最近几周，"汇率战争"这个词已经被用滥了。真希望这只是一时之风尚：这个词用得并不妥当，可以说全不属实。事实上不存在什么汇率战争，一切不过是汇市对一些事件的正常反应。
让我们回顾一下事实。过去5年，人民币兑美元汇率上升了20%左右，其中约十分之一是今年入夏后出现的。以贸易加权汇率计算，同期内人民币升幅约为14%。无论以何种标准衡量，这样的升值幅度都非同寻常，会带来重大影响。
对于那些富于研究精神的人而言，有大量证据显示，中国经济已在向着更好的方向转变。我们不妨以10月份贸易数据为例。人们的注意力都集中在中国贸易顺差的大幅扩张（升至271亿美元）上。但今年前10个月，中国贸易顺差占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例仅为3.2%左右，约为金融危机爆发前峰值水平的三分之一。
中国的经常账户盈余看上去也相当庞大：国际货币基金组织(IMF)预计，今年中国经常账户盈余将达2700亿美元。但盈余占GDP的比重很可能不会高出5%太多，约为峰值水平的一半。贸易顺差的降幅甚至更大；今年可能会降至GDP的4%以下，同样不足上一次峰值水平的一半。还有大量报告显示，成本的不断攀升，让跨国公司不再把中国视为一个低成本制造基地，而这可能会进一步减少贸易顺差。难怪中国正考虑承诺将经常账户盈余控制在GDP的4%以内；它距离这一目标已经不远。
一些人宣称，这些改进只是暂时性的，仅仅反映出中国出口需求——尤其是来自美国需求——的骤减。但若果真如此，为何目前中国的进口额较2009年要高出约4000亿美元呢？这一数字甚至超过了整个希腊的经济规模。这要归功于中国强劲的内需，包括德国在内的许多出口强劲的国家都从中受益。当然，一些国家没能捞到好处，但这不能成为指责中国参与汇率战争的原因。实际上，到未来某个阶段，甚至美国也会看到自己的出口有所提升。
在最近的20国集团(G20)峰会上，许多国家开始指责美国在这场"战争"中只顾一己之利——此前，美联储(Fed)决定向美国经济注入6000亿美元。但美联储的职责是维持高就业和低通胀，而不是汇率问题。美元走低或许是美联储政策的一个后果。但待到政策获得成功、经济也出现复苏后，美元也会走强。这就是浮动汇率的结果。
近几个月，许多国家都开始干预汇市，以阻止本币升值；一些国家是偶一为之，但另一些国家则要频繁得多。但仅以巴西、日本和瑞士为例，鉴于它们的货币似乎的确被高估，各国都能拿出一些完全正当的理由，为自己的行动辩护。再说一遍，采用战争用语有失妥当。
在所有这些白热化的讨论中，那些抨击人民币被低估的人，只在一个问题上拿出了令人信服的论据：中国外汇储备的增长——目前中国外储总额逾2.5万亿美元。但即使在这一点上，我们也必须认识到，中国资本流入的规模也相当庞大。这意味着，中国包括资本流入在内的基本国际收支，比近来有所改善的经常账户还要稳健得多。其中一部分流入是明智的，尽管还有一部分来自旨在避免1998年亚洲危机再现的不必要的外汇储备积累。
在目前我们所生活的时代，发展正帮助数百万人脱离贫困。而中国正是这一进程的领军力量——十年里，其经济规模增长了两倍。巴西、俄罗斯和印度等其它金砖国家，以及诸多新兴经济体也都十分重要。这些令人瞩目的进展，与那些通常会与战争挂钩的事件不可混为一谈。随着我们迈过这十年，进一步增长将扭转全球失衡这一当前汇率争论的核心问题。而随着这一问题通过汇率波动的此消彼长得以解决，我们的流动汇率体系将展现出自身的功效。历史终将证明，这一体系比目前许多人所以为的都要有道理得多。
本文作者为高盛资产管理公司(Goldman Sachs Asset Management)董事长
译者/陈云飞
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035669
In recent weeks, the phrase "currency war" has been used liberally. Let us hope this is a passing fad: it is inappropriate, and actually a fiction. In truth there are no real currency wars, just normal currency markets responding to events.
Let us review the facts. The Chinese currency has risen by about 20 per cent against the US dollar in the past five years. About a tenth of this appreciation has happened since this summer. On a trade-weighted basis the renminbi has risen by about 14 per cent over the same time. Whichever measure you use this is quite a move, and one with powerful consequences.
For those minded to look, there is plenty of evidence that China's economy is already changing for the better. Take its October trade data. The massive increase in the size of its trade surplus – which rose to $27.1bn – got all the attention. But in the first 10 months of 2010 China's surplus has only been around 3.2 per cent of gross domestic product, around a third of its peak before the financial crisis.
China's current account surplus also looks large: the International Monetary Fund thinks it will be $270bn this year. But as a proportion of GDP this surplus will probably not be much more than 5 per cent, about half its peak. The trade surplus has declined even more; this year it will likely be below 4 per cent of GDP, again less than half its recent peak. There are also widespread reports that rising costs mean international companies no longer see China as a low-cost option for their production, which could lower the trade surplus further. No wonder China is mulling a commitment to keep its current account surplus below 4 per cent of GDP; it is already not far off.
Some claim that these improvements are only temporary, and merely reflect a sharp drop in demand for China's exports – especially in the US. But if that were true, why are Chinese imports now about $400bn higher than in 2009, an amount bigger than the Greek economy? Here strong Chinese domestic demand should take the credit, something that benefits countries with strong exporters, like Germany. Some are not benefiting, of course, but that is not a reason to blame China for engaging in a currency war. Indeed, the US might even see its own exports rise at some stage.
At the recent meeting of the Group of 20 leading nations, many began to accuse the US of playing its own part in this war game, following the Federal Reserve's decision to pump $600m into America's economy. But the Fed's responsibility is to maintain high employment and low inflation, not currencies. A lower dollar might be a consequence of the Fed's policies. But as and when it succeeds, and the economy recovers, so will the dollar. This is what happens with floating exchange rates.
Various countries have also been intervening to stop currency appreciation in recent months; some occasionally, others more often. But to take just the examples of Brazil, Japan and Switzerland, each has some perfectly legitimate excuse for their actions, given that their currencies do appear to be overvalued. Again, the war-like language is inappropriate.
Amid all of this overheated talk, there is only one point where those who attack China as undervalued have a credible point: the growth of its foreign exchange reserves, which now sit above $2,500bn. But even here we must recognise China's sizeable inward investment flows. This means its basic balance of payments, which includes capital inflows, is much stronger even than its recently improved current account. Some of this has been sensible, although some of it stems from needless reserve accumulation designed to avoid a repeat of the 1998 Asian crisis.
We are living through an era in which development is lifting millions out of poverty. China is at the forefront of this process, with an economy that has tripled in size in a decade. The other Bric nations of Brazil, Russia and India are important too, alongside various emerging economies. These remarkable developments are not those you would normally associate with war-like conditions. As we progress through this decade, further growth will reverse the global imbalances that lie at the heart of the current currency debate. And as this unfolds, through the ebb and flow of foreign exchange movements, our system of floating rates will demonstrate its utility. It will ultimately deliver much more sense than many of those who currently opine about it.
The writer is chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001035669/en
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