格雷欣法则(Gresham's Law)应该有一个推论：不但“劣币会驱逐良币”，“廉”币也会驱逐良币。接近于零的超低央行政策利率，实际上可能会使金融体系去杠杆化而非再杠杆化，使实体经济萎缩而不是扩张。恰如牛顿物理学被颠覆、爱因斯坦提出的概念以光速占据统治地位一样，宽松货币政策在利率接近于零时可能真的无法起到刺激作用。
历史上，央行一直对一种模型颇为信赖。该模型声称，不断压低收益率会刺激总需求，就金融市场而言，则会推动资产购买活动趋向“风险光谱”外侧——因为投资者希望维持较高的回报。在美国、欧洲乃至日本，接近于零的政策利率和一系列“定量宽松”(QE)政策，暂时成功地维系了资产市场和实体经济的正常运转。眼下，由于几乎所有发达经济体的政策利率都已达到或接近于零，定量宽松又面临着政治上的限制，因此，无论是对历史上的概念性模型的有效性提出质疑，还是对这些模型是否有可能对经济健康构成危害（与人们的直觉判断相左）进行探讨，都在情理之中。
重要的是，“格雷欣推论”并非“推绳子”(pushing on a string)或“流动性陷阱”的别称。后两个概念在很大程度上取决于人们觉察到信贷市场风险不断加剧，这种觉察反过来会减弱贷款机构扩张信贷的动力。近零利率使问题变得更加严重。近零利率下的资金——先抛开信贷质量不提——产生不了任何信贷扩张的动力。威尔•罗杰斯(Will Rogers)曾在大萧条时期深情地表示，他更关心的是他的资金能否收回，而不是他的资金能否产生回报。但从整个体系的视角来看，当资金名义回报率接近于零、实际回报率为高额负值时，信贷市场的正常功能可能会失灵。
货币市场基金商业模式的逆转就是一个很好的例子。按照当前的收益率和营运开支水平，货币市场基金永远不可能实现盈利。随着货币市场资产的规模因之出现缩水，整个体系的杠杆率都下降了——尽管客户将所持资产转移到银行（银行把所得资金转投入存放在美联储(Fed)的准备金中，而不是转投于私人市场的商业票据）。此外，在近零利率下，银行不再积极地招揽存款，因为利用存款来赚取利润难度很大。招揽存款后转投于拥有一定期限溢价利差的无风险资产（2年期、3年期乃至5年期美国国债就是很好的例子）是一回事；当这些中期国债的收益率只有20至90个基点时就是另一回事了，银行成本高昂的基础设施会削弱利润潜力。目前，银行业动辄裁员上万人，整个行业的分支机构扩张趋势正在逆转，这绝非偶然现象。
就低收益美国国债而言，“格雷欣推论”乍一看似乎不合逻辑。如果银行能以近零利率借到资金，那么理论上它应该肯定能够赚到钱。但这里面有个重要的因素，那就是收益曲线平坦化及其对所有信贷市场中放贷活动的影响。如果联邦基金利率和30年期美国国债收益率相同，或者商业票据收益率和30年期公司债收益率相同，那么资本主义肯定无法良好地运转。致使金融业增长和实体经济增长去杠杆化的不止是过高的债务水平、无力偿债和流动性陷阱等因素；接近于零的名义利率、名义利率将在“相当长一段时间”内维持在这一水平的假设、以及由此导致的收益率曲线平坦化，同样是罪魁祸首。
从概念上讲，当金融体系再也不能为自己创造的信贷找到出口时，就会去杠杆化。应当从收益率以及信贷风险的角度来理解这个观点。如果从格雷欣法则来看，收益率和信贷都面临风险，那么二者的相互作用可能会造成危害。近期MF Global倒闭的例子就突显了这个概念，欧洲某些处境艰难经济体的储户的所作所为也说明了这一点。如果投资者将资金存入某家投行或经纪商，而该投行或经纪商不但看上去面临风险、而且还把投资者的钱吞得一干二净，那么为何还要存在它们那里呢？尽管美国有证券投资者保护公司(SIPC)，但与把100美元存到经纪商那里相比，投资者恐怕还是觉得把它藏在床垫下面更放心。如果真是这样，就会发生整个体系的去杠杆化，而不是历史上那种对于经济增长来说必不可少的信贷扩张。
历史上的例子和央行的人员模式很可能无法为这一新的“格雷欣推论”提供佐证。美联储主席本•伯南克(Ben Bernanke)认为，上世纪30年代经济再次下滑的原因是政策利率上调，60年后日本“失去的几十年”的原因在于没能进行信贷扩张。不过，各国央行都应当从常识出发询问一下，超级廉价的资金能否持续带来信贷扩张，而不会摧毁流动性、导致去杠杆化并阻碍复苏。理论与这个新时代更相符的经济学家可能是格雷欣，而不是凯恩斯(Keynes)。
本文作者为太平洋投资管理公司(Pimco)联席首席投资官
译者/邢嵬
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001042438
Gresham’s law needs a corollary. Not only does “bad money drive out good”, but “cheap” money may as well. Ultra low, zero-bounded central bank policy rates might in fact delever instead of relever the financial system, creating contraction instead of expansion in the real economy. Just as Newtonian physics breaks down and Einsteinian concepts prevail at the speed of light, so too might easy money policies fail to stimulate at the zero bound.
Historically, central banks have comfortably relied on a model which dictates that lower and lower yields will stimulate aggregate demand and, in the case of financial markets, drive asset purchases outward on the risk spectrum as investors seek to maintain higher returns. Near zero policy rates and a series of “quantitative easings” have temporarily succeeded in keeping asset markets and real economies afloat in the US, Europe and even Japan. Now, with policy rates at or approaching zero yields and QE facing political limits in almost all developed economies, it is appropriate not only to question the effectiveness of historical conceptual models but to entertain the possibility that they may, counterintuitively, be hazardous to an economy’s health.
Importantly, Gresham’s corollary is not another name for “pushing on a string” or a “liquidity trap”. Both of these concepts depend significantly on perception of increasing risk in credit markets which in turn reduce the incentive of lenders to expand credit. Rates at the zero bound do something more. Zero-bound money – credit quality aside – creates no incentive to expand it. Will Rogers once fondly said in the Depression that he was more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money. But from a system-wide perspective, when the return on money becomes close to zero in nominal terms and substantially negative in real terms, then normal functionality may break down.
A good example would be the reversal of the money market fund business model where operating expenses make it perpetually unprofitable at current yields. As money market assets then decline, system wide leverage is reduced even if clients transfer holdings to banks, which themselves reinvest proceeds in Fed reserves as opposed to private market commercial paper. Additionally, at the zero bound, banks no longer aggressively pursue deposits because of the difficulty in profiting from their deployment. It is one thing to pursue deposits that can be reinvested risk free at a term premium spread – two-, three-, even five-year Treasuries being good examples. But when those front end Treasuries yield only 20 to 90 basis points, a bank’s expensive infrastructure reduces profit potential. It is no coincidence that tens of thousands of layoffs are occurring in the banking industry, and that branch expansion is reversing industry wide.
In the case of low yielding Treasuries the Gresham’s corollary at first blush seems illogical. If a bank can borrow at near 0 per cent, then theoretically it should have no problem making a profit. What is important, however, is the flatness of the yield curve and its effect on lending across all credit markets. Capitalism would not work well if Fed funds and 30-year Treasuries coexisted at the same yield, nor if commercial paper and 30-year corporates did as well. It is not only excessive debt levels, insolvency and liquidity trap considerations that delever both financial and real economic growth; it is the zero-bound nominal yield, the assumption that it will stay there for an “extended period of time” and the resultant flatness of yield curves which are the culprits.
Conceptually, when the financial system can no longer find outlets for the credit it creates, then it delevers. The point should be understood from a yield as well as a credit risk point of view. When both yield and credit are at risk from the standpoint of “Gresham’s law”, the mix can be toxic. The recent example of MF Global emphasises the concept, as does the behaviour of depositors in some struggling European economies. If an investor has money on deposit with an investment bank/broker that not only appears to be at risk but returns nothing, then why maintain the deposit? Perhaps an investor would be more comfortable with a $100 bill at home in a mattress than a $100 bill on deposit with a broker – Securities Investor Protection Corporation notwithstanding. If so, system-wide delevering takes place as opposed to the credit extension historically necessary for an expanding economy.
Historical examples and central bank staff models will probably not validate this new Gresham’s corollary. Fed chairman Ben Bernanke blames policy rate increases in the midst of the 1930s for an economic relapse, and a lack of credit expansion for Japan’s lost decades 60 years later. But all central banks should commonsensically question whether ultra-cheap money continually creates expansions as opposed to destroying liquidity, delevering and obstructing recovery. Gresham as opposed to Keynes may become the applicable economist of this new day.
Bill Gross is founder and co-chief investment officer of Pimco
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