沃伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffet)上周六早晨发布了一年一度的致伯克希尔哈撒韦(Berkshire Hathaway)股东信，这封机智诙谐的信件吸引了无数的读者。这位喜欢成为人们关注焦点的80岁老人，仍是富有魅力的首席执行官角色的典型代表。但读者今年会仔细审视这封信件，看看它是否谈及了巴菲特离任后将由谁执掌伯克希尔。与苹果(Apple)首席执行官史蒂夫•乔布斯(Steve Jobs)一样，巴菲特似乎很难面对一个事实，即他作为人们关注焦点的时刻行将结束。
在接班人问题上，巴菲特的赚钱技能长期以来催生了一种“相信我”的行事方法。众所周知，巴菲特作为投资者所兼具的魅力与才能无人能及。早在上世纪90年代他就告诉股东们，他的工作最终将被分拆：一名首席执行官督管运营，一名首席投资官管理伯克希尔的投资组合。他在一封信中列出了秘密选定的接班人的名字。这封信的开头是“昨日我已离开尘世”，意味着只有当他去世时这封信才能被宣读。巴菲特说，一旦他有了任何其它关于接班人的想法，他会立刻告知他的家人——而非董事会。
2003年，监管者迫使巴菲特在一定程度上亮出手中的底牌。于是，他给了伯克希尔董事一份名单，上面列有首席执行官的三名内部候选人。但最近，候选人的个数从三个增加到四个。在一个管理得法的接班竞争中，随着时间的推移，人选应该越来越少，逻辑应该越来越清晰。在伯克希尔，这一过程却变得越来越难以捉摸。
例如，去年，当卢•辛普森(Lou Simpson)退休时，巴菲特并未抓住机会，阐明他对首席投资官是如何设想的。辛普森是巴菲特唯一依赖的投资经理。由于巴菲特还彻底抛弃了关于设立一名首席投资官的承诺，在他退休之后，伯克希尔1660亿美元的投资资产及衍生品组合将如何管理仍然是个谜。
市场如今已受够了“相信我”的行事方法，巴菲特已不再能从市场的怀疑中获得好处。伯克希尔的估值最近一直在稳步下跌，所谓的“巴菲特溢价”变成了“巴菲特折价”。在商业史中，因对糟糕的接班人规划之危害认识不清而英名尽丧的首席执行官比比皆是。眼下的危险是，巴菲特可能会加入那些失败的交班者的行列——当中包括他的朋友、保险公司美国国际集团(AIG)的莫里斯•“汉克”•格林伯格(Maurice “Hank” Greenberg)。格林伯格离任时，AIG遭受了重大亏损。正如历史已经证明的，除非投资者的信心得以重建，否则什么也阻止不了股价的下跌。
重建投资者信心的方法之一是提高透明度，但在伯克希尔，该做法存在两个阻碍。一个是巴菲特自己——他不愿意讨论接班人问题。另一个是巴菲特的一个希望——他想让自己的子女发挥某种作用。他每年都会在年报中指出，他的子女应该“帮助”挑选公司的管理层。去年，他还写道，如果董事会选择他子女当中的一人担任非执行董事长，那将是“明智”的。
巴菲特希望家人参与伯克希尔事务的想法是可以理解的，但从商业角度看却不具正当理由。事实上，显而易见的非执行董事长人选是比尔•盖茨(Bill Gates)。鉴于巴菲特已决定将大部分财产委托给盖茨与其妻子梅琳达(Melinda)的慈善基金，伯克希尔最大的一部分经济利益最终将由盖茨夫妇控制。盖茨在微软(Microsoft)的交班过程处理得当，堪称典范。
如果把接班问题提交伯克希尔股东投票抉择，我们很难想象他们会认为，从商业角度看，巴菲特的儿子霍华德(Howard)——一位农场主及颇有成就的摄影师——是更为明智的非执行董事长人选。最后，这一抉择也并非仅是假设性的。一旦董事会做出相关决定，市场就会进行投票，投票结果将反映在伯克希尔的价值中。
伯克希尔下任首席执行官的选择问题也同样如此。董事会必须意识到，除了在若干由拥有巨大人格魅力的非凡领袖执掌的公司，商界的“相信我”时代多年前就已经结束。这些公司越早意识到自己的“相信我”时代也行将结束，前景就会越好——对股东来说如此，对它们首席执行官留下的财富来说也是如此。
本文作者著有《滚雪球：沃伦•巴菲特和他的财富人生》(The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life)一书。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001037201
Warren Buffett’s witty annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders will reach an audience of millions when released on Saturday morning. The 80-year-old loves the limelight, and still epitomises the role of charismatic chief executive. But this year’s report will be examined for what it says about who will run Berkshire after he is gone. And as with Apple chief executive Steve Jobs, Mr Buffett seems to be struggling with the fact that his moment in the limelight is ending.
Mr Buffett’s money-making skills have long engendered a “trust me” approach to his succession. It is understood that no one can match his mix of charisma and prowess as an investor. Back in the 1990s, he told his shareholders only that his job would eventually be split: with a chief executive overseeing operations, and a chief investment officer handling Berkshire’s portfolio. The names of those secretly anointed were memorialised in a letter that began “Yesterday I died”, meant to be read only on that occasion. Mr Buffett said he would keep his family – not the board – posted with any other succession thoughts.
In 2003, regulators forced Mr Buffett to partially show his hand, by giving Berkshire’s directors a list of three internal candidates for the chief executive role. But recently the number of candidates has expanded, from three to four. In a well-run succession race the choices should become fewer, and the reasoning clearer as time passes. At Berkshire, the process has grown murkier.
Last year, for example, Mr Buffett failed to take a chance to clarify how he envisaged the chief investing role, when Lou Simpson, the only investing manager Mr Buffett ever relied on, retired. Just how the company’s $166bn of invested assets and its derivatives portfolio will be managed after he retires remains a mystery, because he has also backed away from the commitment to have a chief investment officer at all.
The market is now fed up with the “trust me” approach, and is no longer giving Mr Buffett the benefit of the doubt. Berkshire’s valuation has progressed steadily downward of late, turning the so-called “Buffett premium” into a “Buffett discount”. The annals of business are filled with chief executives who have fallen prey to the blind spot of poor succession planning. The danger now is that Mr Buffett will join a list of failed transitions that includes the financially disastrous departure of his friend, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg of insurance company AIG. And as history has shown, there is nothing to prevent stock from getting cheaper, unless investors’ confidence is rebuilt.
One way to do that is through more transparency, but at Berkshire there are two obstacles. One is Mr Buffett himself, who is not open about succession. The second is Mr Buffett’s desire that his children should play a role. He argues each year in his annual report that his children should “help” to pick the company’s management. Last year he also wrote that it would be “wise” for the board to choose one of them as non-executive chairman.
Mr Buffett’s wish for his family to be involved is understandable, but there is no business justification for it. Indeed, the obvious choice for non-executive chairman is Bill Gates who, with his wife Melinda, will eventually control the largest economic interest in Berkshire, through Mr Buffett’s decision to entrust the bulk of his fortune to their charitable foundation. Mr Gates is also an example of a transition well-handled, at Microsoft.
If the matter were put to a vote of Berkshire’s shareholders, it is hard to imagine that they would see Mr Buffett’s son, Howard, a farmer and accomplished photographer, as the wiser business choice for non-executive chairman. Ultimately, this choice will not be hypothetical either. When the board decides, the market will vote, and the results will show in Berkshire’s value.
The same is true with Berkshire’s choice of its next chief executive. The board must realise that the “trust me” era in business has been over for years, except at a few companies run by unusual leaders with gigantic personalities. The sooner these companies realise it is ending there too, the better it will be – for shareholders, and for their chief executive’s legacy.
The writer is author of The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life
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