2011年8月21日

全球化的大败笔 The great failure of globalisation

最近欧元区和美国经济几乎同时发生市场信心崩溃,背后的真正原因在于经济战略和政府领导的失败。我们没有必要指责评级机构:欧洲和美国的政府没能处理好全球资本市场的现实和来自亚洲的竞争,理应承担最主要责任。

我仔细研究过数十次金融危机,知道成功的政策意味着要向公众指出一条出路,它既要大胆、在技术上合理,又必须以社会价值观为基础。大西洋两岸的领导人在所有这些方面都不孚众望。甚至,美国和欧洲都未能正确诊断出核心问题所在,即这两个地区都深受全球化的危害。

国际竞争导致制造业的低技术工人失去工作、大量工业领域的新投资减少。21世纪头十年里,美国和欧洲的就业率一开始之所以得以保持,只是因为低利率和不负责任的放松监管刺激了住房建设,直到后来泡沫破裂。现在的复苏之路,不在于催生一个新的房地产泡沫,而在于提高工人技能、扩大出口、以及增加在基础设施和低碳能源方面的公共投资。可恰恰相反,美国和欧洲却时而采取行不通的消费导向刺激计划,时而诉诸于不考虑未来投资的紧缩政策。

现在的宏观经济政策不仅没能创造就业,也不符合基本的社会价值观。让我来说得清楚一些:好的社会政策不应该导致巨大的财政赤字。欧洲和美国的公共债务规模已经太过庞大了。但好的政策的确应该在削减社会福利和对富人增税之间进行一种完全不同的平衡。

一个明明白白的事实是,全球化不仅对缺乏技能的就业者造成了沉重打击,而且实际上已成为全球超级富豪的巨大财源。他们能够在新兴市场国家进行新的高利润项目投资。同时,正如沃伦•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)上周所言,他们还能够成功说服本国政府,以全球税收竞争的名义为他们的利润和高收入减税。即使偶尔受到政客的抨击,避税天堂仍然得以迅速发展。最终,穷人受到双重打击:先是来自全球市场的竞争,然后是富人以低税率把钱藏在遍布世界的避税港所造成的伤害。

因此,改善欧美财政政策应该以三点为基础。首先,应该扩大对人力资本和基础设施的投资。其次,应该削减浪费性支出,比如在伊拉克、阿富汗和也门等地的不明智军事活动。第三,应该在中期内实现平衡预算,主要手段是增加对高额个人所得和跨国企业利润的征税,这些所得和利润通过各种漏洞和海外避税天堂被隐藏起来。

如果新项目能够自募资金,基础设施投资并不一定会增加赤字。即使项目需要先期借款,但如果以未来收入偿还债务,就不会增加净负债。目前,美国和欧洲的预算会计,基本上都未能区分自融资资本项目(比如以未来通行费作为收入来源的桥梁项目)和用一般财政收入作为融资来源的项目。

出口导向型经济增长是另一条尚未有效开发的复苏通道。其中一部分必须依赖技能和技术的改善来实现——这是不能削减教育开支的又一个原因。但另一部分可以通过改进融资政策来实现。中国已经认识到了这一点,通过提供长期中资贷款,每年向非洲出口几十亿美元的基础设施项目。而美国和欧洲由于没有向非洲和其它快速增长国家提供融资,实际上把这个市场拱手让给了中国。

然而,经济复苏的最后一块拼图,是政界的目标必须明确。在欧洲,国家政府的决策已经取代了由欧盟(EU)主导的统一决策——最近法国和德国达成的协议不过是最新一个例子。几个月以来,欧洲的命运已经为德国州议会选举和芬兰一些小政党所左右。欧洲央行(ECB)也陷入严重的分裂,以至于同样忽视了其稳定恐慌市场的核心职能。如果这些泛欧洲机构继续如此无力、迟钝和四分五裂,欧元不可能幸存下去。

美国也同样陷入各部门、阶层和区域利益的纷争中。巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)是一个不作为到令人难以置信地步的领导人,只是坐等国会权力大佬的电话。总言之,只要美国的政客仍需要恭恭敬敬地请既得利益集团为他们永无休止的竞选活动出钱,美国就没有好前途可言。

金融市场最近的暴跌和美国及欧洲经济复苏的停滞,反映出这些根本的缺陷。政府根本拿不出什么经济增长战略,只是指望被吓坏并且负债累累的消费者会重新购买他们不需要、也负担不起的房子。不幸的是,全球经济的湍流将继续卷走就业岗位和资本,直到大胆而齐心协力的领导人再次出现。在此期间,市场将不停地在不确定的漩涡中打转。

本文作者系美国哥伦比亚大学地球研究所(The Earth Institute at Columbia University)所长

译者/方舟


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001040249


 

A failure of economic strategy and leadership lies behind the near simultaneous collapse of market confidence in the eurozone and US economies. No need to blame the rating agencies: governments in Europe and America have been unable to cope with the realities of global capital markets and competition from Asia – and deserve the lion’s share of the blame.

I’ve watched dozens of financial crises up close, and know that success means showing the public a way out that is bold, technically sound and built on social values. Transatlantic leadership is falling short on all counts. Neither the US nor Europe has even properly diagnosed the core problem, namely that both regions are being whipsawed by globalisation.

Jobs for low-skilled workers in manufacturing, and new investments in large swaths of industry, have been lost to international competition. Employment in the US and Europe during the 2000s was held up only by housing construction stoked by low interest rates and reckless deregulation – until the construction bubble collapsed. The path to recovery now lies not in a new housing bubble, but in upgraded skills, increased exports and public investments in infrastructure and low-carbon energy. Instead, the US and Europe have veered between dead-end, consumption-oriented stimulus packages and austerity without a vision for investment.

Macroeconomic policy has not only failed to create jobs, but also to respond to basic social values too. Let me be clear: good social policy does not mean running big deficits. Public debts are already too large in both Europe and the US. But it does mean a completely different balance between cuts to social services and tax increases on the rich.

The simple fact is that globalisation has not only hit the unskilled hard but has also proved a bonanza for the global super-rich. They have been able to invest in new and highly profitable projects in emerging economies. Meanwhile, as Warren Buffett argued this week, they have been able to convince their home governments to cut tax rates on profits and high incomes in the name of global tax competition. Tax havens have proliferated even as the politicians have occasionally railed against them. In the end the poor are doubly hit, first by global market forces, then by the ability of the rich to park money at low taxes in hideaways around the world.

An improved fiscal policy in the transatlantic economies would therefore be based on three realities. First, it would expand investments in human and infrastructure capital. Second, it would cut wasteful spending, for instance in misguided military engagements in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Third, it would balance budgets in the medium term, in no small part through tax increases on high personal incomes and international corporate profits that are shielded by loopholes and overseas tax havens.

Infrastructure investment also need not increase deficits if any new projects pay their own way. Even if they require upfront borrowing, projects will not add to net financial liabilities if they are repaid through future revenues. Currently, budget accounting in the US and Europe generally fails to distinguish between these self-financing capital projects – such as bridges, which earn revenue through future tolls – and those financed by general revenues.

Export-led growth is the other under-explored channel of recovery. Part of this must be earned through better skills and technologies – another reason not to cut education. But another part can be earned through better financial policies. China, realising this, has sold Africa many billions of dollars per year of infrastructure export projects, financed by long-term Chinese loans. Yet the US and Europe have virtually ceded that market to China by the lack of financing to African and other fast-growing economies.

The last missing piece for any recovery, however, is clarity of purpose from the political class. In Europe, a coherent response led by the European Union has been sidelined to policymaking by national governments – the pact between France and Germany being only the latest example. For months, Europe’s fate has been decided by German state elections and small Finnish parties. The European Central Bank has been so divided that it too has neglected core functions of stabilising panicked markets. There is no way the euro can survive if European-wide institutions continue to be so weak, slow and divided.

The US has similarly devolved into a mélange of sector, class, and regional interests. President Barack Obama is the incredibly shrinking leader, waiting to see whether Congressional power barons will call. More generally, the US cannot prosper while its politicians go hat in hand to the vested interests that finance their nonstop campaigning.

The recent swoon in financial markets and the stalled recovery in the US and Europe reflect these fundamental shortcomings. There is no growth strategy, only the hope that scared and debt-burdened consumers will return to buying houses they don’t need and can’t afford. Sadly, these global economic currents will continue to claim jobs and drain capital until there is a revival of bold, concerted leadership. In the meantime, the markets will gyrate in pangs of uncertainty.

The writer is director of The Earth Institute at Columbia University


http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001040249/en

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