巴西财长吉多•曼特加(Guido Mantega)对新的汇率战争发出了警告。世界银行(World Bank)行长罗伯特•佐利克(Robert Zoellick)主张施行一种新的金本位制。美国决策者提出了数字化的收支平衡目标。日本则正忙于干预汇市，以阻止日元进一步升值。一些漫不经心的观察人士的想法可以原谅，他们认为，此次全球金融危机的核心问题是汇率失衡，而修正这种失衡将挽救全球经济。但这是错误的。
我们认为，中美两国决策者围绕人民币升值速度问题不时爆发、几乎已成为一种定式的口水战，更多是出于政治意图。中国贸易顺差和经常账户盈余反映了其储蓄/投资失衡。中国国内储蓄总额占到了国内生产总值(GDP)的50%以上，即便以历史绝对值衡量，也是一个非常高的水平。要解决全球贸易失衡问题（且不谈美国国内对这一问题的普遍不满），必须从这里着手。中国储蓄率之所以居高不下，源于一系列结构性原因，多数经济学家（包括美欧决策者在内）对此了然于胸，尽管他们嘴上并不这样说。那种认为仅仅通过名义汇率的大幅升值，就可以有效解决中国高储蓄的根源问题——从大量城市移民，到缺乏有效的社会保障，再到已施行半个世纪之久的计划生育政策——的想法是荒唐可笑的。实际上，如果这可以通过相对价格的调整来解决，那么必要的升值幅度肯定要达到40%至60%左右——即使是最乐观的外国观察人士，也不可能指望中国会这样做。
美国决策者明白这一点。作为把商品和服务卖给美国的回报，中国得到了美元，他们通过干预累积美元储备，并尽职尽责的将其投资于美国国债（不管他们所声称的外汇储备多元化程度有多高）。当他们尝试购买实物资产（例如美国的能源和资源资产）时，美国国会却一直以国家安全为由加以阻挠。美国明白，自己正以可能会升值或贬值的汇率形式付钱给中国。最终，如果没有中国来购买美国国债（在进行外汇干预之后），美国将无法承担占到GDP 10%的预算赤字——这是其巨额经常账户赤字背后的财政状况。
同样重要的是，中国也完全明白这些。实际上，这是其弱势货币政策的必然镜像。从某种意义上讲，中美两国心照不宣地达成了一笔重大交易；中国将本币汇率维持在低位，同时实际上从全球其它国家(包括美国)输入增长，而美国通过运行巨额预算赤字和印制钞票为赤字融资，刺激自己摆脱紧缩影响。在这一过程中，美国实际上正在全球范围内制造通胀，这将推动人民币升值，但只是实际汇率，而非名义汇率。
这种交易对资产定价的影响显而易见：新兴市场充斥着新印制的美元。不管怎样以干预、交易税或资本管制的形式加以阻止，这些资金流入都会得偿所愿。主要影响将是资产价格通胀，进而是商品和服务价格上涨。
利率将被推至更低水平（在土耳其和中国等重要市场，实际利率已为负值）。这将推高股票和房地产等实际资产价格——只要这被用于对冲即将到来的通胀。最终，新兴市场货币将继续面临巨大的升值压力。
简而言之，我们的确正走向一种潜在的泡沫——正是这种泡沫导致了新兴市场危机。灾难无法预先确定，但在政策工具和银行体系有欠发达的背景下，摆脱灾难将需要极大的政治毅力。新兴市场决策者将面临古老的难题：是否对外汇市场进行干预，或者是否以较高成本进行冲销式干预。尽管担心出现全球性的经济萧条，但它们将必须进一步紧缩预算。并非所有国家都能经受住考验。
如果中国让人民币每年升值5%，且中国与全球其它国家的通胀差距升至5%，5年过后，我们会发现，实际汇率调整幅度将超过50%。这是全球正面临的方向，所有人都明白这一点。出访欧洲的中国决策者承诺为财政状况脆弱的欧盟(EU)成员国提供支持，这是件好事。欧洲人似乎也受邀参与了上述重大交易。
加利姆•阿波德尔-默塔尔是曼氏集团(Man Group)下属公司GLG Partners投资组合经理。本文是他与该公司另一位投资组合经理巴特•特特尔布姆合写。
译者/梁艳裳
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035596
Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister, is warning of new currency wars. Robert Zoellick, World Bank president, is arguing for a new gold standard. US policymakers suggested numerical balance of payments targets. Their Japanese counterparts are busy intervening to prevent further Japanese yen appreciation. The casual observer can be forgiven for believing currency imbalances are at the centre of the international financial crisis and their correction the salvation of the world economy. This would be an error.
The recurrent and now de rigueur shouting matches between US and Chinese policymakers on the pace of revaluation of the Chinese renminbi are in our opinion more political than anything else. The Chinese trade and current account surpluses are the mirror image of their saving/investment imbalance. The Chinese gross domestic saving rate exceeds 50 per cent of gross domestic product, very high in an absolute historical context. Any attempt to address global trade imbalances, let alone US popular discontent with the issue, must start there. The Chinese save a lot for a host of structural reasons that most economists, US and European policymakers included, clearly understand, in spite of exhortations to the contrary. The idea that major causes of high savings in China, from mass urban migration and a lack of any meaningful social security net to a 50-year-old one child policy, can be meaningfully addressed merely through a large nominal exchange rate revaluation is laughable. And if it were, in fact, possible to do this through adjustment of a relative price, the revaluation necessary would surely be on the order of magnitude of 40-60 per cent, a size even the most optimistic foreign observers cannot possibly expect the Chinese to deliver.
US policymakers understand this. In exchange for the goods and services they sell into the US, the Chinese receive US dollars, which they accumulate through intervention and dutifully invest in US Treasuries (no matter what degree of reserve diversification they claim). When they have tried to buy real assets, such as energy and resource assets in the US, they have been prevented from doing so by Congress on national security grounds. The US understands that it is paying China in the form of a currency it can inflate away or devalue. Finally, without Chinese purchases of US Treasury bills (on the back of its FX intervention), the US would not be able to run budget deficits of 10 per cent of GDP, a fiscal position that underlies its massive current account deficit.
Just as important, the Chinese understand all this, too, and that these are, in fact, the necessary mirror image of their weak currency policy. In a sense, the US and China have implicitly struck a grand bargain; China keeps its currency weak and in effect imports growth from the rest of the world (US included) and the US stimulates itself out of the contractionary impact by running large budget deficits and printing dollars to finance them. In so doing, the US in effect is producing inflation globally, which will appreciate the Chinese exchange rate, only the real not nominal exchange rate.
The asset pricing implications of this quid pro quo are clear; emerging markets are being flooded with freshly minted dollars. No matter how much sand is thrown in the wheel in the form of intervention, transaction taxes or capital controls, these capital inflows will get through. The main impact will be asset price inflation and then that of goods and services.
Interest rates will be pushed lower (and are already negative in important markets, such as Turkey and China). Real asset prices, such as those of equity and real estate will be pushed higher, if only as hedges against the impending inflation. Last, emerging market currencies will continue under massive appreciation pressure.
In short, we are heading towards precisely the potential bubbles that have caused emerging market crises. Catastrophes are not predetermined but, in the context of underdeveloped policy tool kits and banking systems, the way out will require enormous political stamina. EM policymakers will be faced with the age old dilemma of intervening in FX markets or not, sterilising at high cost or not. They will need to tighten their budgets further in spite of global depression concerns. Not all will meet the test.
If China revalues its nominal exchange rate 5 per cent a year, and its inflation differential versus the rest of the world rises to 5 per cent, we will wake up five years from now with a real exchange rate adjustment greater than 50 per cent. This is where the world is heading, and everyone understands this. It is instructive to watch Chinese policymakers touring Europe promising support for fiscally vulnerable members of the EU. It seems the Europeans are invited to join the grand bargain.
Karim Abdel-Motaal is a portfolio manager at GLG Partners, a member of the Man Group. This piece was co-authored by Bart Turtelboom, also a portfolio manager at GLG Partners
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