2010年11月30日

对个人转让限售股征税意欲何为? Potent Implications of a Mundane Tax Statement

国财政部发出的一则貌似不起眼的补充通知被很多人认为是造成如今中国股市大面积抛售的其中一个原因,这则通知是有关于一项11个月之前开始实施的措施,即对转让或出售限售股所得征收个人所得税。

Reuters
一位投资者在上海股票交易所电子公告牌前。昨日,中国股市大跌。
然而,该声明引发的恐慌和困惑远远超出了股票投资范围,甚至在一定程度上表明了中国在使快速增长的经济转型过程中面临着不断增长的财政压力,和中国政府试图解决其资产负债表上的一些短期问题。

中国财政部自今年1月1日起,开始对以前属于非流通股的股票出售所得征收20%的个人所得税。自中国开始股票交易之初,非流通股就代表政府权属和对大多数上市公司的控制。个人所得税影响的主要是那些在国有企业改革后获得这些公司的大量股票并第一次将其卖出的股票持有者。

如今这则貌似技术性的中文声明让个人所得税的征收范围更加明确。声明详细说明了这项税收适用的限售股为个人从机构或其他个人受让的未解禁限售股、个人因依法继承及因上市公司合并、原被合并方公司限售股所转换的股份。这份说明似乎足以吓到投资者并引发股票抛售。

眼下中国国内经济增长放缓,通货膨胀水平不断升高,全球经济疲软,在这个节骨眼上,很难想象北京会试图故意打压本月已累计下跌超过6%的股市,而股市的下跌缘于中国大幅收紧信贷和货币政策。然而若再考虑到前不久中国决定提高购买特定车型的购置税并增加个人带外国商品的入境关税,那么这份声明的言外之意的确是在说,中国政府越来越迫不及待地希望寻找新的财政收入来源。

不仅如此,外界还一直盛传中国政府可能会征收某种房产税。语焉不详的征税计划曾在一开始被解读为对抗中国顽固不化的房地产泡沫的最后一招,但越来越多的投资者开始相信,中国政府是因为可卖给开发商的土地量正在日益减少,才考虑利用征税作为补偿。

表面上来看,中国的财政状况十分坚挺。财政赤字规模属温和范围,持有外汇储备量居世界第一。但是,鉴于北京方面启动的4万亿元大力投资基础设施建设的刺激计划产出的回报很低并且要花很长时间,人们的担忧开始加剧,担心中国的财政在未来几年会面临越来越大的压力。

对财政状况恶化的预期因大肆宣传的十二五规划而进一步加强,十二五规划旨在实现"更健康"及更平衡的经济增长,部分通过改革中国不完善的社会福利体系和对清洁能源等新产业的大量投资。

与此同时,中国银行业已处于超负荷、易发风险的状态,地方政府融资平台难以控制,县级政府实际上濒于破产,外界对此的担忧也有增无减。

为了解决上述部分问题,中国一些智库和学术机构提倡明年大力发放地方政府债券。这也是中国在上调基准利率和收紧银行信贷的同时仍坚持宽松财政政策的一个原因。


一定程度的融资具有经济意义,但最近的财政措施大部分是针对普通纳税人,而给了企业自由通行证,尤其是那些国有企业。如果此种趋势持续下去,那么就会造成一种印象,即这是一个试图从普通大众手中获取现金和资源的政府,对一个本应更依赖于私人部门的消费和技术创新的经济来说,很难说这是一个明智之举。

Shen Hong / Horatio Fu


(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)
 
 
A seemingly inconspicuous statement from China's Ministry of Finance on the details of an 11-month-old capital gains tax on profits from transfers or sales of fomerly nontradable shares was widely cited as one of the reasons behind a heavy sell-off in the Chinese stock market today.

However, the panic and puzzlement the statement has generated goes far beyond equities investment and to some extent betrays the growing fiscal stress Beijing faces as it reshapes a fast-expanding economy and addresses some of the short-term woes on its balance sheet.

Starting on January 1 of this year, the Ministry of Finance began levying a 20% capital gains tax on profit from sales of shares that were once non-tradable stock--a class of shares that from the early days of stock trading in China represented government ownership and control over most publicly traded companies. The tax primarily affects holders of large corporate stakes who acquired the stock following reforms to the state-owned sector yes and are selling it for the first time.

Today's technical-looking statement ( in Chinese) made the scope of the tax much clearer, specifying that it applies to profit from the sale of this special category of shares between individuals and institutions, the inheritance of such shares and share transfers as a result of an acquisition by a listed company. The clarification appeared to spook investors enough to trigger the sell-off.

At a time of slowing domestic growth, rising inflation and a weakening global economy, it's hard to imagine Beijing would deliberately try to depress a local stock market that has already fallen more than 6% this month due to aggressive credit and monetary tightening. But, taken together with recent decisions to raise taxes on certain types of car purchases and reinforce tariffs on foreign goods brought into China by individuals, the statement does suggest that the government is growing desperate in its search for fresh fiscal revenue sources.

That perception is only reinforced by incessant chatter about the government possibly imposing some kind of real estate tax. The vague tax proposal had initially been interpreted as a last resort in tackling the country's stubborn property bubble, but more and more investors have started to believe Beijing is considering the new tax to compensate for dwindling supplies of land it can sell off to developers.

On the surface, China's fiscal position is strong. The country is running just a mild budget deficit and boasts the world's biggest foreign exchange reserves. But with the various infrastructure projects Beijing has embarked on via a 4 trillion-yuan stimulus package likely to produce lowâ 'and slow--returns, concerns are growing that the country's finances will come under increasing pressure in the coming years.

Reinforcing expectations of fiscal pain to come is Beijing's well-broadcast 12th five-year plan, which aims to realize 'healthier' and more balanced economic growth, partly through an overhaul of the nation's underdeveloped social welfare system and massive investment in new industries like clean energy.

At the same time, there are unabated worries about China's overburdened and risk-prone banking sector, wayward local government financing platforms and virtually bankrupt county-level governments.

In order to fix some of these problems, a few think tanks and academics in China have called for significantly boosting the issuance of local government debt next year. This is one reason why China has hiked benchmark interest rates and tightened bank credit while still remaining committed to an expansionary fiscal policy.

While a certain level of fund-raising makes economic sense, the latest fiscal measures have mostly targeted ordinary tax-payers while giving a free pass to corporations--especially those owned by the state. If such a trend continues, it can only buttress Beijing's image as a government trying to grab cash and resources from the men and women on the streetâ 'hardly a wise tack for an economy that is supposedly trying to rely more on private consumption and technical innovation.

Shen Hong / Horatio Fu
 

2011年给有钱人的忠告:低调 Advice For the Rich in 2011: Hide

今,除了国会里的支持者,富人没什么朋友。在愤怒的公众眼中,他们是罪犯,是接受救助却仍拿着丰厚奖金的家伙,是囤积财富的逃税者,他们操纵体制以利自己。

那么,富人该如何做才能重获公众的尊敬呢?

《经济学人》(the Economist)财经编辑盖斯特(Robert Guest)对全球精英们在2011年该做什么提了些建议:

他写道,“他们可以从承认自己多么不受欢迎开始;2011年,大众会对世界的糟糕状态怒火中烧,指责的对象不仅仅是大银行家,而是全球整个精英阶层。”

富人一旦知道自己遭到了斥责,就可以听从他的下一条建议了:低调。

“2011年,富人会保持低调,至少在西方世界是这样。他们将会减少大肆耀富的花费,无论是镶嵌钻石的皇冠还是大到无处停泊的豪华游艇,都不会再拿出来炫耀。他们花钱的方式会更低调:让子女接受更好的教育,随叫随到的医疗保健,去免遭妒忌的遥远之地度假。他们还会为自己和家人的人身安全花更多钱。即将实施的下一轮增税措施会让他们想出更周密的逃税计划。”

当然了,在中国和印度这样的新兴市场,富人会变得更高调、更自信。

而在美国和欧洲,富人需要认真地改头换面。盖斯特说,慈善是开始改变的最佳途径。

你认为富人在2011年还能做些什么来平息公众日益加剧的愤怒情绪?

Robert Frank

(“奢华人生”专注于富人的生活和文化,由Robert Frank主笔。)



(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)
 

http://www.cn.wsj.com/gb/20101201/wrt080500.asp?source=UpFeature

 

Setting aside their supporters in Congress, the rich don't have many friends these days. They're seen by an angry public as criminals, bailed-out bonus babies or wealth-hoarding tax-avoiders who have rigged the system in their favor.

So what can the rich do to win back the public's respect?

Robert Guest, business editor of the Economist, has some suggestions on what the global elite should do in 2011.

'They could start by recognizing how unpopular they are,' he writes. 'In 2011 the masses will be furious at the mess the world is in, and will blame not only big bankers but the global elite in general.'

Once they understand that they're reviled, the rich can follow his next bit of advice: hide.

'The very wealthy will keep a low profile in 2011, at least in the West. They will spend less on loud displays of wealth, from diamond-studded tiaras to yachts too big to moor. They will spend their money in quieter ways: even better education for their children, medical care on call and holidays far from envious eyes. They will also spend more on physical security for themselves and their families. And the coming wave of tax increases will drive them to devise ever more elaborate tax-avoidance schemes.'

Of course, in emerging markets like China and India, the wealthy will become louder and more confident.

But here in the U.S. and Europe, the wealthy need a serious image makeover. Mr. Guest says philanthropy would be the best place to start.

What else do you think the wealthy will do in 2011 to respond to growing public anger?

Robert Frank

 

男士礼服着装准则 The Rules for Tuxedos

:标准的男士无尾礼服有没有什么中规中矩的替代品呢?两件套或者三件套的黑西装够得上标准吗?眼下的社交日历上排满了各式各样的假日派对,其中许多都要求宾客穿着无尾礼服(black-tie)。在这种情况之下,穿什么才合适呢?

看名人是如何穿着他们的无尾礼服。
答:派对请柬上如果写着“无尾礼服”,意思就是这次派对极为正式。这种派对的沉闷气氛兴许会让你呵欠连天,可是,回溯到十九世纪晚期,那些富裕的精英人士一到吃晚饭的时候就会换上无尾礼服,几乎是天天如此。

如今,要求你如此着装的派对已经非常之少,即便有也不会苛刻到那种地步。不过,为了不让自己和别人尴尬,你最好还是不要去破坏规矩。

登喜路公司(Alfred Dunhill)的定做业务主管克劳森(Karl Clausen)说,“你应该选择那些久经考验的经典礼服。不到万不得已的时候,不要拿一套简简单单的黑西装去敷衍场合。”

以下是一些相关的注意事项:

时至今日,千变万化的时尚依然没有把男士的无尾礼服赶下舞台。碰到上述的正式场合,传统的无尾礼服依然是你惟一的得体选择,除非你是个苏格兰人,而且还拥有一条苏格兰短裙。

说到礼服的颜色,你应该始终选择黑色。深蓝色也可以过关,白色则是侍应生和亨弗莱•鲍嘉(Humphrey Bogart)的选择。

全套的无尾礼服应该包括以下两个基本要件:一件单排单纽、带有“戗驳头”翻领的黑色上装(普通西服的翻领尖端指向下方,礼服翻领的尖端则应该指向上方),以及一条外侧裤缝滚有丝带或是花边的裤子。

衬衫的材质应该是白色的凸纹棉布,它要比一般的衬衫面料挺括一些。此外,衬衫的前襟应该带有褶皱装饰。

选择衬衫的时候,你还应该注意:双层袖口是一个必须具备的条件,领型则可以是普通的折叠领,也可以是领尖下折的翼领。不过,坚守传统的人士一般都会选择折叠领。

穿礼服的时候最好是打上领结,而你也应该学会打领结的方法。你已经是个成年人了,眼下可不是去参加什么中学生的舞会。

按照规矩,你还应该系上腹带──也就是怪模怪样的腰封,同时要保证腰封上的褶缝朝着上方。

鞋子:黑漆皮的牛津鞋是经典的选择,擦得亮闪闪的普通牛津鞋也算是中规中矩。

克劳森说,穿着无尾礼服的时候,你可以根据自己的个人品味来选择领型。青果领(shawl collar)──这种领的线条比较圆浑,跟休•赫夫纳(Hugh Hefner)穿的那种晚便服有点儿像──也算得体,只不过不那么正式。

选购无尾礼服的时候,你一定得记住,礼服的尺码应该和商务套装的尺码略有不同。克劳森说,“按照传统习惯,晚礼服应该比普通套装紧身一点儿。”

穿礼服的规矩如此严苛,还有没有什么别的东西能让你展现自己的个人风格呢?有的,那就是你的方巾、你的袖扣、你的手表(手表应该跟袖扣形成搭配)以及你优雅得体的举止。再搞什么其他花样的话,你就是在跟150年来的裁缝传统过不去了。

Jason Chow

(本文版权归道琼斯公司所有,未经许可不得翻译或转载。)
 

http://www.cn.wsj.com/gb/20101201/sfs083042.asp?source=channel

 
Q: Are there any acceptable alternatives to the standard tux? Does a black suit or a three-piece cut the mustard? As the social calendar fills up with holiday parties ' many of which are black-tie events ' what should you wear?

A: The words 'black tie' on a party invite denote that the event is the most formal of functions. You may well yawn at the stuffiness, but back in the late 19th century, the wealthy elite used to change into a dinner jacket for practically every evening meal.

Now, the rare instance you're asked to do the same hardly seems like such a drag. To save you and everybody else from embarrassment, don't bend the rules.

'Stay with the tried and true,' says Karl Clausen, head of bespoke at Alfred Dunhill. 'One should only wear a plain black suit as a last resort.'

Here's what you need to know:

The vagaries of fashion have not dislodged the dinner jacket from its perch. Unless you're Scottish and own a kilt, the traditional dinner jacket ' sounds better than 'tux,' doesn't it? ' remains the only acceptable clothing.

As for the color of your ensemble, stick to black. Navy is acceptable; white is for waiters and Humphrey Bogart.

Your black-tie attire should consist of the following foundational components: a black, single-button, single-breasted jacket with a peak lapel (the points of the lapel point should point upward, whereas they point down on a regular suit) and trousers that have a silk stripe or braiding running along the outside seam of the leg.

Your shirt should be of white marcella, a cotton that is starchier than that used in regular shirts, with a bib front.

Other shirt details to watch: French cuffs are a must, and a regular fold-down collar, as opposed to the smaller-flapped winged collar, is the purist's choice.

The bowtie is the recommended choice ' and learn to tie it. You're not going to the prom, you're an adult now.

A cummerbund 'the fancy waistband ' is also de rigueur, and make sure the pleats facing upward.

The shoes: Patent-leather Oxfords are the classic, but a pair of well-polished regular Oxfords could do just as well.

Mr. Clausen says that the one part of the dinner-jacket uniform that is up to personal taste is the collar. A shawl collar ' a more rounded shape that looks a bit like Hugh Hefner's smoking jacket ' is acceptable, but less formal.

When shopping for a tux, remember that the fit is slightly different than your business suit. 'Dinner suits are traditionally worn closer to the body,' Mr. Clausen says.

How else can you express your personal style in such a rigid uniform? Your pocket square, cuff links, watch (which should match your cuff links) and good manners. Anything else and you'd just be flouting 150 years of sartorial tradition.

Jason Chow
 
 

中国复星集团计划大举进军欧洲 Private group joins China’s Europe push

 

复星集团(Fosun)计划大举进军欧洲,对奢侈品牌、小型科技公司和仿制药行业展开一系列投资。以销售收入衡量,复星是中国最大的民营企业。

复星集团董事长、中国最富有的人之一郭广昌向英国《金融时报》表示,该集团正"深入讨论"上述三个领域的多个潜在投资目标。"我们确实有几个已经非常深入的项目……复星将成为中国投资欧洲的先驱企业之一,"郭广昌称。他表示,复星的任何一笔投资都有可能高达20亿美元,尽管初始投资可能会限制在1亿欧元(合1.31亿美元)到2亿欧元之间。

一批中国大型工业企业正在考量欧洲市场,试图开拓利用其科技专业能力、高技能劳动力基础和西方品牌,将其引入中国市场。复星就是其中之一。

"许多中国企业和我们一起来到这里,了解如何在这里投资,"中国工经联(China Federation of Industrial Economics)副会长刘海燕上周在汉堡中欧经济峰会(Summit on Sino-European economic relations)间隙表示。

汉堡商会(Hamburg Chamber of Commerce)的数据显示,过去一年,中国企业在欧洲投资3亿欧元,尽管这个数字只是欧洲企业对华53亿欧元投资的零头。

郭广昌表示,复星关注于那些它能够协助其在中国扩张的企业,以及与复星国内业务相匹配的企业。复星去年的销售收入达到348.6亿元人民币(合52亿美元)。

该集团尤其关注服装与鞋履品牌的投资机会。

复星还计划将医药业务扩展至欧洲,在欧洲建立研发中心和分销渠道,并投资仿制药行业。

郭广昌表示,他希望这些举措以及可能成立的合资企业,能够加强集团的新药开发能力。

复星医药持有全球最大的药品销售商之一中国医药集团(Sinopharm) 49%的股份。复星认为中药具有巨大的出口潜力。

译者/管婧

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035814

 

 

Fosun, China's largest private conglomerate by sales, is planning a foray into Europe with a range of investments into luxury brands, small technology companies and the generic drugs sector.

Guo Guangchang, Fosun's chairman and one of China's richest men, told the Financial Times the group was in "deep discussions" with a number of possible targets in all three areas. "We do have several projects where we are very deep in the process ... Fosun will be one of the Chinese pioneers in investing in Europe," Mr Guo said. He said Fosun could invest up to $2bn in any single deal, although initial investments would probably be limited to between €100m ($131m) and €200m each.

Fosun is part of a wave of large Chinese industrial companies that are eyeing the European market to tap into the continent's technological expertise, its highly skilled labour base and as well as western brands to take to the Chinese market.

"A number of Chinese companies came with us to understand how they can invest here," Liu Haiyan, vice-chairman of the China Federation of Industrial Economics, said on the sidelines of the Summit on Sino-European economic relations in Hamburg last week.

In the past year Chinese companies have invested €300m in Europe, according to figures from the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, though this is a fraction of the €5.3bn that European companies have invested in China.

Mr Guo said Fosun, which reported sales of Rmb34.86bn ($5.2bn) last year, was focusing on companies that it could help expand in China and that would fit with its domestic operations.

The group is looking in particular to buy clothes and shoe brands.

Fosun also aims to expand its pharmaceutical business into Europe by setting up research and development centres and distribution channels and by buying into the generic drugs sector.

Mr Guo said he hoped these steps, as well as possible joint ventures, would strengthen the group in the development of new drugs.

Fosun Pharma owns 49 per cent of Sinopharm, one of the world's largest drugs distributors and it sees great potential in exporting Chinese traditional herbal medicine.

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035814/en

投资一块家族墓地?

 

老说房地产市场一直不景气,不妨看看墓地卖家的处境吧。位于纽约市布朗克斯林地公墓里的利兹墓(Woodlawn Cemetery in the Bronx)自从2003年挂拍以来,至今仍未能售出,虽说该墓地最近要价下跌了30%,从5百万美元降到了350万美元。墓由大理石与青铜建成,面积达200平方英尺。

这座气派的墓是锡业大亨威廉•巴特曼•利兹(William Bateman Leeds)最后的安息地,由杰弗逊纪念堂(Jefferson Memorial)的建筑师约翰•卢梭•波普(John Russell Pope)设计,碑石浅浮雕的雕刻活由最高法院(Supreme Court)的设计师完成。换句话说,除了在《纽约时报》专门刊登的那些大卖点("能安放9具灵柩,环境静谧,风景如画)外,该墓也算颇有渊源,然而至今仍无人问津。正如公墓的历史部主任苏•奥尔森(Sue Olsen)所评论的:"这其中肯定夹杂着某种不爽的感情。当客户发现该块墓地已经有人'捷足先登'后,还是有点接受不了。"

奇怪的是,买二手墓地虽说听起来有点渗人,但也算司空见惯。在整个林地公墓的1300块墓地中,约有10%在过去几年中成功售出,使得许多长期无人拾掇的墓得以再次利用,而原先的墓主人也能从中得一笔钱。"当经济不景气时,拥有墓的家庭有时就想卖掉墓地,"奥尔森说。"使用二手墓地就不失是个好办法。"

但原先的棺椁必须先挖出来,尸骨由其亲属另行归葬;此外,墓碑上刻的字也得磨掉(这通常是卖家的活)。买二手墓地的好处多多。"如今根本无法复原出过去陵墓的工艺水平,如今的做工也不像过去那样精雕细刻,"奥尔森说。况且买的墓地将来还会有较大的升值空间。公墓最新挂售的墓地都建于上世纪20年代,墓室能安放4具棺椁,售价为50万美元(包括公墓的地皮)。"现在建一座同样的墓至少得花75万美元,况且地皮还不算在内。"

如今墓地地皮紧俏,这成了建造精美墓室最大的制约因素。然而,有了规模化的制造工艺后,现代特色的新型墓——比过去精雕细刻的手工制造要简单得多——在美国越来越风靡。如今火化是个很好的选择。一次性买断墓地后,安放骨灰(而不是棺椁)可以满足更多代亲人的"需要"。

位于俄亥俄州肯特市(Kent, Ohio)的The Daily Monument Company公司已经有100多年制造陵墓的历史了,它如今改从中国进口各种型号预先安装好的墓。卖得最火的是那些小型石棺(起步价不到1万美元),而不是那种门廊式的陵墓(它起步价6万美元,整座墓用花岗岩材质做成,活像一座海滨小屋)。

一般人的陵寝还显得不起眼,整齐有序地排列在市公墓中,但历史上有些最壮观的建筑曾经(甚至仍然)就是陵墓。

"陵墓"(mausoleum)一词源自最初"世界七大奇迹"中的一座,即公元前4世纪的小亚细亚统治者摩苏拉斯(Mausolus)的陵墓,他死后葬于哈利卡那苏(Halicarnassus,现土耳其的博德鲁姆(Bodrum))。埃及耸立了几千年的金字塔是陵墓,泰姬陵(Taj Mahal)也是陵墓,它由莫卧尔王朝的皇帝沙迦汉(Mughal emperor Shah Jahan)修建,以纪念其最心爱的王妃亚珠曼德•贝侬•比古姆(Arjumand Banu Begum,又叫蒙泰姬•马哈尔(Mumtaz Mahal))。在伊朗,也正在为已故精神领袖阿亚图拉•霍梅尼(Ayatollah Khomeini)修建面积达20平方公里的陵墓群(还有购物中心)。

 

但是,亲朋好友(特别是南欧国家的人)聚在一起、尤其在吉日里(如万圣节(All Saints' Day))去追思逝者,自家建造的陵寝仍是首选之地,即便一般家庭也概莫能外。

"11月1日,我们全家去家族墓地祭奠亲人,孩子们就在公墓里四处玩耍,仿佛是在大花园中造访某座小屋,"娜塔莉亚•戈麦兹-费雷尔(Natalia Gómez-Ferrer)说,她就住在西班牙巴伦西亚(Valencia)附近。"这个地方十分静谧,透过窗户就可以看到四周的美景。"

娜塔莉亚的父亲阿尔瓦罗•戈麦兹-费雷尔(Álvaro Gómez-Ferrer)是位建筑师,他在巴伦西亚附近的贝特拉(Bétera)村建造了家族墓地。老戈麦兹-费雷尔是芬兰设计师阿尔瓦•阿尔托 (Alvar Aalto)的忠实粉丝,阿尔托的作品的激发了他的设计灵感。整座墓用铜顶覆盖,用玻璃与取自穆尔西亚(西班牙东南部省)未经打磨的石材建成。"整个设计理念是把现代的简约建筑风格与传统材质巧妙地融为一体,"他说。整座墓并不想太突出宗教风格。 "天主教的标志要掩饰起来,但又显得无处不在,而且不能太过招摇。我在两扇玻璃门上方的玻璃上镂刻了个十字架,这样阳光就能照射进墓室内部,反射后的十字架在墓室内磨光锃亮的大理石过道上呈现出变幻的图样。"

"有时知道这里就是自己最终的归宿地,心头会别有一番滋味,"娜塔莉亚说,"但又很释然。这毕竟比在市公墓墙上放置骨灰盒显得隽永,而且,全家人可以最终都能汇聚于此。正如我老公说,归根到底,这也算是我们最终的财产!"

但至少在欧洲,象戈麦兹-费雷尔家族这种丧葬习俗已越来越不流行。"如今在西班牙,很少有人在公墓中自建陵墓,"马德里殡葬部(Funeral Services in Madrid)的负责人加比诺•阿巴那迪斯(Gabino Abánades,音译)如是说。"费用太贵了,找块地自建陵园一直是最大的困难;在马德里,光地皮钱就得4万欧元,而建一座8墓穴的陵墓还得再花3万欧元。若要再讲究一点,连同建筑师的费用,至少得花费12万欧元。"两年前,阿拉木德那公墓(Almudena)新建了5座私人陵墓,去年则没有一座。"经济衰退影响到了一切,"阿巴那迪斯说。

虽然如此,西班牙仍是修建陵墓的理想地。马德里的阿拉木德那公墓是全欧洲最大的安葬地之一,据估计有5百万人最终长眠于此,比马德里全市活着的人还多。当局甚至还专门开设了一条公交线路(110路)穿行于这座诺大的公墓中。在阿拉木德那公墓中,既有19世纪风格、建成小礼拜堂的精美墓园,也有朴实无华的现代陵墓,还有一些墓的设计风格语焉不详,更有一些座墓的设计即使刊登于当代建筑杂志的封面也绰绰有余。

其中有座墓建得很可爱,完全参照巴伦西亚的传统民居,金字塔形的屋顶上还长着蔓生植物;另外有一座墓修了排水沟,并用倾斜的石板作屋顶。打扫卫生的工具就放在墓室内。对于有些墓来说,看起来家务活就一直没停过。

就在郊区,大多数新建墓修得就象"小盒子",它们由目录中提供的标准设计样建成,也可能是从中国进口的。虽然有些小墓室是用打磨的花岗岩或者大理石砌成,还用十字架,甚至可能是爱奥尼亚式柱子(Ionic columns)或者三角墙来装点,但公墓的这一大片整体看上去有点很象英国的海滨度假村。

但是,在阿拉木德那公墓中,耸立着一座与众不同的现代工艺特色的墓,它就是佩雷兹-帕拉(Pérez-Pla)家族的墓。整座墓面积约6平方米,呈立方体状,由未经打磨的灰色花岗岩石块砌成,整座墓仿佛漂浮于地面上一般。墓正面是两扇横杠焊的黑色铁门,中间的墓室没有顶盖,完全是开放式的,墓墙内排放着密封的棺材,前面锈迹斑斑的铁板上只刻有逝者的名字以及出生与死亡的年月。太阳照射到无顶的墓室,"会在一天之中的某些时段形成一个十字架的图样",但四处找不见任何宗教标志,何塞•佩雷兹-帕拉(José Pérez-Pla)解释道,他今年56岁,是马德里大宗商品交易商,有朝一日,他也会加入他逝去的亲人队伍,最终长眠于这片墓墙内。

对于万圣节全家来墓地祭奠先人的家庭来说,家族墓园的建筑风格是连接子孙后代永远的纽带,会一代代地传承下去。看来,买(建)座漂亮的陵墓作自己最终的安息地是个不错的选择。

译者/常和

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035758

“商界铁娘子”董明珠 Dong Mingzhu

 

国籍:中国

公司:珠海格力电器股份有限公司

行业:家电

住址:中国

三年股东总回报:38.7%

董明珠是格力电器(Gree Electric)的掌门人。格力电器是中国最大的空调制造商,在全球市场堪与LG电子(LG Electronics)抗衡。董明珠不仅是中国不断壮大的核心企业领袖阵营的典范,也是一位广受欢迎的商界精英。她的《行棋无悔》(Regretless Pursuit)一书在中国非常畅销,讲述了她如何从一名销售员成长为企业领袖的经历。她出名还有另一个原因:20年没有休过一次假。

董明珠——在中国被称作董姐——常常被援引的一句总挂在嘴边的话是:“我从不犯错,我永远是对的。”这句话显露出了这位被称为“商界铁娘子”女性的特质。

格力电器的成长与中国中产阶级的激增同步——该公司为许多新城市家庭提供空调。1990年,董明珠加盟格力时,中国的300户城市家庭中,仅有一户拥有空调;而现在,一半家庭拥有至少一台空调,且数字还在不断增长。格力(这个名字被有意写成了西方的发音方式Gree,是“glee”与“green”的双关语)在中国的四个省份设有工厂,另外在巴西、越南和巴基斯坦也有工厂。它拥有中国空调市场约36%的份额,其用于出口的空调中,有三分之二用的是另一个品牌。这正是董明珠试图推动的变革——在全球推广格力品牌。

董明珠30岁丧夫,她将自己三岁大的儿子留给了她妈妈照顾,南下去了珠海工作。她以销售经理的身份加盟格力,公司将最没有前景、经济落后的安徽地区分给她管理。不到18个月,安徽地区的销售额就突破了280万美元,将近公司销售总额的十分之一。董明珠由此确立了自己杰出营销人员的声誉。

1994年,她被任命为销售总监。她系统地打破了经销商对供应商的压制——拒绝按照通常的“先发货再付款”条件供货。在书中,她朴素地说道:“想要货?先付钱。”到1997年,格力公司报表上没有一分钱的应收账款。

1996年,格力挂牌上市;2001年,董明珠出任格力首席执行官。格力2009年的年报显示,该公司实现营收426.4亿元人民币(合64亿美元),较2008年增长1%;实现利润33.8亿元,较上年增长40%。格力表示,经济低迷影响了出口,公司希望能够从政府“家电下乡”的新政策中受益。

译者/董琴

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035806

 

 

Nationality: Chinese Company: Gree Electric Appliances International Development Sector: Household goods Location: China Three-year TSR: 38.7%

Dong Mingzhu presides over Gree Electric, China's largest manufacturer of air conditioners, rivalling LG Electronics globally. She is not only an example of her country's growing cadre of corporate leaders, but also a popular business pundit. Her book, Regretless Pursuit, charting her route from saleswoman to the corporate throne, is a bestseller in China. She is famous, too, for not having had a holiday in 20 years. Dong – or Sister Dong as she is known across China – is often quoted as saying she never misses: "I never admit mistakes and I am always correct." The words give a flavour of the woman who is also dubbed "the iron lady of business". Gree Electric has grown with the explosion of China's middle class, providing air-conditioning units for the many new urban homes. In 1990, when Dong joined the company, just one in 300 urban households had air conditioning; now half have at least one unit, and numbers continue to rise. Gree (which is intentionally western-sounding and a play on "glee" and "green") has plants in four provinces in China as well as Brazil, Vietnam and Pakistan. It has roughly 36 per cent of China's market share in air conditioners, and two-thirds of units it ships for export are made under a different brand name. This is something Dong aims to change, developing the Gree brand globally. She was in her early 30s when, having lost her husband, she left her three-year-old son in the care of his grandmother and went south to Zhuhai in pursuit of employment. She joined Gree as a sales manager and was given the least-promising, economically poor region of Anhui to look after. Within 18 months, sales had broken $2.8m, or just shy of a 10th of the company's revenues. Dong's reputation as a marketer extraordinaire was sealed. In 1994, she was appointed sales director. She systematically broke the stranglehold that sales agents then had on suppliers by refusing to supply on normal "deferred payment terms". In her book, she puts it simply: "Want goods? Money comes first." By 1997, there was not a cent in the company's accounts receivable. In 1996, the company went public; in 2001, Dong became its chief executive. Gree's annual report for 2009 shows revenues of RMB42.64bn ($6.4bn) – 1 per cent up on the previous year – and profit of 3.38bn yuan, up 40 per cent on 2008. The company said exports had been hit by the economic downturn and that it hoped to benefit from a new government policy to increase the provision of domestic appliances to rural communities.

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035806/en

“中国可以接受韩国统一朝鲜半岛”China open to unified Korea, leaked note says

 

据泄露的美国外交文件显示,中国官员曾向外国同僚表示,北京方面可能最终接受朝鲜半岛统一到首尔的控制下。

维基解密(WikiLeaks)网站周二发表的报告,推翻了外界这样一个观感,即中国在维持朝鲜半岛现状方面的立场是绝对的,尽管北京方面拒绝谴责平壤上周炮击韩国一个岛屿,并在3月份击沉韩国一艘军舰。

在今年早些时候的一封外交电报中,时任韩国副外长千英宇(Chun Yung-woo)告诉美国驻韩大使,不止一名中国官员已向他保证,"就安全屏障而言,朝鲜现在对中国几乎已经没有什么价值"。

许多分析人士表示,北京方面支持朝鲜金正日政权,是为了防止韩国活跃的民主社会延伸至中国边界,引发社会不安定。

根据上述电报,现任韩国总统李明博(Lee Myung-bak)国家安全顾问的千英宇表示,金正日政权在2006年试爆核弹头后,中国对其作为一道安全屏障的兴趣有所减弱。中国官员还告诉千英宇,只要美军留在目前的韩国领土,他们可以接受统一的朝鲜半岛。

不过,千英宇的言论也流露出一些疑问,即"开明的中国官员"的这些观点,是否代表北京的主流意见。金正日在中国共产党和军队高层得到相当大的支持。

说明这一点的例证之一是,千英宇形容中国的朝鲜问题特使武大伟是一名"只会讲马克思主义套话的傲慢的前红卫兵,对朝鲜一无所知,对核不扩散事务一无所知,而且难以沟通,因为他不懂英语"。

类似的分歧在公共生活中也相当明显。一些老一代的中国人记得1950-53年朝鲜战争时期共同奋斗和牺牲的感觉。但中国与朝鲜的联系使许多较年轻的中国人想起毛泽东时代动荡的几十年。

千英宇表示,他预期,病中的金正日过世后,朝鲜政权只能维持两到三年。此言透露了首尔方面的战略思路。

另一份文件援引中国驻哈萨克斯坦大使程国平的话称,朝鲜的核武活动是"对全世界安全的威胁"。程国平希望韩朝"在长期内实现和平统一,但……预期两国在短期内将保持独立"。

针对朝鲜对韩国的炮击,中国提议举行紧急磋商,但日本、美国和韩国表示,朝鲜不应由于暴力行为而得到奖赏。

译者/何黎

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035811

 

 

Chinese officials have told international counterparts Beijing could ultimately accept a Korean peninsula unified under Seoul's control, according to leaked US diplomatic dispatches.

Reports published on the WikiLeaks website on Tuesday counter the perception that China's defence of the status quo on the Korean peninsula is absolute in spite of Beijing's refusal to condemn Pyongyang for shelling a South Korean island last week and sinking one of Seoul's warships in March.

In a diplomatic cable earlier this year, Chun Yung-woo, then South Korea's vice-foreign minister, told the US ambassador to Seoul that Chinese officials had assured him North Korea "now had little value to China as a buffer state".

Many analysts say Beijing supports the regime of Kim Jong-il in North Korea to prevent South Korea's lively democracy from reaching China's border and inspiring social unrest.

According to the dispatch, Mr Chun, now national security adviser to Lee Myung-bak, South Korea's president, said China was less keen on Mr Kim as a buffer after he tested a nuclear warhead in 2006. The Chinese officials also told Mr Chun they could accept a unified peninsula as long as US troops remained in what is currently South Korea.

However, Mr Chun's remarks also revealed doubts about whether such views from "sophisticated Chinese officials" were mainstream in Beijing. Kim Jong-il has considerable favour in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist party and army.

Illustrating this point, Mr Chun described Wu Dawei, China's special representative on Korea affairs, as an "arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about non-proliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English".

A similar divide is evident in public life. Some older Chinese remember the sense of joint endeavour and sacrifice of the 1950-53 Korean war. But the ties to Pyongyang remind many younger Chinese of the decades of turbulence under Mao Zedong.

Revealing an insight into Seoul's strategic thinking, Mr Chun said he expected the North Korean regime to survive two or three years beyond the death of the ailing Kim Jong-il.

Cheng Guoping, China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, was quoted in another document as saying North Korea's nuclear activities were a "threat to the whole world's security". Mr Cheng hoped for "peaceful reunification in the long term but . . . expects the two countries to remain separate in the short term".

China responded to the shelling of South Korea by proposing emergency talks but Japan, the US and Seoul said North Korea should not be rewarded for violent behaviour.

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035811/en

中国“影老板”入股米高梅?Hooray for Hollywood but money shot is at home, says China studio action man

 

中国电影行业的一位新秀表示,中国电影公司应向好莱坞学习宝贵的经验,而非从中寻找投资机会。

中国主要民营电影公司之一光线影业(Enlight Pictures)总裁张昭向英国《金融时报》表示,“中国电影行业肯定会朝着好莱坞的模式发展。”

“(但)我们首先应着眼于国内市场,而不是试图成为资本玩家。”

此番言论突显出中国电影行业正处在十字路口:既寻求挖掘快速增长的国内市场,也在探索打入国际市场的渠道。

近来盛传中国投资者可能有意入股本月刚申请破产保护的好莱坞电影公司米高梅(MGM)。针对这种说法,张昭作出了上述回应。

这些谣言并非空穴来风,而是有事实为依托:一是由于国内电影市场繁荣兴旺,中国电影行业充斥着大量资金;二是中国政府正推动本国电影行业“走出去”,在国际上弘扬中国文化。

据预计,今年中国电影票房收入将达到100亿元人民币(合15亿美元),到2015年将达到400亿元人民币,届时中国将成为全球第二大电影市场。

外国影片经常出现在中国最卖座影片之列,但为了发展本土电影行业并阻止不受欢迎的内容进入,中国政府限制在国内影院放映的外国影片数量。

光线影业是中国三大非国有电影公司之一,另外两家是去年在深圳上市的华谊兄弟传媒股份有限公司(Huayi Brothers Media Corporation)和刚刚申请在纳斯达克上市的博纳电影公司(Bona Film Group)。光线影业不公布财务信息,但该公司预计,今年其发行或合拍的电影的票房收入将达到7亿元人民币。

华谊兄弟的主业是影片制作,并向发行领域拓展,而博纳和光线影业都是从发行起步,然后延伸到影片制作领域。

张昭表示,这种业务模式旨在避免好莱坞所犯的错误。他表示,米高梅之所以经营失败,原因就在于该公司试图以影片制作为基础,建立一个电影帝国。

相反,光线影业与华谊兄弟和博纳更为相似,都把重点放在了有希望创造最大商业利益的项目上。

这三家公司都与境外合作伙伴合拍了许多影片,其合作伙伴主要来自香港。

光线影业最成功的影片包括《证人》(The Beast Stalker)和《阿童木》(Astroboy),其中动作片《证人》名列2008年香港票房榜首,而《阿童木》是根据日本著名系列动画故事拍成的3D影片。

动作片、动画片和高科技影片仍将是光线影业的重点,该公司也认为这三类影片最有希望获得全球观众认同。

张昭表示:“在中国叫座的影片,像《阿凡达》(Avatar)和《2012》,都没有太多的文化背景。你就得卖在世界各地都有市场的影片。”

译者/杨远

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035803

 

 

Chinese film companies should turn to Hollywood for valuable lessons rather than for investment opportunities, a rising star of the country’s movie industry says.

“China’s film industry will definitely develop towards the Hollywood model,” Zhang Zhao, president of Enlight Pictures, one of the country’s leading privately owned studios, told the Financial Times.

“[But] we should focus on our home market first, and not try being a capital player.”

The remarks highlight that China’s film industry is at a crossroads as it seeks to exploit its fast-growing home market but also explore ways to tap international markets.

Mr Zhang was responding to persistent rumours that Chinese investors might be interested in taking a stake in MGM, the Hollywood studio that filed for bankruptcy protection this month.

Such rumours are driven by the fact that China’s film industry is awash with money from a booming domestic movie market, and that the government is pushing for it to “go out” and propagate Chinese culture around the world.

China’s box-office receipts are forecast to reach Rmb10bn ($1.5bn) this year and to grow to Rmb40bn in 2015, which would make the country the world’s second-largest film market.

Foreign productions are frequently among the best-grossing films in China, but in an attempt to develop the local industry and to keep unwanted content out,

Beijing limits the number of foreign films that can be shown at China’s cinemas.

Enlight is one of China’s three largest non-state film companies, alongside Huayi Brothers Media Corporation, which listed in Shenzhen last year, and Bona Film Group, which has just filed for a Nasdaq listing. Enlight does not publish financial information, but the company expects box-office receipts of films it distributes or co-produced to reach Rmb700m this year.

While Huayi Brothers’ main business is film production, from which it has diversified into distribution, Bona and Enlight both started as distribution companies and branched out into film production later.

Mr Zhang said this business model was designed to avoid the mistakes made by Hollywood. He said the fact that MGM had failed was because it tried to build a movie empire based on film production.

Instead, Enlight, much like Huayi and Bona, is trying to focus on projects that promise the biggest commercial benefit.

All three companies have teamed up with non-mainland partners, mostly from Hong Kong, in many of their productions.

Among Enlight’s most prominent successes were The Beast Stalker, an action thriller that topped the Hong Kong box office in 2008, and Astroboy, the animated 3D movie based on a popular Japanese series.

Action, animation and technology-intensive films will continue to be the focus for Enlight as the company also considers them the most promising with a global audience.

“The films that do well in China, like Avatar and 2012, have not too much cultural background,” said Mr Zhang. “You have to sell things that work everywhere in the world.”

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035803/en

中国正匆匆适应全新角色 Scramble to adjust to a new reality

编者按:年历翻至12月,2010年迫近尾声。中国有盘点的传统。这一年,中国经济在全球金融危机和波动中仍保持高增长,超越日本,成为世界第二大经济体。不过,30年突进之后,其增长模式越来越受到诟病,政府和民间也愈发意识到转型的迫切。从国际看,今年中美经贸摩擦仍在升温,邻国的地缘政治充满变数;从国内看,劳资关系急需调整,通胀的威胁触手可及,政治改革呼声重起,环境与能源压力增大,城乡地区差距凸显, 教育医疗等公共服务日益遭受市场挤迫。大国博弈应谨慎落子。今年,多事之秋,正需明事理、负责任的媒体加以仔细观察、记录、思考、评析。从今天起,FT中文网推出“2010年中国特别报告”,为期一个月,与公众一道回顾一年来中国发展的足迹,从纷乱现象中探寻出一条相对清晰的路径,并期待我们在新的一年继续前行。

如果说这场全球金融危机有赢家的话,这个赢家就是中国。由于中国政府对危机的应对迅速且颇具规模,中国经济迅速复苏。当许多发达国家仍萎靡不振的时候,中国却在以种种新颖而重要的方式,扩展自己的影响力。

不过,随着尘埃落定,中国的后危机策略引发了一系列疑问。尽管中国政府抓住了许多新的机遇,但国内外观察人士均称,政府犯下了一些失误,可能对中国的利益造成重大损害。

这场危机过后显露出的一个最明显的趋势,是中国重新开始尝试降低对西方国家的经济依赖。

对于中国政府来说,2008年秋季出口大幅下滑,导致数以万计的工人失业,是一次难忘的痛苦经历,这促使政府加快推进现有计划,将中国的经济伙伴多元化。

其结果是,中国与全球许多发展中国家增强了联系。

例如,过去十年,随着中国对大宗商品需求的上升,中国成为巴西越来越重要的贸易伙伴。中国不仅已于去年成为巴西最大的贸易伙伴国,而且,在双方宣布一系列的钢铁、港口、制造业与农业合作协议之后,中国还将于今年成为巴西最大的直接投资国。在中亚、东南亚以及非洲部分地区,类似的故事也在上演。

这一情况的结果是,有可能出现一轮由中国贸易与投资驱动的全球经济增长,但大部分发达国家可能与这场增长无缘。

中国拥有充沛的金融流动性,也正在利用这些资金,投资于越来越多的发达国家的基础设施与工业领域。而且,中国的一些企业能以较低价格提供机械设备与其他资本品,从而使一些投资项目具备财务上的可行性。

例如,中国目前正向阿根廷、土耳其、伊朗和乌克兰的铁路项目提供融资与设备。

欧亚咨询(Eurasia)总裁伊恩•布雷默(Ian Bremmer)表示:“这是一种经过深思熟虑的对冲策略,旨在减轻经济上对西方的依赖。”

除了加大对部分发展中国家的投资之外,中国政府还在加速推进扩大人民币国际使用的计划。例如,中国政府已开始允许某些投资者购买国内资本市场上发行的人民币债券;一些亚洲国家的央行也已开始购买此类证券。

尽管中国当局希望谨慎地控制这一进程,但随着这一进程的发展,以人民币结算的国际贸易可能迅速增多,这最终会对美元的地位构成一定挑战。

 

但是,尽管中国或许在以前所未有的方式扩大影响力,但它也发现,它正在卷入越来越多的外交纠纷之中。

仅仅9月份的纠纷就包括:人民币汇率问题,南海与东海一系列有争议的岛屿问题,以及今年的诺贝尔和平奖(Nobel Peace Prize)被授予狱中的异见分子刘晓波。

一个国家的影响力和重要性在如此快速地上升,难免会被卷入一些外交冲突。但在一些分析人士看来,近来一系列中外紧张事件,似乎源于北京方面的误判。

在1997年亚洲金融危机之后的十年里,中国一直在亚洲地区开展所谓的“魅力攻势”——与别国签署贸易与投资协议,解决边界纠纷。这一策略的潜在逻辑是,在中国领导人看来,与亚洲邻国之间的良好关系,是中国经济发展的基石。

但在过去的几年里,中国与许多邻国的关系都发生恶化。在南海地区,许多多东南亚国家抱怨称,中国政府正在采取一种更为强硬的策略,寻求对帕拉塞尔群岛(西沙群岛)和斯普拉特利群岛(南沙群岛)行使主权。除中国外,越南、台湾、菲律宾、马来西亚和文莱等国家和地区,也在对这些岛屿主张完全或部分主权。

与此同时,在一场激烈的中日外交拉锯战之后,日本政府正在舔着自己的伤口。那场冲突涉及的是东海上另一组有争议的岛屿,其起因是日本巡逻船扣押了一艘中国渔船的船长。

新摩擦还不止于此。印度有人抱怨称,中国一直在克什米尔地区挑起紧张关系;韩国政府对北京也是一肚子火,因为自3月一艘韩国军舰被击沉以来,中国一直拒绝就此事谴责其盟国朝鲜。

华盛顿已经利用这些紧张关系,再次申明了自己在亚洲的地位。美国在6月宣布,视南海为自己的重要战略利益,并提出在南海纠纷中充当调停人。

中国政府抗议称,美国这是在干涉与它无关的问题,但令中国政府担忧的一个现实是:越南、新加坡等国一直在秘密游说美国,让其加大干预力度。

与此同时,在日本,尽管新政府去年上台后表示,要与中国结成更为紧密的盟友关系,但支持这一想法的人在不断减少,尤其是在围绕中国渔船的争端之后。

中国的一些观察人士担心,最近的这些分歧,可能促使一些国家结成遏制中国的战略联盟。中国人民大学国际关系教授时殷弘表示:“如果从长远角度看,很显然,我们必须非常谨慎地处理与邻国的关系。”

刘晓波被授予诺贝尔奖,也源于北京方面的一次举动,在许多观察人士看来,那是一场恐慌之下的过度反应。刘晓波获奖激怒了中国领导层,而且在许多人看来,是对中国的蓄意侮辱。刘晓波在《零八宪章》(Charter 08)发布前数日被逮捕。那是一份支持民主的宣言,最终签署人达到了数千人。不过,当刘晓波随后被判以颠覆政权罪、入狱11年时,不仅他的支持者,连许多官员也感到吃惊,因为按中国近来的标准看,如此长的刑期有些反常。

刘晓波获得诺贝尔奖,激发了中国年轻人对其思想更广泛的兴趣,在这种情况下,中国当局面临的风险是,刘晓波会成为民主运动的一面旗帜。

美国乔治华盛顿大学(George Washington University)中国问题专家沈大伟(David Shambaugh)表示:“中共在海外行事越来越自信,但在国内却流露出了局促不安的迹象。”

过去两年里,中国迅速兴起,并发现自己不得不承担一系列全新角色。

此刻,中国乃至许多世界其它国家的政府,都在匆忙地进行调整,以适应这一新的现实。

译者/何黎

译者/何黎

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035797

 

 

If a global financial meltdown can be said to have a winner, then that would be China. Its economy has rebounded rapidly after the government responded to the crisis quickly and in size. While many developed countries are still wilting, China is expanding its reach and influence in all sorts of new and important ways.

Yet as the dust settles, China’s post-crisis strategy is raising questions. While Beijing has taken advantage of many new openings, observers both inside and outside the country argue that the government is making a number of missteps that could damage its interests down the line.

One of the most powerful trends to emerge from the crisis is a renewed effort to reduce economic dependence on western economies.

The collapse in Chinese exports in the autumn of 2008, which led to tens of thousands of factory jobs being lost, was a traumatic experience for the authorities and it encouraged them to step up existing plans to diversify the country’s economic ties.

The result has been an intensification of links with a host of developing countries around the world.

In one example, China has been an increasingly important partner for Brazil over the past decade, as its demand for commodities has increased. Yet not only did it become Brazil’s biggest trading partner last year, it is also set to be the biggest direct investor in the country this year, after a string of deals have been announced in steel, ports, manufacturing and agriculture. Similar stories can be told in central Asia, south-east Asia or parts of Africa.

The result is the prospect of a new cycle of global growth that is led by both Chinese trade and investment, but which also sidesteps much of the developed world.

The country has abundant financial liquidity, which is being made available for investments in infrastructure and industry in a growing range of developed countries. And it also has companies that can provide machinery and other capital goods at costs that make some of these projects financially viable.

For instance, China is now helping to finance and provide equipment for rail projects in Argentina, Turkey, Iran and Ukraine.

“This is a deliberate hedging strategy to reduce economic dependence on the west,” says Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia consultancy.

While Chinese investment in parts of the developing world is being stepped up, the authorities are also accelerating plans to expand the international use of the renminbi. For instance, the government has started to allow certain investors to buy renminbi bonds issued in the domestic capital market and some Asian central banks have already started to buy such instruments.

Although the authorities want carefully to control the process, it could lead to a rapid expansion in the use of the Chinese currency in trade in a way that would eventually start to challenge some of the role played by the US dollar.

Yet while China may be extending its influence as never before, it is also finding itself involved in an increasing number of diplomatic disputes.

Last month alone, the country has been in arguments: over its exchange rate; about a series of disputed islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and concerning the award of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed dissident.

A country whose influence and importance are rising so quickly is bound to find itself in new diplomatic stand-offs, yet for some analysts, the recent series of tensions between China and the rest of the world appear to be rooted in misjudgments by Beijing.

 

In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China spent the following decade conducting what was often called a “charm offensive” in the region, signing trade and investment deals and settling border disputes. The underlying rationale was that China’s leaders saw good relations with their Asian neighbours as a cornerstone of the expansion of the Chinese economy.

However, over the past couple of years, many of those relations have become frayed. In the South China Sea, a number of south-east Asian countries complain that Beijing is taking a more aggressive strategy in pursuing its claims on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in full or part by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government is licking its wounds after a bruising diplomatic stand-off with Beijing over another set of disputed islands in the East China Sea, which was sparked by Japanese coast guards arresting the captain of a Chinese fishing boat.

The new frictions do not end there. In India, there are complaints that China has been stirring tensions in Kashmir, while the South Korean government has been angered by Beijing’s refusal to condemn its North Korean ally over the bombing of a South Korean warship in March.

Washington has taken advantage of these tensions to reassert its position in Asia, announcing in June that it views the South China Sea as an important strategic interest and offering to act as a mediator in the dispute.

Beijing complains that the US is interfering in issues that are not of its concern, but the worrying reality for the Chinese government is that countries such as Vietnam and Singapore have been quietly lobbying the US to get more involved.

And while the new Japanese government talked about forging a much closer alliance with China after it took office last year, support for such ideas has waned, especially after the dispute over the Chinese fishing boat.

Some observers in China fear the recent disagreements could encourage a strategic alliance to contain the country. “If we take a long-term view, it is clear that we have to be very careful with our dealings with our neighbours,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing.

The Nobel Prize for Liu Xiaobo, which has infuriated the leadership and is seen in many quarters as a calculated insult to China, also stemmed from what many observers see as a panicked reaction by Beijing. Mr Liu was arrested days before the launch of Charter 08, a pro-democracy manifesto that was eventually signed by several thousand people. Yet it was not just Mr Liu’s supporters but also many officials who were surprised when he was later sentenced to 11 years in jail after being convicted of subversion, an unusually long sentence by recent Chinese standards.

Now that he has been awarded a Nobel Prize, sparking wider interest in his ideas among young Chinese, the risk for the Chinese authorities is that he becomes a rallying point for a democracy movement.

“The party is behaving more assertively abroad, but is showing signs of insecurity at home,” says David Shambaugh, a China expert at George Washington University in the US.

China’s rise over the past two years has been so rapid that it has been thrust into a whole series of new roles.

Both Beijing and many other capitals around the world are scrambling to adjust to this new reality.

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035797/en


http://www.ftchinese.com/topic/2010annualreport.html

中国正匆匆适应全新角色 Scramble to adjust to a new reality

 

编者按:年历翻至12月,2010年迫近尾声。中国有盘点的传统。这一年,中国经济在全球金融危机和波动中仍保持高增长,超越日本,成为世界第二大经济体。不过,30年突进之后,其增长模式越来越受到诟病,政府和民间也愈发意识到转型的迫切。从国际看,今年中美经贸摩擦仍在升温,邻国的地缘政治充满变数;从国内看,劳资关系急需调整,通胀的威胁触手可及,政治改革呼声重起,环境与能源压力增大,城乡地区差距凸显, 教育医疗等公共服务日益遭受市场挤迫。大国博弈应谨慎落子。今年,多事之秋,正需明事理、负责任的媒体加以仔细观察、记录、思考、评析。从今天起,FT中文网推出“2010年中国特别报告”,为期一个月,与公众一道回顾一年来中国发展的足迹,从纷乱现象中探寻出一条相对清晰的路径,并期待我们在新的一年继续前行。

如果说这场全球金融危机有赢家的话,这个赢家就是中国。由于中国政府对危机的应对迅速且颇具规模,中国经济迅速复苏。当许多发达国家仍萎靡不振的时候,中国却在以种种新颖而重要的方式,扩展自己的影响力。

不过,随着尘埃落定,中国的后危机策略引发了一系列疑问。尽管中国政府抓住了许多新的机遇,但国内外观察人士均称,政府犯下了一些失误,可能对中国的利益造成重大损害。

这场危机过后显露出的一个最明显的趋势,是中国重新开始尝试降低对西方国家的经济依赖。

对于中国政府来说,2008年秋季出口大幅下滑,导致数以万计的工人失业,是一次难忘的痛苦经历,这促使政府加快推进现有计划,将中国的经济伙伴多元化。

其结果是,中国与全球许多发展中国家增强了联系。

例如,过去十年,随着中国对大宗商品需求的上升,中国成为巴西越来越重要的贸易伙伴。中国不仅已于去年成为巴西最大的贸易伙伴国,而且,在双方宣布一系列的钢铁、港口、制造业与农业合作协议之后,中国还将于今年成为巴西最大的直接投资国。在中亚、东南亚以及非洲部分地区,类似的故事也在上演。

这一情况的结果是,有可能出现一轮由中国贸易与投资驱动的全球经济增长,但大部分发达国家可能与这场增长无缘。

中国拥有充沛的金融流动性,也正在利用这些资金,投资于越来越多的发达国家的基础设施与工业领域。而且,中国的一些企业能以较低价格提供机械设备与其他资本品,从而使一些投资项目具备财务上的可行性。

例如,中国目前正向阿根廷、土耳其、伊朗和乌克兰的铁路项目提供融资与设备。

欧亚咨询(Eurasia)总裁伊恩•布雷默(Ian Bremmer)表示:“这是一种经过深思熟虑的对冲策略,旨在减轻经济上对西方的依赖。”

除了加大对部分发展中国家的投资之外,中国政府还在加速推进扩大人民币国际使用的计划。例如,中国政府已开始允许某些投资者购买国内资本市场上发行的人民币债券;一些亚洲国家的央行也已开始购买此类证券。

尽管中国当局希望谨慎地控制这一进程,但随着这一进程的发展,以人民币结算的国际贸易可能迅速增多,这最终会对美元的地位构成一定挑战。

 

但是,尽管中国或许在以前所未有的方式扩大影响力,但它也发现,它正在卷入越来越多的外交纠纷之中。

仅仅9月份的纠纷就包括:人民币汇率问题,南海与东海一系列有争议的岛屿问题,以及今年的诺贝尔和平奖(Nobel Peace Prize)被授予狱中的异见分子刘晓波。

一个国家的影响力和重要性在如此快速地上升,难免会被卷入一些外交冲突。但在一些分析人士看来,近来一系列中外紧张事件,似乎源于北京方面的误判。

在1997年亚洲金融危机之后的十年里,中国一直在亚洲地区开展所谓的“魅力攻势”——与别国签署贸易与投资协议,解决边界纠纷。这一策略的潜在逻辑是,在中国领导人看来,与亚洲邻国之间的良好关系,是中国经济发展的基石。

但在过去的几年里,中国与许多邻国的关系都发生恶化。在南海地区,许多多东南亚国家抱怨称,中国政府正在采取一种更为强硬的策略,寻求对帕拉塞尔群岛(西沙群岛)和斯普拉特利群岛(南沙群岛)行使主权。除中国外,越南、台湾、菲律宾、马来西亚和文莱等国家和地区,也在对这些岛屿主张完全或部分主权。

与此同时,在一场激烈的中日外交拉锯战之后,日本政府正在舔着自己的伤口。那场冲突涉及的是东海上另一组有争议的岛屿,其起因是日本巡逻船扣押了一艘中国渔船的船长。

新摩擦还不止于此。印度有人抱怨称,中国一直在克什米尔地区挑起紧张关系;韩国政府对北京也是一肚子火,因为自3月一艘韩国军舰被击沉以来,中国一直拒绝就此事谴责其盟国朝鲜。

华盛顿已经利用这些紧张关系,再次申明了自己在亚洲的地位。美国在6月宣布,视南海为自己的重要战略利益,并提出在南海纠纷中充当调停人。

中国政府抗议称,美国这是在干涉与它无关的问题,但令中国政府担忧的一个现实是:越南、新加坡等国一直在秘密游说美国,让其加大干预力度。

与此同时,在日本,尽管新政府去年上台后表示,要与中国结成更为紧密的盟友关系,但支持这一想法的人在不断减少,尤其是在围绕中国渔船的争端之后。

中国的一些观察人士担心,最近的这些分歧,可能促使一些国家结成遏制中国的战略联盟。中国人民大学国际关系教授时殷弘表示:“如果从长远角度看,很显然,我们必须非常谨慎地处理与邻国的关系。”

刘晓波被授予诺贝尔奖,也源于北京方面的一次举动,在许多观察人士看来,那是一场恐慌之下的过度反应。刘晓波获奖激怒了中国领导层,而且在许多人看来,是对中国的蓄意侮辱。刘晓波在《零八宪章》(Charter 08)发布前数日被逮捕。那是一份支持民主的宣言,最终签署人达到了数千人。不过,当刘晓波随后被判以颠覆政权罪、入狱11年时,不仅他的支持者,连许多官员也感到吃惊,因为按中国近来的标准看,如此长的刑期有些反常。

刘晓波获得诺贝尔奖,激发了中国年轻人对其思想更广泛的兴趣,在这种情况下,中国当局面临的风险是,刘晓波会成为民主运动的一面旗帜。

美国乔治华盛顿大学(George Washington University)中国问题专家沈大伟(David Shambaugh)表示:“中共在海外行事越来越自信,但在国内却流露出了局促不安的迹象。”

过去两年里,中国迅速兴起,并发现自己不得不承担一系列全新角色。

此刻,中国乃至许多世界其它国家的政府,都在匆忙地进行调整,以适应这一新的现实。

译者/何黎

译者/何黎

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035797

 

 

If a global financial meltdown can be said to have a winner, then that would be China. Its economy has rebounded rapidly after the government responded to the crisis quickly and in size. While many developed countries are still wilting, China is expanding its reach and influence in all sorts of new and important ways.

Yet as the dust settles, China’s post-crisis strategy is raising questions. While Beijing has taken advantage of many new openings, observers both inside and outside the country argue that the government is making a number of missteps that could damage its interests down the line.

One of the most powerful trends to emerge from the crisis is a renewed effort to reduce economic dependence on western economies.

The collapse in Chinese exports in the autumn of 2008, which led to tens of thousands of factory jobs being lost, was a traumatic experience for the authorities and it encouraged them to step up existing plans to diversify the country’s economic ties.

The result has been an intensification of links with a host of developing countries around the world.

In one example, China has been an increasingly important partner for Brazil over the past decade, as its demand for commodities has increased. Yet not only did it become Brazil’s biggest trading partner last year, it is also set to be the biggest direct investor in the country this year, after a string of deals have been announced in steel, ports, manufacturing and agriculture. Similar stories can be told in central Asia, south-east Asia or parts of Africa.

The result is the prospect of a new cycle of global growth that is led by both Chinese trade and investment, but which also sidesteps much of the developed world.

The country has abundant financial liquidity, which is being made available for investments in infrastructure and industry in a growing range of developed countries. And it also has companies that can provide machinery and other capital goods at costs that make some of these projects financially viable.

For instance, China is now helping to finance and provide equipment for rail projects in Argentina, Turkey, Iran and Ukraine.

“This is a deliberate hedging strategy to reduce economic dependence on the west,” says Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia consultancy.

While Chinese investment in parts of the developing world is being stepped up, the authorities are also accelerating plans to expand the international use of the renminbi. For instance, the government has started to allow certain investors to buy renminbi bonds issued in the domestic capital market and some Asian central banks have already started to buy such instruments.

Although the authorities want carefully to control the process, it could lead to a rapid expansion in the use of the Chinese currency in trade in a way that would eventually start to challenge some of the role played by the US dollar.

Yet while China may be extending its influence as never before, it is also finding itself involved in an increasing number of diplomatic disputes.

Last month alone, the country has been in arguments: over its exchange rate; about a series of disputed islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and concerning the award of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed dissident.

A country whose influence and importance are rising so quickly is bound to find itself in new diplomatic stand-offs, yet for some analysts, the recent series of tensions between China and the rest of the world appear to be rooted in misjudgments by Beijing.

 

In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China spent the following decade conducting what was often called a “charm offensive” in the region, signing trade and investment deals and settling border disputes. The underlying rationale was that China’s leaders saw good relations with their Asian neighbours as a cornerstone of the expansion of the Chinese economy.

However, over the past couple of years, many of those relations have become frayed. In the South China Sea, a number of south-east Asian countries complain that Beijing is taking a more aggressive strategy in pursuing its claims on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in full or part by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government is licking its wounds after a bruising diplomatic stand-off with Beijing over another set of disputed islands in the East China Sea, which was sparked by Japanese coast guards arresting the captain of a Chinese fishing boat.

The new frictions do not end there. In India, there are complaints that China has been stirring tensions in Kashmir, while the South Korean government has been angered by Beijing’s refusal to condemn its North Korean ally over the bombing of a South Korean warship in March.

Washington has taken advantage of these tensions to reassert its position in Asia, announcing in June that it views the South China Sea as an important strategic interest and offering to act as a mediator in the dispute.

Beijing complains that the US is interfering in issues that are not of its concern, but the worrying reality for the Chinese government is that countries such as Vietnam and Singapore have been quietly lobbying the US to get more involved.

And while the new Japanese government talked about forging a much closer alliance with China after it took office last year, support for such ideas has waned, especially after the dispute over the Chinese fishing boat.

Some observers in China fear the recent disagreements could encourage a strategic alliance to contain the country. “If we take a long-term view, it is clear that we have to be very careful with our dealings with our neighbours,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing.

The Nobel Prize for Liu Xiaobo, which has infuriated the leadership and is seen in many quarters as a calculated insult to China, also stemmed from what many observers see as a panicked reaction by Beijing. Mr Liu was arrested days before the launch of Charter 08, a pro-democracy manifesto that was eventually signed by several thousand people. Yet it was not just Mr Liu’s supporters but also many officials who were surprised when he was later sentenced to 11 years in jail after being convicted of subversion, an unusually long sentence by recent Chinese standards.

Now that he has been awarded a Nobel Prize, sparking wider interest in his ideas among young Chinese, the risk for the Chinese authorities is that he becomes a rallying point for a democracy movement.

“The party is behaving more assertively abroad, but is showing signs of insecurity at home,” says David Shambaugh, a China expert at George Washington University in the US.

China’s rise over the past two years has been so rapid that it has been thrust into a whole series of new roles.

Both Beijing and many other capitals around the world are scrambling to adjust to this new reality.

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035797/en

Ursula Mcpherson

Interpol Issues Arrest Warrant for WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange

Fox News - ‎32 minutes ago‎
The Australian is suspected of rape, sexual molestation and unlawful coercion in an investigation that stems from his encounters with two women during a visit to Sweden in August.

Video: Cable-embarrassed: How will US make WikiLeaks shut up? RT

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The Associated Press - Wall Street Journal - Reuters - CBS News - Wikipedia: Julian Assange

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Toddler dies at Virginia mall, grandmother charged

Reuters - ‎3 hours ago‎
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A 2-year-old girl died on Tuesday after being thrown off a balcony at a shopping mall in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, and her grandmother faces charges over her death, police said.

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高铁竞争下航空业的未来

这是在候机室完成的博客。没完没了的误点造就了这点关于民用航空业的感想……

航空业会连续赚大钱,这不是猜测,是正在发生的事实。中国国航在今年(2010)将盈利超过100亿元人民币。其他航空公司也不会差。并且,这次不同是,在可以预见的未来,似乎没有什么东西能够改变当前的局面。现在只要买上一张机票,搭乘任何一个时间稍微正常一点的航班,您不难得出一个直观的印象:头等舱像过去的经济舱一样满,经济舱像火车厢人挨人。票价折扣动不动没有,甚至有时候买不上票! 坐飞机的人素质越来越差,为了鸡毛蒜皮的小事吵架的乘客以及喜欢脱了鞋子抠脚的乘客原来越多。越来越多的人坐得起飞机了。其实这样的变化在所谓的金融危机之前已经露出端倪,而现在则越来越明显!

航空公司赚钱的原因非常简单,不是因为管理的巨大改进,不是因为人民币升值,不是因为相对便宜的油价,也不是国家的补贴。是因为——出行的需求加上有限的供给,再捎带一点货币贬值的因素。虽然我的博客有很多都发源自“从容投资”的内部研究结果,但博客毕竟不是研究报告,所以没有必要展开阐述出行的需求与人均收入的关系、飞机的采购计划,即将增加的座位数等等等等。其实很多事实摆在那里,与十五年前相比,干线航班的票价不仅没有上升而且一直在打折。同期人民币的币值至少下降了一半以上(看购买什么,如果买房子或者娶老婆……),因此机票相对于居民收入实际上越来越便宜。但是由于人民币对外的升值,飞机和航空材料却越来越便宜。航空公司正处于一种美妙的境地,越来越多的人消费得起航空服务,而成本反倒下降或者至少持平。比这更美妙的是,小航空公司纷纷被三大航空公司兼并,有限的航线资源制约了新的供给出现…..

但是高铁会不会是一个威胁呢?在1000公里以内,绝对是。高铁普及的速度很快。我曾经多次乘坐过高铁,沪宁线、武广线都坐过。理论上高铁的最大优势是准点。不过尽管我所乘坐过的高铁班次不多,还是碰上过延误,甚至还有一次班次在没有任何通知的情况下取消了。高铁的设计最高时速是350公里,这个速度误导了90%未曾乘坐过高铁的旅客。有好几个因素导致实际运行的速度显著小于350公里/小时:首先,空中航线基本是直线,铁路实际是弯曲的,地图上直线1000公里的两个城市之间,高铁的线路长度可能是1300公里;第二,大部分高铁班次中间要停好几站,由于必须减速到零,所以大大降低了平均速度;第三,即便不停站,在经过车站、弯道、隧道的很多路段都得减速。总之,大部分班次的高铁实际速度估计在260公里左右。沪宁之间的高铁常常要花上两个小时,武广线的停站间隔更大,所以实际运行速度快很多。高铁的车站通常并不是传统市中心的火车站,一般设在市近郊,这样也延长了市内抵达的时间。铁路当局针对高铁乘客的服务基本是一种大众化的设计。高端乘客的一等软座车厢并不是封闭式的,卖东西的“乘务员”来来去去。虽然有人查票,但还是不停地有持其他票的乘客过来坐坐。最离谱的是他们也卖站票!一次经过无锡站的时候,上来一大帮乘客站在一等车厢里面,既不安全也不安宁。大众化的定位没有什么不好,但是乘客消费铁路服务的感受差于消费航空服务,客观上留下了航空业向高端走的空间。

航空运输业的主要难题是误点。误点的根源,以我一个外行的看法是房地产惹的祸!这当然是句玩笑话。面对巨大的航空出行需求,供给的增加有瓶颈。瓶颈主要是航线资源。一个机场可以起降的飞机架次有限,飞机再多,流量就得控制。上海有两个民用机场,已经是国内航空枢纽城市中机场最大最多的了,但是纽约有六个民航机场同时运行,北京和广州各自只有一个。似乎新建新的机场并不容易,传说北京的新机场得向河北买地了,土地是稀缺资源啊。

按照这个逻辑,航空业在低端和短途遭到高铁的重大挑战,如果再增加班次也许会进一步提高误点率,未来的发展方向只能是高端化远程化。南方航空公司推出的“超级经济舱”也许就是这个趋势的开始。商务舱和头等舱的票价远远高于普通经济舱,如果拆除经济舱的座位,增加前者的容量,就可以显著提高客公里单价。这样提高盈利与购买新飞机相比边际成本几乎可以忽略不计。航路拥堵得到控制以后准点率会上升。乘客也会觉得比高铁多花的钱到底也值得。

航空与高铁错位竞争,这符合所有人的利益。   
 

马明哲:缔造平安帝国

                           马明哲:缔造平安帝国 
2010-11-30       来源:上海证券报      作者:⊙记者黄蕾 ○编辑 于勇
    南方吹来的带着咸味的海风,饱含着浓烈的改革开放大潮的讯息。

    20多年前,一个在改革开放前沿阵地——深圳蛇口工业区管委会工作的年轻人,紧紧抓住了保险业打破垄断的机遇,在中国人民保险公司一统天下的局面下,迅速撕开一个口子。这个人就是后来的中国平安董事长马明哲。

    时任央行副行长的刘鸿儒至今仍对一个场景记忆犹新。当年在深圳蛇口工业区的招商银行考察时,有个年轻人西装笔挺地站在招行门口,对他发出邀请,“咱们公司是您审批成立的,就在马路另一边,您一定要过去看看。”这个年轻人就是马明哲。

    刘后来在文章中回忆说,“看起来,那实在是一家太小的金融企业:矮矮的一个楼层的门面,几百平米的办公面积,十几个员工。但真正让我记住的,是以马明哲为首的那群年轻人的蓬勃生机和活力。”

    平安之大,是用脚走出来的。20年来,平安人不厌其烦不断创新地行销保险,由最初的十几人发展到数以十万计的庞大营销团队,中国平安位列2010年世界500强第383位,为中国内地非国有企业第一。20年来,企业发展可谓天翻地覆,但惟一不变的是平安晨会的第一课,内容仍然是集体高唱“平安之歌”,歌词的作者也是掌舵人马明哲。

  ⊙记者 黄蕾 ○编辑于勇

  

    首吃螃蟹

    每天十几个小时都泡在办公室的马明哲,其实也是“潮人”。跟了他多年的Blackberry(黑莓手机)最近被换成了iphone4、ipad,他说,先替大伙儿试一试,如果好使,就跟当年Blackberry一样,在公司普及一下。

    马明哲对“求新求变”的迫切感,或许已经深入了骨髓。从最初草创中国平安,到之后一系列的改革——开发投连险、建立员工持股、引入外资股东、引进海外人才、并购同业银行、实践综合金融,中国平安无一不是业内“第一个吃螃蟹”。正如蛇口工业区的领导评价所称,马明哲是一个很能学以致用的人,他总是像饿狼一样,不断寻找,一看到好的东西,他都会一口吃下去,变成自己的东西。

    但习惯了“摸着石头过河”的中国企业家们,一开始并不能认同马明哲的这些“奇思怪想”。马明哲清晰地记得,1996年,当他提出已经8岁的平安应该给自己请个“洋大夫”,进行一番“望、闻、问、切”的彻底梳理时,种种质疑扑面而来,却难摧他创新的坚定。

    不是不赞成“摸着石头过河”,马明哲的理解是,“这是一个很好的探索前进的方法,但在某些领域或状况下,如果河上有桥,我们为什么不付一点过桥费,然后迅速地通过呢?这样不仅可以使我们少犯探索的错误,还帮我们赢得了时间和空间。那么,什么样的桥梁值得我们付费通过?”

    摩根和高盛给马明哲推荐了麦肯锡,那是一家曾帮助诸多国际知名金融机构进行流程再造的世界顶尖管理咨询公司。“建议是挺好,但数百万的‘问诊费’,值不值?”当时反对的声音是很多的,董事们质疑马明哲:平安是不是有必要花那么多钱去请麦肯锡,美国的经验是不是适合中国?

    问诊费虽贵,但若从此脱胎换骨,那就值。马明哲进一步说服董事们,“河水湍急,我们为什么不请懂行的人搭这座桥,帮助我们过河。通过麦肯锡咨询,只要我们加强管理,保单持续率提高1个百分点,营销员脱落率降低1个百分点,或者全国700多个机构平均每年每个机构节约成本3万元,或者少一个机构发生重大失误,这些费用一年就赚回来了。”

    事实上,麦肯锡之后为平安带来的改造效应,远比马明哲当年想象得要大。以至于现在各投行在剖析中国平安股票的投资价值时,仍不时重提当年麦肯锡项目对平安的重大影响力,为之后平安沪港两地上市夯实了地基。“寿险运作流程、投资管理体系、人力资源管理体系的改革中,麦肯锡的身影无处不在。”

    2004年8月18日,麦肯锡受邀为中国保监会做了一场专题报告,保监会第一次成为麦肯锡的客户。此时距离平安与麦肯锡牵手,已经过去了8年。

  

  构建金融控股

    1998年,在平安系统工作会议上,马明哲确定了公司未来的远景和战略。 “公司将设立集团公司,绝对控股寿险、产险、证券和信托公司……我们要去哪里?我们要去‘国际一流的综合性金融服务集团’。”

    马明哲将综合金融设定为平安未来10年的目标,但这恰恰与当年(20世纪90年代末)保险业分业潮流的监管思路相背离。一位平安“老臣”回忆说,当时监管要求分拆经营的压力实在很大,“在没有完成分业之前,新的分支机构和新的险种就不会获批。我们的新产品报上去,一个都不批,说先不急,等你们把分业问题搞完。翻翻那两年的业绩数字,基本就是停止状态。”

    马明哲还记得在监管部门的一次会议上,有位领导说“保险公司就应专注在自己的保险上……有些人要搞什么综合金融?不是时候!”会场上,几百人的目光唰地都聚集到坐在右前方的马明哲身上。

    尽管压力很大,但马明哲仍然“一意孤行”。平安管理层班子里有人跳出来质疑马明哲坚持综合金融的“偏执”,“你成天在外面,为了等一个领导说上几句,几个小时站在外面等人家,等到半夜,值不值?”

    马明哲回答:“为了公司的未来,我给人下跪都可以。我对公司长远的发展,有信心。”

    马明哲的得力干将孙建一回忆起当时的处境:“监管部门要求公司把证券、信托卖掉,当时公司认为这些业务都是日后综合金融必不可少的执照,不能卖。我们一直扛了下来。”

    步入21世纪的门槛,中国本土金融企业即将被卷入更大的竞争中,这一形势令监管层的监管思路开始从“管制”向“促进发展”转变,改造平安的说法随着形势的改变渐渐销声匿迹。马明哲心底吁了一口气。2003年2月14日,中国平安终于挂上了“集团”的牌照,这是继光大、中信后的第三家金融控股集团。

    但对马明哲而言,银行依旧是平安集团的短板。2009年深发展重组项目落入马明哲视野。在深发展上市之初,成为深圳股市龙头的时候,中国平安还只是个“孩子”。

    与2002年时初次向深发展提亲时的环境相比,眼前要退出的美国新桥显然没那么好对付。从交易协议本身而言,不论怎么看新桥都是赢家。

    但马明哲不这么看。“如果财务上没有投资价值,我是不会收购深发展的。当然,战略比财务更重要。”他深知,纵览现在可供收购的全国性股份制商业银行,绝大多数已经引入了战略投资者或股东结构稳定,深发展,几乎是平安惟一的机会。对其倾心打造的金控集团来说,也是难以拒绝和逾越的机会。

    与深发展整合的方案已经获双方股东大会高票通过。现在,马明哲在等待监管部门的消息。

  

  “呛水”海外投资的辨证视角

    按照国家整体“走出去”的方针和原则,马明哲和他的团队开始研究和推进资产全球化的工作。经过历时两年多、全球范围内的精心、反复挑选,马明哲将目标锁定为富通。“投资富通,我们主要有两个出发点:一是规避单一经济体周期性的风险,通俗地说就是不要把鸡蛋放在一个篮子里。二是规避单一资本市场波动过大的风险,在法规规定的额度里,将一部分资金分散投资到波动比较小的欧洲荷比卢地区。”

    2008年,平安斥资22亿欧元购入富通集团4.99%股份,坐上单一最大股东之位。本以为退潮时能捡到美丽贝壳,殊不知竟是一块扎脚的玻璃。未满一年,受累金融风暴,比利时政府为避免富通破产,将其收归国有后分拆。此举导致富通股价一落千丈,平安损失惨重,2008年为此计提了227亿元人民币减值准备,当年利润所剩无几。

    外界质疑平安“出海”太草率——如此高企的收购价格,从开始决策到具体行动,居然只用了区区数月。激进的心态不言而喻。

    “回顾整个过程,我们评估的只是富通所在国家和周边地区的风险,而此次全球金融风暴,其覆盖面之广、影响之深、破坏力之大超出所有人的预计,这是我们所没有考虑到的。”马明哲事后在内部会议上反省说。

    所幸的是,2008年,除海外投资部分,平安主营业务都在国内,保险、银行、资产管理都取得了健康、快速、可持续的增长,特别是综合金融的协同效应进一步增强。

    但曾认为自己对得起6000多万元天价年薪的马明哲决定2008年分文不取。

    经过这次金融危机,有人质疑综合金融是这次金融海啸的导火索之一,与之相伴随的是对马明哲坚持的综合金融的质疑。

    在马明哲看来,“虽然这次金融海啸,波及了很多大型综合性金融机构,但并不意味综合金融本身出了什么问题。这次危机的本质是,在监管缺失的情况下,非传统金融业务的高杠杆累积风险的一次集中释放,风险波及传统金融领域,继而影响到实体经济。这和某一家金融企业采用什么样的业务模式没有关系……不能因为有风险就放弃创新、止步不前,综合金融是提升企业整体实力和国际竞争力的必由之路,平安将矢志前行。”

    呛水富通后,尽管马明哲多次为此道歉,但他仍认为:“我们要懂得从好的东西中取其所长,更上台阶。从不好的经历中汲取教训,要不断地向前看。”这是他对成败的看法。他在一次内部会议上直言,“现在回头看看平安走过的路,之前经常‘犯错’,常常感到彷徨和困惑。但正是经历这些艰难和挑战,磨炼了我们的意志,锻炼了我们的能力。”

    之所以如此感慨,是因为马明哲习惯辩证地看问题,没有绝对的好,也没有绝对的坏。他还记得2002年到普陀山拜访戒忍大师时的那番谈话。大师讲了一句令他至今铭记深思的话——知“足”常乐。

    戒忍大师告诉他:人的一生,像我们在沙滩上走,每走一步都留下足迹。这些足迹记录我们踏踏实实走过的历史,无论是对是错、或辉煌或平凡。重要的是看到未来的前途和希望,这样才会感到快乐和满足。这才是知足常乐。

    投资富通失败之后,很多人问马明哲,平安国际化征程是否会就此止步?他回答说:“几年前,我第一次到汇丰英国总部考察。看着高耸的汇丰大楼,我开玩笑说,总有一天,我们要在旁边盖一座比它还高的楼,当然楼上一定要插上五星红旗。”

 

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4a78b4ee0100nlz5.html

2010年11月29日

马云减持300万股华谊兄弟 董秘称为了改善生活

http://www.sina.com.cn  2010年11月30日 00:06  21世纪经济报道

  雷李平

  11月26日,华谊兄弟(28.780,-1.82,-5.95%)再遭大宗交易减持,当天出现3笔大宗交易,累计股数400万股,套现金额达1.2亿元。深交所统计数据未披露上述大宗交易详细情况,不过华谊兄弟董秘办人士向记者证实,马云减持了所持华谊兄弟300万股,“是为了改善生活”。

  按11月26日30.04元的交易价格计算,马云300万股的套现金额高达9012万元,相较其不足1000万元的入股成本,盈利已近10倍;若算上剩余2464.8万股零成本持股市值,浮盈超过百倍。由于300万股尚未达到披露要求,马云的减持行为未获公开披露。

  百倍盈利

  根据深交所大宗交易数据和《上市公司董事、监事、高级管理人员及相关人员持有本公司股份变动情况》(简称《持股变动情况》)披露,11月1日至26日,共有12笔大宗和21笔竞价交易减持华谊兄弟1558.56万股,累计套现金额4.69亿元。

  其中,深交所大宗交易数据显示,11月1日至26日,共有12笔大宗交易卖出华谊兄弟1264.5万股,均价29.44元,套现金额达3.73亿元。其中,11月1日-19日卖出的8笔均来自中信建投北京东直门南大街营业部。根据深交所《持股变动情况》披露,除11月1日一笔中金公司北京建国门外大街营业部以30.31元接手的200万股无记录外,其余7笔全由孙晓璐卖出。

  11月22日,华谊兄弟仍被以29.82元价格在大宗交易平台卖出50万股,买卖方均为中金公司北京建国门外大街营业部。11月26日,大宗交易上升到3笔,中金公司北京建国门外大街营业部分别卖出200万股、100万股和100万股,价格均为30.04元。其中,200万股接手方为中金公司北京建国门外大街营业部,后两笔则为民族证券北京西坝河营业部。上述4笔大宗交易累计减持华谊兄弟450万股,成交金额1.35亿元。不过,深交所《上市公司董事、监事、高级管理人员及相关人员持有本公司股份变动情况》并未记录该4笔交易,卖出方无法从中获悉。

  从大宗交易买卖营业部来看,11月1日无记录的200万股应该同为孙晓璐所售,而马云减持的300万股则发生在无记录的26日,成交价格30.04元,金额累计9012万元。

  而马云参股华谊兄弟的成本是多少呢?

  公开资料显示,马云入股华谊兄弟最早在2006年。该年6月15日,周石星将华谊兄弟前身浙江华谊10.7%的股权转让给马云,转让价款为53.5万元;同日,汪超涌、王忠军、王忠磊、刘晓梅分别将其持有浙江华谊2.1%、0.525%、0.105%、0.07%的股权转让给马云,转让价款分别为10.5万元、2.625万元、0.525万元、0.35万元。转让结束后马云出资金额为67.5万元,占出资比例的13.5%,持股成本为67.5万元。

  2006年6月23日,浙江华谊注册资本由500万元增至5000万元,其中增加的4500万元全部由股东华谊广告认缴。华谊广告注册资本200万元中,王忠军出资144万元,占72%;王忠磊出资8万元,占4%;马云持有15%的股权。增资后,华谊广告出资浙江华谊4550万元,占比91%;马云在浙江华谊中直接出资67.5万元,占比1.35%。假设马云在华谊广告中出资价格与王忠磊一样,则马云持有华谊广告15%股权的成本为30万元,加上其在浙江华谊的出资成本67.5万元,马云直接和间接在浙江华谊的投入为97.5万元。

  2006年8月1日,浙江华谊变更为华谊有限。2007年8月28日,马云将其持有的华谊有限0.27%的股权转让给鲁伟鼎,转让价款为13.5万元。转让后马云持有华谊广告12%股权,出资华谊有限54万元,占比1.08%。2007年11月19日,华谊广告将其持有的华谊有限91%股权中的12.7048%转让给马云,转让价款为635.24万元,马云共出资金额689.24万元,占比13.78%。2007年11月华谊有限增资至5264万,马云出资金额689.24万元,占比13.09%。2008年1月华谊有限整体变更设立股份公司后,马云持股华谊兄弟1310.4万股,占比13.09%。2008年2月华谊兄弟增资至1.26亿股,增资每股定价3元,马云认购72万股,出资216万元,累计持股1382.4万元,占比10.97%。

  2009年10月30日,华谊兄弟在创业板上市,马云持股仍为1382.4万股,占总股本的8.23%。综合历次股权变更马云直接投入资金约为935.24万元,持股成本约0.68元/股。

  2010年4月28日,华谊兄弟实施2009年分红方案每10股转10股派3元,马云持股变更为2764.8万股,占比8.23%,在扣除3元派现获得的414.72万元(含税)分红款后,马云2764.8万元的持股成本只有520.52万元,为0.188元/股。

  2010年11月1日,华谊兄弟1.36亿股限售股解禁,马云所持2764.8万股全部解禁,兑现每年转让的比例不超过其所持股份总数25%的承诺后,实际上市流通股数为691.2万股。

  此次,马云减持其中的300万股,套现9012万元,相比原始投资的935.24万元,获益达8.64倍,扣除现金分红后的盈利为16.31倍。剩余的2464.8万股则为零成本,以11月29日30.6元收盘价计算,市值为7.54亿元。若汇总2764.8万股的盈利,市值加套现总额达8.44亿元,原始投资获益为89.28倍,扣除现金分红后浮盈161.21倍。

  马云最近很缺钱

  记者从华谊兄弟董秘办获悉,马云给出减持的理由是“为改善生活”。而在一年前,马云减持阿里巴巴时表示卖出股票是为给家人阶段性的成就感。

  据港交所公告显示,马云于2009年9月8日,售出阿里巴巴b2b公司(1688.HK)共1300万股,套现约2.70亿港元(约合2.38亿元人民币),令公司股价大跌6.93%,为四个月来最大幅度下跌。马云随后在公告中表示,阿里巴巴10周年庆之际,在阿里巴巴第一个创业阶段的即将结束而另一个激动人心的新时代即将启动的时候,“卖一些阿里巴巴上市公司的股票,给自己、家人一点小小的阶段性的成就感。”

  同期,腾讯高管也套现部分股权。2009年9月8日及9日,腾讯控股主席马化腾共计减持50万股腾讯控股股票,累计6440万港元。而此前的8月26日,马化腾一日就减持500万股,套现近6亿港元。2008年下半年,马化腾曾连续13次套现6.7亿港元。与马云不同的是,就在马化腾套现减持之际,腾讯控股创下每股130港元的新高。此时的腾讯已经超越eBay、雅虎,以接近300亿元的总市值位列市值第三大互联网公司。

  在香港套现2.4亿元人民币满足成就感,短短一年后又需要“改善生活”在A股套现近亿元,马云的开销不小:

  2008年,马云联合郭台铭,投资1500多万美元在杭州低调投资了百世物流科技有限公司;2010年5月,百世物流收购业内排名第六的汇通快递70%股权。

  2010年4月,PE热潮中,马云与同为华谊兄弟股东的虞锋等创建云锋基金,主要针对互联网、消费品和新能源三个领域投资。基金的LP全部为包括马云、虞锋、史玉柱、沈国军、汪建国、王玉锁等十五六个自然人的美元及人民币资产。据称,该基金第一期资金的规模,可能会达到六七亿美元左右,而最终“云锋”的总盘有可能达到百亿元人民币规模。而华谊兄弟成为该基金“投资人提供经验与资源———企业丰厚回馈投资人”的典型样板。

  或许是基金启动等资金抽水过多,马云不得不再次将手伸向资本市场,一本万利的股权投资无疑成为最好的生活改善来源。

 

http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/newstock/cyb/20101130/00069027766.shtml

央行催促国际板 担当池子功能

http://www.sina.com.cn  2010年11月30日 01:55  第一财经日报

  陆媛 李彬

  央行官员突然“催促”证监会主管的国际板尽快推出,这给市场带来不少微妙的解读。

  昨日上午,央行副行长马德伦在中俄金融合作新闻发布会上表示,央行希望国际板能够尽快推出。

  而就在上周六(11月27日),证监会副主席姚刚在“2010第二届北京律师论坛”上表示,证监会正在加紧研究推动国际板建设,着力解决相关法律问题。

  两位官员对国际板的高调表态,联系起央行行长周小川近日提出的“池子”说法,不少业界人士将国际板解读为“池子”的一部分。这是否意味着,国际板增添了新的定位?而国际板是否能够有效承担对冲热钱的功能,且承受住热钱骤然撤离的冲击?

  国际板“池子”新功能?

  近日,周小川在财新年会上提到要建一个“池子”管理热钱,后来被解释为是指建立一系列的政策措施来管理热钱,既包括对流入资本的外汇管理(前不久外汇局刚发布对流入资本的管制政策),也包括存款准备金等一系列政策措施。

  业内人士对《第一财经日报》指出,从某种意义上说,热钱来到境内,也属于整体流动性的一部分,那么只要是能够对冲流动性的工具,都可以看成“池子”的一部分。除去提高存款准备金率等数量工具外,债市、股市都是一种手段,而国际板在此时被高调重提,也可被当作“池子”使用。

  业内人士指出,这将增强国际板推出的必要性,但其能否胜任还有待市场检验。

  由于国际板涉及到不同的金融监管部门,马德伦特意解释说,沪深交易所的国际板建设是由证监会主管,但他乐意作为中俄金融合作委员会的中方主席来推动国际板建设。

  而关于“央行希望尽快推出国际板”的说法,是他在新闻发布会上对俄罗斯大使馆代表提问的回答。

  目前,在中俄战略协作伙伴关系的背景下,中俄金融合作日益密切,除了人民币兑卢布的挂牌交易上周已经顺利展开,此前还有报道称中俄考虑互相推动国际板交易。

  马德伦认为,国际板的推出有其市场需求、业界需求,这种需求不再是潜在的,而是现实的,证监会作为监管者也注意到了这一点,正在积极推进。

  姚刚在上述论坛表示,国际板建设是内地资本市场国际化的重要步骤,让境外的公司,也包括像中国移动这样业务在境内,但注册地在香港、上市在香港的公司,到内地的交易所发行以人民币计价的股票,目前证监会正在加紧研究推动。

  而对于国际板能否有效发挥“池子”功能,昨日一位监管部门人士告诉本报记者,国际板在对冲外汇占款方面,的确能发挥不小作用。

  而一位证券业人士指出,国际板的推出,能增多境内投资者对于股票市场的投资渠道和选择范围,不过短期内会对股市带来一定的供应压力。而在热钱大规模撤离的情况下,如果国际板前期遭遇过度炒作,将会成为一个“重灾区”。“当然,具体的交易情况,肯定监管部门还会出台不少配套措施,具体的判断只能走一步看一步。”

  中介机构觊觎国际板蛋糕

  国际板首先面临国际法律和中国法律这两套体系的对接问题。姚刚说:“国际板建设要解决重大法律问题,如公司法、证券法在2006年修订的时候并没有考虑境外的公司到境内来上市,因此就必须有一套完整的针对这样新业务的法律规定。如公司法要求公司组织架构须有监事会和独立董事,而在国外监事会和独立董事属于不同的治理结构,人家没有监事会来中国上市怎么办。”

  虽然最终没有决定名字是否叫做国际板,但一位参与制度设计的监管人士对本报记者表示,计划中的国际板应当具备六个特征。

  这六大特征是:同一上市主体,是原注册地的已经在其他交易所上市的公司,比如汇丰控股(00005.HK),业已上市的公司主体方可登陆国际板;是实体经营的公司不能是壳公司,反向收购以控制境内资产,出于谨慎监管的需要,监管部门目前不会接受壳公司来登陆国际板;是较为成熟的经营稳健的国际公司,诸如世界500强公司,目前不考虑接受成长性的境外创业期公司;尊重公司注册地的监管法律,不可能要求来登陆国际板的公司完全符合公司法的一些特殊性要求,比如设立监事会;以人民币计价,由境内投资者购买国际板公司股票;发行新股,不能存量发行,不能“只挂牌卖老股”。

  据了解,目前钟情国际板的境外公司包括汇丰控股、纽交所、西门子等。而中国投行、律师事务所、会计师事务所等一系列中介机构,也将为登陆A股的国际企业提供相应的发行服务,只要它们拥有证监会核发的保荐牌照,有望分享数以百亿元计的国际板保荐蛋糕。

  目前,中信证券(12.70,-0.48,-3.64%)、中国国际金融有限公司正在为一些准备登陆A股国际板的企业做上市顾问服务,如汇丰控股等,汇丰的融资额被指可能在数十亿美元。一位投行人士告诉本报记者,前期登陆国际板的企业不会太多,但该项服务与公司的国际化目标有关,所以要关注这项业务。

 

http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/newstock/zxdt/20101130/01559028297.shtml

Penny Dickson

"Penny Dickson"

Latest updu5pgoaates: Wikileaks' diplogxkmatic cables relrpa44n5wease

CNN (blog) - ‎50 minutes ago‎
WikiLeaks, a whistle-blowiyfwfpng website known for leakara0mring state secrets, helti8c1as relef0qased its latest batch of controversial docuz7q6jments. It has posted the first of ...

Reynaldo Kyle

"Reynaldo Kyle"

Latest updkqp462ates: Wikileaks' diplosx03matic cables relvi8i97v4ease

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WikiLeaks, a whistle-blowir1tng website known for leakgcwp9ing state secrets, hi7xel0yas releximcn06aased its latest batch of controversial docupu2ments. It has posted the first of ...

不应妖魔化中国 Why the west should not demonise China

 

如今,中国与“自信”几乎成了同义词。一提到“中央王国”,西方媒体就都没有一句好话。中国仍坚持低估人民币,以获取不公平的贸易优势;在领土纠纷问题上恫吓邻国;完全不采取任何举措,以钳制危险的朝鲜政权,而且尽管朝鲜的挑衅行为逐渐升级(包括此次炮击韩国),中国仍继续向其提供大量援助。

但在中国国内,民众对中国政府对外政策的看法几乎截然相反。大多数普通民众认为,中国政府还不够自信,中国领导人太软弱,而西方对中国的批评都是不公平且虚伪的。

以两个广受关注的问题为例:有关中国汇率政策的较量,以及中日围绕东海有争议岛屿的纠纷。中国国内的主流民意是,美国将其自己的经济问题归咎于中国、并威逼中国做出政策改变是不公平的,那只会既伤害中国经济,又无法提振美国的增长。至于中日领土争端,大多数中国人认为,西方一直在不公平地偏袒日本。

这种分歧并非第一次出现。但以往很少碰到西方人对中国国际立场的看法与中国人自己的看法如此截然相对的情况。最明显的原因是中国国内民族主义的不断抬头,政府支持的爱国主义教育、以及共产党对媒体的控制(使媒体不能对中国与西方的争议进行客观报道和分析)对此起到了推动作用。尽管大多数普通中国民众并不相信官方媒体对国内事件的报道,但他们更容易相信政府对于中国在海外行为的说法。具有讽刺意味的是,中国政府所推行的战略似乎是要完成不可能的任务:强化自己的民族主义资历,同时维持一种灵活的外交政策。一方面,执政的共产党急于证明,自己使中国成为一个受尊重的世界强国。另一方面,中国领导人希望坚持务实的外交政策,避免与西方发生代价高昂且不必要的冲突。这一战略的内在矛盾令其越来越站不住脚。

进一步加深双方认知分歧的是,外界的确用一种不同的标准来评判中国。在与整个世界(尤其是西方世界)打交道时,中国面临着两个不利因素:其实力及其政权的特性。与其它强国一样,人们用更高的标准来评判中国,认为它在任何情况下都应该保持克制(尤其在与实力较弱的国家打交道时),并担负起更重大的国际责任。但与民主政体的强国不同,中国还因为其威权制度而受到无形但重大的惩罚。由于民主的西方认为威权政权不合法理,因此西方人士透过更加怀疑和不信任的棱镜来看待中国的海外行为。其结果是,每当中国卷入国际纠纷,西方都自然而然地支持中国的对立方。对于西方政客和舆论影响者而言,这种意识形态偏见已成为第二天性。但对于普通中国民众而言,这种差别对待会让人愤怒。很少有政府受到这种三重标准。

如果任其发展,这种不断扩大且令人不安的认知鸿沟只会导致紧张升级,甚至引发冲突。这会导致在一些关乎全球安全和繁荣的关键问题上更难争取中国的合作。例如,西方将加大对中国施压,阻止中国的战略缓冲地带——朝鲜——扩大其核武计划和进一步挑衅韩国。但随着中国与西方之间不信任和争吵的逐步升级,中国可能会选择熟视无睹,只是为了表达一种态度,即西方软硬兼施是行不通的。

缩小这种认知鸿沟需要双方都付出努力。总体上说,北京方面可以做得更多。它必须允许媒体对中国外交政策进行更客观的报道,并停止煽动民族主义。西方政客和舆论影响者在批评中国时应更讲究策略(纵使这些批评是合理的),并尽量从中国的视角看待这些问题。此类温和措施可能不会彻底消除认知分歧,但除此之外没有什么现实的选择。

本文作者为美国克莱蒙特-麦肯纳学院(Claremont McKenna College)政治学教授、美国卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)客座高级研究员

译者/何黎

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035759
 
 

Nowadays China and “assertiveness” have become practically synonymous. The portrayal of the Middle Kingdom in the western press is uniformly unflattering. It is maintaining an undervalued currency to gain unfair trade advantages; it is bullying its neighbours in territorial disputes; it is doing nothing to rein in the dangerous North Korean regime and, despite its escalating aggression (including the latest artillery attacks on South Korea), continues to pump aid into Pyongyang.

Within China, however, popular perception of Beijing’s international behaviour is almost the exact opposite. Most ordinary people believe the Chinese government is, if anything, not assertive enough. They see their leaders as spineless and western criticisms of Chinese behaviour as unfair and hypocritical.

Take, for example, two well-publicised issues: the tussle over China’s exchange rate policy and the Sino- Japanese row over disputed islands in the East China Sea. The predominant perception within China is that America is unfairly blaming China for its own economic woes and bullying China to adopt a policy change that would only hurt the Chinese economy without reviving America’s growth. In the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, most Chinese believe the west has unfairly sided with Japan.

Such divergence is not unprecedented. But it is hard to recall an era when western views of China’s international stance were diametrically opposed to those of the Chinese themselves. The most obvious reason is the rising nationalism within China, fuelled both by state-sponsored patriotic education and by the Communist party’s control of the media that has precluded objective coverage and analysis of China’s disputes with the west. While most ordinary Chinese distrust the official media’s coverage of domestic issues, they are far more credulous of the government’s versions of China’s conduct abroad. Ironically, the Chinese government is pursuing a strategy that attempts to achieve the impossible: bolstering its nationalist credentials while maintaining a flexible foreign policy. On the one hand, the ruling Communist party is eager to show that it has made China a respected world power. On the other hand, Chinese leaders want to stick to a pragmatic foreign policy that avoids costly and needless conflicts with the west. The tensions inherent in this strategy are making it increasingly untenable.

Further exacerbating the gap in perceptions is that China is, indeed, held to a different standard. In its dealings with the world in general, and the west in particular, China suffers from two handicaps: its power and the nature of its regime. Like other great powers, China is judged by a much higher standard. It is expected to use restraint under all circumstances (particularly in dealing with less powerful countries) and to assume greater international responsibilities. But unlike democratic powers, China also pays an implicit but substantial authoritarian penalty. Because the democratic west views authoritarian regimes as illegitimate, China’s international behaviour is seen through far more sceptical and distrustful prisms in the west. As a result, whenever China is featured in an international dispute, western sympathies naturally flow to China’s opponents. To western politicians and opinion-makers, such ideological bias is second-nature. But to an average Chinese, such differentiated treatment engenders outrage. Few states are subject to such a triple standard.

Left unattended, this growing and troubling perception gap can only lead to rising tensions, even conflict. It makes it all the more difficult to gain Chinese co-operation on matters vital to global security and prosperity. For example, China will face growing western pressure to prevent North Korea, Beijing’s strategic buffer, from expanding its nuclear programme and engaging in further aggression against South Korea. But with rising distrust and acrimony between China and the west, China may choose to do nothing just to show that the west cannot bash it and beg at the same time.

Narrowing this perception gap requires efforts on both sides. On balance, Beijing can do much more. It must allow more objective reporting on Chinese foreign policy and stop fanning nationalism. Western politicians and opinion-makers should exercise greater tact in criticising China (even when such criticisms are justified) and strive to see the issues from the Chinese perspective. Such modest steps may not fully close the perception gap, but there are few realistic alternatives.

The writer is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and an adjunct senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

 

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035759/en