最近一连串经济坏消息中蕴含的唯一好消息是，情况本来可能更糟：三大评级机构本来都可能调降美国的评级，股市本来可能下跌得更厉害，美国本来可能出现债务违约。人们普遍认为，在“大衰退”(Great Recession)发展到眼下这一最新阶段时，情况恶化的可能性非常高，而政府手中却没什么行之有效的政策工具。这一观点的第一部分是对的，第二部分则不完全对。
整个危机期间、以及危机之前，凯恩斯主义经济学家就事态的发展给出了条理清晰的解释。危机前，美国经济是由泡沫支撑的，全球经济大体上也是如此。泡沫破裂后，留下的是过量的杠杆和房地产。因此，消费将持续疲软，而大西洋两岸现在实施的财政紧缩又使得政府无法去填补消费疲软留下的需求缺口。鉴于此种情况，企业不愿意投资就不足为奇了——即使那些能够获得资本的企业也不愿投资。
当然，那些担心政府手中缺少政策工具的人在一部分程度上是正确的。糟糕的货币政策让我们陷入当前的困局，却不能将我们拉出去。即使美联储(Fed)内的通胀鹰派人士能够被降伏，第三轮定量宽松(QE3)也只会比第二轮(QE2)更加低效。即便是QE2，恐怕更多的作用也只是吹大了新兴市场的泡沫，而不是给美国国内带来多少新的贷款或投资。
但解决办法是存在的，至少对像美国这样能够以低利率借债的国家来说是如此：拿钱去做高回报的投资。这既能促进经济增长，又能带来税收，从而在中期内降低债务相对国内生产总值(GDP)的比率，并提升债务的可维持性。即使在同样的预算情况下，对支出和税收进行结构调整、使之能够促进增长，也可提升债务的可维持性。这些调整包括降低工资税、对富人增税、对做出投资的企业减税、对不做出投资的企业增税。
不过，其他地方却存在着斗争。市场知道，在北大西洋大行其道的低税收和举债癖组合意味着，政府手中没有什么立刻可用的政策工具：货币政策将毫无收效，财政政策受到限制，经济增长将会放缓，减赤效果（依靠财政紧缩）将令人失望。
然而市场也有一项斗争任务，这在标准普尔(S&P)调降美国评级事件中表现得很明显。没有哪位经济学家会只看资产负债表的负债一侧，但这却是标准普尔的关注焦点。更能说明问题的是，美国是用美元偿还债务，而它手中掌控着印美元的机器。因此，美国根本不可能发生债务违约——我们上周看到的那类假戏真做的政治秀不算数。
市场经常犯错，但评级机构的过往记录无法唤起人们对这些机构的信心。用少数“专家”的判断代替无数人的综合观点——而这些专家是供职于一家治理和激励都成问题的机构——这显然无法令人信服。欧洲领导人最近在会议中呼吁减少对这些评级的依赖，这是正确的。
欧洲和美国现在面临极端困难的政治局面。很难说哪边的情况更糟糕：是美国的僵局，还是欧洲支离破碎的政治结构？欧洲领导人已经采取果断行动，但事态的发展要快于他们批准和实施对策的进程。欧洲债务相对GDP的比率也低于美国；如果其财政框架足够统一，其财政状况也会好于美国。
欧洲的另一个问题是，有太多人认为财政紧缩是当下的灵丹妙药。然而在危机前，爱尔兰和西班牙的财政处在盈余状态，债务相对GDP的比率也很低。更多的财政紧缩只会使欧洲的经济增长变得更加缓慢、财政问题越积越多。直到最近，欧洲领导人才终于认识到，希腊和其他被危机困扰的国家需要经济增长——而财政紧缩永远不会带来这种增长。
上述这一切加大了北大西洋步入双底衰退的可能性，不过，关注经济增长率是否大于零并没有太大的意义。关键的增长率是使得就业岗位缺口不再扩大的经济增长率。在这方面美国和欧洲都成问题，两者当前的增长率约为1%，要提高一倍以上才能做到上面这一点。
当这次衰退开始之时，许多人都头头是道地表示已从大萧条(Great Depression)和日本的长期经济低迷中吸取了教训。现在我们知道，我们什么都没有吸取。我们实施的刺激力度太弱、持续时间太短，并且没有好好规划。我们没有敦促银行恢复放贷。我们的领导人则试图掩盖经济存在的缺陷——这或许是出于这样一种恐惧，即如果对公众如实相告，那么已然脆弱不堪的信心将会消失殆尽。但是，这是一场我们现在已经输掉的赌博。如今，问题的严重性有目共睹，人们已经产生了一种新的信心：即相信无论我们采取什么措施，情况都会恶化。现在看起来，经济长期低迷好像还是一个乐观的前景。
本文作者是2001年诺贝尔经济学奖(the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics)得主，哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)教授
译者/方舟
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001040070
The only good thing about the continuing barrage of bad economic news is that it could have been worse: all three rating agencies could have downgraded the US, stock markets could have fallen further and the US could have defaulted on its debt. The general view is now that in this, the next round of the Great Recession, there is a high risk of things getting worse, with no effective instruments at governments’ disposal. The first point is correct but the second is not quite right.
Throughout the crisis – and before it – Keynesian economists provided a coherent interpretation of events. Pre-crisis, America, and to a large extent the world economy, was sustained by a bubble. The breaking of the bubble has left a legacy of excess leverage and real estate. Consumption will therefore remain weak and austerity on both sides of the Atlantic now ensures the state will not fill the void. Given this, it is not surprising that companies are unwilling to invest – even those that can get access to capital.
Of course, those worried about the shortage of policy instruments are partially correct. Bad monetary policy got us into this mess but it cannot get us out. Even if the inflation hawks at the Federal Reserve can be subdued, a third bout of quantitative easing will be even less effective than QE2. Even that probably did more to contribute to bubbles in emerging markets, while not leading to much additional lending or investment at home.
But there is an answer, at least for countries such as the US that can borrow at low rates: use the money to make high-return investments. This will both promote growth and generate tax revenues, lowering debt to gross domestic product ratios in the medium term and increasing debt sustainability. Even given the same budget situation, restructuring spending and taxes towards growth – by lowering payroll taxes, increasing taxes on the rich, as well as lowering taxes for corporations that invest and raising them on those that do not – can improve debt sustainability.
The politics, however, are elsewhere. Markets know that the mix of low tax and debt fetishism sweeping the North Atlantic means that there are no instruments at hand: monetary policy won’t work, fiscal policy is constrained, growth will slow and the improvement in deficits (brought by austerity) will be disappointing.
But markets have a political agenda too, clearly evident in S&P’s downgrade. No economist would look just at the debt side of a balance sheet, yet that is what S&P focuses on. Even more telling is the fact that the US pays its debts in dollars, and it controls the printing presses. There is thus no chance of a default – apart from the kind of political charade we saw last week.
Markets are often wrong but the rating firms’ record does not inspire confidence – certainly not to justify replacing the aggregate views of millions with judgments of a few “technicians” working in a firm whose governance and incentives are problematic. Europe’s leaders were right in their recent meeting to call for less reliance on these ratings.
Europe and America now face extraordinarily difficult politics. It is hard to know which is worse: America’s gridlock, or Europe’s broken political structure. Europe’s leaders have taken decisive action but events move faster than their processes of ratification and implementation. Europe’s debt-to-GDP ratio is also lower than in the US; if it had an adequate common fiscal framework, it would be in a better position than America, too.
Europe’s other problem is too many think fiscal stringency is now the answer. Yet Ireland and Spain had a surplus and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the crisis. More austerity will only ensure that Europe grows more slowly and its fiscal problems will mount. Only latterly have Europe’s leaders finally recognised that Greece and the other crisis-plagued countries needed growth – and that austerity would also never bring that growth.
All of this makes it more likely that the North Atlantic will enter a double dip, but there is also nothing magic about the number zero. The critical growth rate is that which stops the jobs deficit growing larger. Problematically, America and Europe’s current growth rate of about one per cent is less than half of the amount required to do this.
When the recession began there were many wise words about having learnt the lessons of both the Great Depression and Japan’s long malaise. Now we know we didn’t learn a thing. Our stimulus was too weak, too short and not well designed. The banks weren’t forced to return to lending. Our leaders tried papering over the economy’s weaknesses – perhaps out of fear that if we were honest about them, already fragile confidence would erode. But that was a gamble we have now lost. Now the scale of the problem is apparent, a new confidence has emerged: confidence that matters will get worse, whatever action we take. A long malaise now seems like the optimistic scenario.
The writer is a recipient of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics and University Professor at Columbia University.
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