国际货币基金组织(IMF)一般不会理会小小的新闻工作者。但该组织职员对我有关英国财政整顿步伐的观点进行了明确反驳。有一点——即有必要制定财政“B计划”——IMF和我站在了同一立场，与政府对立。这是一场不小的胜利，考虑到该组织有关英国的最新报告在其它方面读上去就像是英国财政部的口吻，这场胜利尤为珍贵。
这份最新报告有一个特殊章节，名为“紧缩还是不紧缩——公共辩论中的英国财政政策”，其中引用了几篇我的专栏文章。报告指出，对紧缩计划持批评态度的人提出了三个主要观点：第一，“当政府紧缩开支时，无法保证其它经济部门会继续扩张”，而“额外的货币刺激或许不足以抵消这种风险”；第二，“过度紧缩甚至可能会破坏供应能力”；第三，“英国长期利率没有显示出市场恐慌的迹象，对未来财政整顿的承诺比立即紧缩更加重要”。
报告至少承认“其中许多观点都很有价值”，但随即提出了四点反驳意见：第一，“尽管财政紧缩已经启动，但有迹象表明私人部门正在拉动经济复苏”；第二，“虽然存在低估潜能的风险，但相反的风险同样存在——即迟迟才发现结构性赤字高于预期、通胀压力增加”；第三，“对当前债券收益率的粗略了解并不足以公正评价主权资金危机风险——发生这种情况的可能性虽低，但会对英国造成非常巨大的影响”；最后，“批评者们轻视了政治可信度的重要性：仅有未来财政整顿的承诺不太可能具有说服力，特别是一旦它们超出了本届议会的任期”。
这些观点也有值得肯定之处。但以下是我的反驳。
第一，尽管经济确实正在复苏，但IMF的报告也承认，即便其对供应能力持悲观看法，大量经济资源闲置的现象仍可能会延续至2015年。
第二，这份报告聚焦于在公共债务的可持续性，却忽略了私人部门。如果英国为了改善前者，而实施超宽松的货币政策和更加草率的放贷行为，导致后者继续恶化，未来将积累许多重大问题。
第三，如果通胀压力真的出现，货币政策可以以传统方式加以应对。
第四，尽管市场形势也许确实会突然扭转，我本指望IMF至少能考虑一下欧元区周边国家的局势是否会影响到英国，以及影响会有多大。这些欧元区周边国家竞争力低下、增长前景疲弱、严重依赖外资、国家央行缺位、自保储蓄有限。
最后，政治可信度当然重要。但假设随后未能执行一连串行动，并由此推断其对可信度之影响的论点，在本质上是无法证实的。我们现有的证据是，财政紧缩计划仅让德国国债的利差略有下降。
除了上述几点，IMF报告还忽视了与紧缩计划相关的其它成本。比如说，报告几乎没有关注开支削减速度本身也可能会造成破坏，因为这个问题没有得到那么认真彻底的思考。在大学资金来源的问题上，我支持提高学费。但政府计划取消教育资助，只保留对少数几个似乎有用的学科的补贴，这样做看上去破坏性很大，且没有经过深思熟虑。
更重要的是，报告几乎丝毫没有关注公共部门的资产负债状况，其实也就是整个经济的资产负债状况。这是捡了芝麻，丢了西瓜。公共部门不仅对外举债，也会创造资产（或者不创造）。如果像英国那样，政府为了减少举债而削减投资，长期来看是在帮助经济乃至公共财政吗？然而投资再次遭到无情削减，力度比其他任何重要开支领域都要更大。此外，在衰退时期维持高水平投资支出和较低举债成本的承诺，有着自我约束的优点：当项目完成时，开支便自动停止，除非又有新项目开工。
不过，报告还是给了批评者一点甜头。它提出，“如果经济出现长期严重低迷这种意外的可能情况，（除了进一步放松货币政策）也应该考虑采取有针对性的临时减税措施，最好与长期应得权益改革相结合，以保护财政可持续性，维护市场信誉”。换言之，明确财政当局随时准备在必要时为经济提供支持并没有坏处——而且潜在好处多多。谢谢你，亲爱的IMF职员。你提出了有益且适切的建议。政府是否乐于听取呢？我希望如此。
译者/管婧
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035598
The International Monetary Fund does not normally respond to mere journalists. But its staff have explicitly rejected my arguments on the pace of fiscal consolidation in the UK. On one point – the need for a fiscal “plan B” – the IMF takes my side in the argument with the government. This is no small victory, not least because its latest report on the UK reads, in other respects, as if dictated to it by the Treasury.
The newly released report contains a special section entitled “To tighten, or not to tighten – UK fiscal policy in the public debate”, which cites several of my columns. This notes that critics of the planned tightening make three main points: first, “there is no guarantee that other sectors will continue expanding while the government retrenches” and “additional monetary stimulus may not be powerful enough to offset this risk”; second, “excessive tightening may even destroy supply capacity”; and, third, “long-term UK interest rates show no sign of market panic, and commitments to future fiscal consolidation are more important than immediate cuts.”
The report at least states that “many of these points have merit”. But it make four counter-arguments: first, “although fiscal tightening has already started, there are signs of economic recovery led by the private sector”; second, “while there is a risk to underestimating potential [capacity], there is also the opposite risk – of belatedly discovering higher-than expected structural deficits and greater inflationary pressure”; third, “a glance at current bond yields does not do justice to the risk of a sovereign funding crisis – a low-probability, but very-high-impact scenario for the UK”; and, finally, “critics downplay the importance of political credibility: promises of future consolidation alone are unlikely to be persuasive, especially once they reach beyond the current term of parliament.”
These arguments have merit, too. But here are my counter-arguments.
First, while the economy is indeed recovering, the report accepts that much economic slack is likely to endure, even on its pessimistic view of capacity, until 2015.
Second, the report focuses on the sustainability of public sector debt, while ignoring that of the private sector. But if the UK fixes the former by worsening the latter, via ultra-loose monetary policy and yet more sloppy lending, it will store up huge problems for the future.
Third, if inflationary pressure does indeed emerge, monetary policy can respond in the traditional manner.
Fourth, while markets may indeed turn suddenly, I would have expected the Fund at least to address the question of whether and how far what has happened to peripheral eurozone countries, with their poor competitiveness, weak growth prospects, huge dependence on foreign capital, absence of national central banks and limited captive savings, is relevant to the UK.
Finally, political credibility is, of course, important. But arguments from what would have happened to credibility if a course of action had not been followed are inherently unprovable. The evidence we have is that the planned fiscal tightening secured but a modest reduction in interest spreads over German bunds.
Beyond these points, the IMF report also ignores other costs associated with the programme of cuts. It pays little attention, for example, to the possibility that the speed of the cuts to spending will itself prove damaging, because less carefully thought through. In the case of university funding, for example, I am in favour of higher fees. But the planned elimination of support for teaching of all but a few supposedly useful subjects looks hugely damaging and ill-considered.
More important, the report pays next to no attention to the balance sheet of the public sector or indeed of the economy as a whole. This is to be penny wise, pound foolish. The public sector does not only borrow; it also creates assets (or not). If, as is the case in the UK, the government slashes investment to cut borrowing, is it helping the economy or even the public finances in the longer term? Yet investment has, once again, been slashed more brutally than any other important area of spending. Moreover, a commitment to sustaining high levels of investment spending at a time of recession and low costs of borrowing has the merit of being self-limiting: when projects are finished, the spending ceases automatically, unless new projects are begun.
Nonetheless, the report does throw out one useful bone to the critics. It argues that “in the unexpected but possible case of a significant and prolonged downturn, temporary targeted tax cuts should also be considered (alongside further monetary easing), ideally combined with longer-term entitlement reforms to safeguard fiscal sustainability and market credibility.” In other words, there is no harm – and much potential benefit – in making it clear that the fiscal authorities stand ready to support the economy, when and if necessary. Thank you, dear IMF staff. You offer useful and relevant advice. Is the government ready to listen to it? I hope so.
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035598/en
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