编者按：年历翻至12月，2010年迫近尾声。中国有盘点的传统。这一年，中国经济在全球金融危机和波动中仍保持高增长，超越日本，成为世界第二大经济体。不过，30年突进之后，其增长模式越来越受到诟病，政府和民间也愈发意识到转型的迫切。从国际看，今年中美经贸摩擦仍在升温，邻国的地缘政治充满变数；从国内看，劳资关系急需调整，通胀的威胁触手可及，政治改革呼声重起，环境与能源压力增大，城乡地区差距凸显, 教育医疗等公共服务日益遭受市场挤迫。大国博弈应谨慎落子。今年，多事之秋，正需明事理、负责任的媒体加以仔细观察、记录、思考、评析。从今天起，FT中文网推出“2010年中国特别报告”，为期一个月，与公众一道回顾一年来中国发展的足迹，从纷乱现象中探寻出一条相对清晰的路径，并期待我们在新的一年继续前行。
如果说这场全球金融危机有赢家的话，这个赢家就是中国。由于中国政府对危机的应对迅速且颇具规模，中国经济迅速复苏。当许多发达国家仍萎靡不振的时候，中国却在以种种新颖而重要的方式，扩展自己的影响力。
不过，随着尘埃落定，中国的后危机策略引发了一系列疑问。尽管中国政府抓住了许多新的机遇，但国内外观察人士均称，政府犯下了一些失误，可能对中国的利益造成重大损害。
这场危机过后显露出的一个最明显的趋势，是中国重新开始尝试降低对西方国家的经济依赖。
对于中国政府来说，2008年秋季出口大幅下滑，导致数以万计的工人失业，是一次难忘的痛苦经历，这促使政府加快推进现有计划，将中国的经济伙伴多元化。
其结果是，中国与全球许多发展中国家增强了联系。
例如，过去十年，随着中国对大宗商品需求的上升，中国成为巴西越来越重要的贸易伙伴。中国不仅已于去年成为巴西最大的贸易伙伴国，而且，在双方宣布一系列的钢铁、港口、制造业与农业合作协议之后，中国还将于今年成为巴西最大的直接投资国。在中亚、东南亚以及非洲部分地区，类似的故事也在上演。
这一情况的结果是，有可能出现一轮由中国贸易与投资驱动的全球经济增长，但大部分发达国家可能与这场增长无缘。
中国拥有充沛的金融流动性，也正在利用这些资金，投资于越来越多的发达国家的基础设施与工业领域。而且，中国的一些企业能以较低价格提供机械设备与其他资本品，从而使一些投资项目具备财务上的可行性。
例如，中国目前正向阿根廷、土耳其、伊朗和乌克兰的铁路项目提供融资与设备。
欧亚咨询(Eurasia)总裁伊恩•布雷默(Ian Bremmer)表示：“这是一种经过深思熟虑的对冲策略，旨在减轻经济上对西方的依赖。”
除了加大对部分发展中国家的投资之外，中国政府还在加速推进扩大人民币国际使用的计划。例如，中国政府已开始允许某些投资者购买国内资本市场上发行的人民币债券；一些亚洲国家的央行也已开始购买此类证券。
尽管中国当局希望谨慎地控制这一进程，但随着这一进程的发展，以人民币结算的国际贸易可能迅速增多，这最终会对美元的地位构成一定挑战。
但是，尽管中国或许在以前所未有的方式扩大影响力，但它也发现，它正在卷入越来越多的外交纠纷之中。
仅仅9月份的纠纷就包括：人民币汇率问题，南海与东海一系列有争议的岛屿问题，以及今年的诺贝尔和平奖(Nobel Peace Prize)被授予狱中的异见分子刘晓波。
一个国家的影响力和重要性在如此快速地上升，难免会被卷入一些外交冲突。但在一些分析人士看来，近来一系列中外紧张事件，似乎源于北京方面的误判。
在1997年亚洲金融危机之后的十年里，中国一直在亚洲地区开展所谓的“魅力攻势”——与别国签署贸易与投资协议，解决边界纠纷。这一策略的潜在逻辑是，在中国领导人看来，与亚洲邻国之间的良好关系，是中国经济发展的基石。
但在过去的几年里，中国与许多邻国的关系都发生恶化。在南海地区，许多多东南亚国家抱怨称，中国政府正在采取一种更为强硬的策略，寻求对帕拉塞尔群岛（西沙群岛）和斯普拉特利群岛（南沙群岛）行使主权。除中国外，越南、台湾、菲律宾、马来西亚和文莱等国家和地区，也在对这些岛屿主张完全或部分主权。
与此同时，在一场激烈的中日外交拉锯战之后，日本政府正在舔着自己的伤口。那场冲突涉及的是东海上另一组有争议的岛屿，其起因是日本巡逻船扣押了一艘中国渔船的船长。
新摩擦还不止于此。印度有人抱怨称，中国一直在克什米尔地区挑起紧张关系；韩国政府对北京也是一肚子火，因为自3月一艘韩国军舰被击沉以来，中国一直拒绝就此事谴责其盟国朝鲜。
华盛顿已经利用这些紧张关系，再次申明了自己在亚洲的地位。美国在6月宣布，视南海为自己的重要战略利益，并提出在南海纠纷中充当调停人。
中国政府抗议称，美国这是在干涉与它无关的问题，但令中国政府担忧的一个现实是：越南、新加坡等国一直在秘密游说美国，让其加大干预力度。
与此同时，在日本，尽管新政府去年上台后表示，要与中国结成更为紧密的盟友关系，但支持这一想法的人在不断减少，尤其是在围绕中国渔船的争端之后。
中国的一些观察人士担心，最近的这些分歧，可能促使一些国家结成遏制中国的战略联盟。中国人民大学国际关系教授时殷弘表示：“如果从长远角度看，很显然，我们必须非常谨慎地处理与邻国的关系。”
刘晓波被授予诺贝尔奖，也源于北京方面的一次举动，在许多观察人士看来，那是一场恐慌之下的过度反应。刘晓波获奖激怒了中国领导层，而且在许多人看来，是对中国的蓄意侮辱。刘晓波在《零八宪章》(Charter 08)发布前数日被逮捕。那是一份支持民主的宣言，最终签署人达到了数千人。不过，当刘晓波随后被判以颠覆政权罪、入狱11年时，不仅他的支持者，连许多官员也感到吃惊，因为按中国近来的标准看，如此长的刑期有些反常。
刘晓波获得诺贝尔奖，激发了中国年轻人对其思想更广泛的兴趣，在这种情况下，中国当局面临的风险是，刘晓波会成为民主运动的一面旗帜。
美国乔治华盛顿大学(George Washington University)中国问题专家沈大伟(David Shambaugh)表示：“中共在海外行事越来越自信，但在国内却流露出了局促不安的迹象。”
过去两年里，中国迅速兴起，并发现自己不得不承担一系列全新角色。
此刻，中国乃至许多世界其它国家的政府，都在匆忙地进行调整，以适应这一新的现实。
译者/何黎
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035797
If a global financial meltdown can be said to have a winner, then that would be China. Its economy has rebounded rapidly after the government responded to the crisis quickly and in size. While many developed countries are still wilting, China is expanding its reach and influence in all sorts of new and important ways.
Yet as the dust settles, China’s post-crisis strategy is raising questions. While Beijing has taken advantage of many new openings, observers both inside and outside the country argue that the government is making a number of missteps that could damage its interests down the line.
One of the most powerful trends to emerge from the crisis is a renewed effort to reduce economic dependence on western economies.
The collapse in Chinese exports in the autumn of 2008, which led to tens of thousands of factory jobs being lost, was a traumatic experience for the authorities and it encouraged them to step up existing plans to diversify the country’s economic ties.
The result has been an intensification of links with a host of developing countries around the world.
In one example, China has been an increasingly important partner for Brazil over the past decade, as its demand for commodities has increased. Yet not only did it become Brazil’s biggest trading partner last year, it is also set to be the biggest direct investor in the country this year, after a string of deals have been announced in steel, ports, manufacturing and agriculture. Similar stories can be told in central Asia, south-east Asia or parts of Africa.
The result is the prospect of a new cycle of global growth that is led by both Chinese trade and investment, but which also sidesteps much of the developed world.
The country has abundant financial liquidity, which is being made available for investments in infrastructure and industry in a growing range of developed countries. And it also has companies that can provide machinery and other capital goods at costs that make some of these projects financially viable.
For instance, China is now helping to finance and provide equipment for rail projects in Argentina, Turkey, Iran and Ukraine.
“This is a deliberate hedging strategy to reduce economic dependence on the west,” says Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia consultancy.
While Chinese investment in parts of the developing world is being stepped up, the authorities are also accelerating plans to expand the international use of the renminbi. For instance, the government has started to allow certain investors to buy renminbi bonds issued in the domestic capital market and some Asian central banks have already started to buy such instruments.
Although the authorities want carefully to control the process, it could lead to a rapid expansion in the use of the Chinese currency in trade in a way that would eventually start to challenge some of the role played by the US dollar.
Yet while China may be extending its influence as never before, it is also finding itself involved in an increasing number of diplomatic disputes.
Last month alone, the country has been in arguments: over its exchange rate; about a series of disputed islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and concerning the award of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed dissident.
A country whose influence and importance are rising so quickly is bound to find itself in new diplomatic stand-offs, yet for some analysts, the recent series of tensions between China and the rest of the world appear to be rooted in misjudgments by Beijing.
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China spent the following decade conducting what was often called a “charm offensive” in the region, signing trade and investment deals and settling border disputes. The underlying rationale was that China’s leaders saw good relations with their Asian neighbours as a cornerstone of the expansion of the Chinese economy.
However, over the past couple of years, many of those relations have become frayed. In the South China Sea, a number of south-east Asian countries complain that Beijing is taking a more aggressive strategy in pursuing its claims on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed in full or part by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government is licking its wounds after a bruising diplomatic stand-off with Beijing over another set of disputed islands in the East China Sea, which was sparked by Japanese coast guards arresting the captain of a Chinese fishing boat.
The new frictions do not end there. In India, there are complaints that China has been stirring tensions in Kashmir, while the South Korean government has been angered by Beijing’s refusal to condemn its North Korean ally over the bombing of a South Korean warship in March.
Washington has taken advantage of these tensions to reassert its position in Asia, announcing in June that it views the South China Sea as an important strategic interest and offering to act as a mediator in the dispute.
Beijing complains that the US is interfering in issues that are not of its concern, but the worrying reality for the Chinese government is that countries such as Vietnam and Singapore have been quietly lobbying the US to get more involved.
And while the new Japanese government talked about forging a much closer alliance with China after it took office last year, support for such ideas has waned, especially after the dispute over the Chinese fishing boat.
Some observers in China fear the recent disagreements could encourage a strategic alliance to contain the country. “If we take a long-term view, it is clear that we have to be very careful with our dealings with our neighbours,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University in Beijing.
The Nobel Prize for Liu Xiaobo, which has infuriated the leadership and is seen in many quarters as a calculated insult to China, also stemmed from what many observers see as a panicked reaction by Beijing. Mr Liu was arrested days before the launch of Charter 08, a pro-democracy manifesto that was eventually signed by several thousand people. Yet it was not just Mr Liu’s supporters but also many officials who were surprised when he was later sentenced to 11 years in jail after being convicted of subversion, an unusually long sentence by recent Chinese standards.
Now that he has been awarded a Nobel Prize, sparking wider interest in his ideas among young Chinese, the risk for the Chinese authorities is that he becomes a rallying point for a democracy movement.
“The party is behaving more assertively abroad, but is showing signs of insecurity at home,” says David Shambaugh, a China expert at George Washington University in the US.
China’s rise over the past two years has been so rapid that it has been thrust into a whole series of new roles.
Both Beijing and many other capitals around the world are scrambling to adjust to this new reality.
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