Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain some of their debts. In China's they are more likely to come in the form of a dollar devaluation.
Whatever happens, the savings these countries have built up during the era of global imbalances will be worth considerably less than these countries think. The pain will be shared widely.
Alen Mattich
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