中国的经济上行曾经受到西方的欢迎。然而，自金融危机以来，越来越多的西方人认为，中国推行的是由政府主导的国内政策和以邻为壑的重商主义国际政策。这些担忧可以找到证据支持，但这并不等于说，中国是有意识地决定采取一种更为激进的模式。而如果西方误读了中国的变化，只会让事情变得更糟。
的确，中国经济正朝着国家注意的方向发展。中国从危机中的复苏，得到了大规模刺激方案的帮助。地方支出更是加剧了这一势头，地方政府担保的债务已接近1万亿美元。工业政策的改变也会引发担忧：在2020年前促动技术发展的政府规划，令西方企业不禁担忧，政府支持会赋予中资集团不公平的优势。此外，中国尚未加入保障国内外企业享有同等资格的世贸组织(WTO)政府采购协议。
中国的国际政策更是敲响了警钟。中国政府不愿允许人民币升值已是众所周知的事情；政府支持的企业在世界各地购买油田、矿山等实物和金融资产亦是如此。2010年，中国的海外投资额达到590亿美元。
综合在一起，这些举措似乎表明中国的政策发生了显著变化。不过，我们更应将这些政策视为政府在政治约束不断增加的背景下进行艰难抉择的结果，而非连贯的新激进战略的产物。
就像1997年亚洲金融危机后的情形一样，当前国内的投资行为主要是周期性的，而非永久性的。和之前的许多政策一样，中国的新产业政策可能几乎不会影响到投资格局：工业部门由私人公司主导，国有企业在增加值中所占份额不超过30%。就国际方面而言，中国坚持要保持人民币汇率的稳定，是一项更广泛政策的一部门，目的是确保强劲就业与社会稳定，而不是企图从贸易伙伴手中攫取不当收益。
上述部分举措可以通过某些政策领域出现的强大特殊利益集团得到解释，它们影响了政府的行为方式。到海外获取资源就是一个很好的例子。例如，许多人认为，“股本石油”——即拥有石油资源的所有权——是保证稳定供给的关键。事实上，这个政策相对于在国际市场上购买石油具有明显优势的原因并不是很清楚，所以政府支持也许仅仅是迫于支持三大石油巨头的压力而做出的回应。此类事态发展大多是对特定压力的务实反应。
不过，中国社会的某些部门已显现出意识形态的转变，尤其是在政府内部与拥有左倾意识形态的人群之中。他们声称，中国正在创造一种新的经济与社会模式，一种比西方盛行的市场方式更为优越的模式。特别是，他们将全球金融危机视为以国家为重心的模式收复失地的转折点。
这些人明显错了。一方面，没有以市场为导向的改革，就无法对中国经济的上升做出合理解释。另一方面，政府发起的投资会促进资本密集型项目，阻碍劳动收入的增长，从而加剧中国的失衡问题，让政府在十二五规划中制定的提高家庭收入的目标变得更加遥远。
尽管如此，这种情绪的上升已引发了美国政策制定者的焦虑。要减轻这种焦虑，中国领导层必须认识到，国家主义的发展壮大既不会给中国带来长期利益，也不会为西方所轻易容忍。对美国而言，它应该认识到，尽管中国政府很强大，但也不是中国政府采取的每个举措都是精心策划的结果。国家主义得到了一些人的拥护，但更多的人认为，市场路线才是中国应该采纳的正确路线。
华盛顿建设性接触的政策为中国带来了积极的变化。现在，在与一个更加复杂而不是更加激进的中国打交道时，美国政府应该寻求让这项政策与时俱进，而不是放弃。
姚洋教授是北京大学中国经济研究中心主任。
译者/何黎
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001036863
China’s economic ascent was once welcomed in the west. Since the financial crisis, however, China is increasingly viewed as pursuing a domestic policy of government domination and an international policy driven by beggar-thy-neighbour mercantilism. There is evidence to support these fears but they do not add up to a conscious decision to embark on a more aggressive model. And if the west misinterprets Chinese changes, it will only make matters worse. It is true that China’s economy is moving in a statist direction. Recovery from the crisis was helped with a large stimulus. Local spending added to this, leading to local government-backed debts of close to $1,000bn. Changes in industrial policy can cause concern too: state plans to boost technological development up to 2020 have raised worries among western companies that government support will give Chinese groups an unfair advantage. China has also yet to join the World Trade Organisation’s government procurement agreement, which guarantees equal access for foreign and domestic companies.
China’s international policy rings even louder alarms. Its unwillingness to allow the renminbi to appreciate is well known, as is the purchase of oil fields, mines and physical and financial assets around the world by state-backed companies. China invested $59bn abroad in 2010. Taken together, these moves look like a dramatic change in policy. Yet they are better viewed as the result of a government making difficult choices under growing political constraints, rather than the product of a coherent, newly aggressive strategy. The current domestic investment drive, like that after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, is more cyclical than permanent. Its new industrial policies, like many previous ones, are likely to have little effect on investment patterns: the industrial sector is dominated by private companies, with state enterprises accounting for less than 30 per cent of value added. Internationally, China’s insistence on a stable renminbi is part of a wider policy designed to ensure strong employment and social stability, rather than an attempt to obtain unwarranted gains from trading partners. Some of these moves are explained by strong special interest groups emerging in certain areas of policy and shaping the way the state acts. The resources drive abroad is a case in point. For example, “equity oil” – meaning the ownership of oil sources – is seen by many as vital to guarantee a steady supply. In truth, it is unclear why this policy has much advantage over oil bought on the international market, so state support may simply be a way of responding to pressure to back its three largest oil companies. Such developments are mostly pragmatic responses to specific pressures. There is, however, an emerging ideological shift among certain sections of Chinese society, particularly within the government and among people with a left-leaning ideology. They assert that China is indeed creating a new economic and social model, and one superior to the market-based approach prevailing in the west. The global financial crisis, in particular, is seen a turning point for the state-centred model to regain ground. Those people are clearly wrong. On the one hand, China’s economic ascent cannot be properly explained without market-oriented reforms. On the other, government-initiated investment is aggravating China’s imbalance problems by promoting capital-intensive projects and suppressing labour income – making more distant the government’s goal, set in its 12th five-year plan, to increase household income. Nonetheless, the rise of this sentiment has created anxiety among US policymakers. To reduce this, the Chinese leadership must recognise that greater statism neither brings long-term benefits to China nor will be easily tolerated by the west. For its part, America should be aware that although China’s government is strong, not every move it makes is the result of an orchestrated plan. Statism is embraced by some, but many more think the market path is the right one to follow. Washington’s policy of constructive engagement has brought positive changes to China. It should now seek to update, not abandon it – to deal with a China that is more complex rather than more aggressive. The writer is professor and director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University
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