长期以来，许多国家认为，美元占据主导性的国际地位赋予了美国一种"嚣张的特权"。但如今，这种特权已变成了一种负担。美国是时候准备迎接、并开始构建一个多种全球性货币与美元分庭抗礼的时代。
在其它国家看来，美元的地位为美国的外部失衡提供了自动融资，使其能够进行超出自身收入的消费。在美国国内，由于政治家们考虑的时间范围较短，他们欢迎这种能够规避必要约束的机会，也是可以理解的。不过，来自海外的压力，在推进必要调整方面能够发挥建设性的作用。
上世纪70年代末美元的大幅贬值，迫使美国收紧货币政策，并着手解决财政赤字问题，开始修正两位数的通胀率。到了80年代中期，由于巨额经常账户赤字和美元的急剧贬值，引发了美国第一次削减财政赤字行动。最重要的是，在此次危机爆发之前，美国对外失衡达到了创纪录水平，大量资金流入美国，导致了宽松的货币环境和低利率。
当前的货币体系还存在其它重大缺陷。近年来，流入美国的大部分资金，都源自于外国（特别是中国）货币当局累积巨额美元储备的行为。这是美元储备货币地位所带来的直接后果，而如果没有这种由货币地位内在特性所决定的依赖性资金流入，美国的境况显然会好很多。这种情况也使得其它国家来决定美元汇率——因为中国通过直接干预美元汇率，维持人民币汇率的严重低估，同时美元被明显高估。
历史上，基于美元的货币体系逐渐演变成一项宏大的交易，在这项交易中，其他国家可以将本币汇率与美元挂钩，而无论美国因此出现多高的赤字，都可以从这些国家获得融资。包括德国、日本和中国在内的盈余国家，会经常性地抱怨自己对美元资产的"过度"累积，但一般来说都一直忠实履行着自己在此项交易中所扮演的角色。
当美国决定进行调整，不再寻求资金，并分别于上世纪70年代（《史密森协定》(Smithsonian Agreement)）和80年代（《广场协议》(Plaza Agreement)）要求就美元大规模贬值展开磋商时，这种体系便承担了巨大压力。如今，类似的情形再次出现。
美国现在要想摆脱对由债务支撑的消费需求的依赖、并实现经济的持续复苏，只能通过明显改善贸易收支状况和支持性的投资。这要求美元大幅贬值，特别是对人民币以及其它一些被低估的亚洲货币。但美元目前的储备货币身份对此构成了阻碍。
从更笼统的角度来说，美元之所以能够担纲世界主导货币达一个世纪之久，仅仅是因为它没有敌手。欧元的出现改变了这种局面。欧元区采取了"协作性财政紧缩措施"，还有可能发行真正意义上的欧元债券，这些都表明欧盟很可能在未来几年内恢复欧元的吸引力——特别是如果美国未能削减其庞大的预算赤字的话。
过去十年间，外汇储备中美元资产所占比重已降至60%左右，欧元的比重升至25%以上。中国的崛起，意味着一旦人民币实现完全可兑换、中国政府取消保护性的资本管控措施，人民币也将有资格成为全球性货币。简言之，国际货币体系已经在朝着两极化转变，并有可能很快实现三极化。
美国应该接受这一事实，甚至加速这个过程。其粗略目标应该是在未来十年左右的时间里，实现美元与欧元国际地位的等同，随后让人民币也参与进来，同时稳步创建特别提款权(SDR)。美国应鼓励中国和其它国家在干涉美元汇率的同时，也干涉欧元汇率。在美元兑欧元汇率失调时，美国自己也可以对欧元汇率进行干涉。美国还可以通过采取抵消性货币干预措施、对持有美元资产获得的收益征税，来公开劝阻外国货币当局累积美元资产。美国可以支持国际货币基金组织(IMF)创立一种替代性账户——就像1979年至80年的情形——通过该账户，外国政府能够将部分美元资产兑换为SDR。
这些改革措施不可能解决国际货币体系的所有问题。它们无疑无法让美国躲过恢复财政秩序这个必须完成的任务。但它们将加速世界经济再平衡的过程，并降低未来危机爆发的风险——而这正是我们所亟需的。
（注：本文作者为美国华盛顿彼得森国际经济研究所主任。）
译者/管婧
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001037000
Many nations have long regarded the dominant international role of the dollar as bestowing an "exorbitant privilege" on the US. But the privilege has now become a burden. It is time for the US to anticipate, and begin to build, an era in which there will be several global currencies to rival its own.
Seen from abroad, the dollar's role provides automatic financing for US external imbalances and enables it to live beyond its means. At home it is understandable that US politicians, with their short-run time horizons, welcome this opportunity to evade needed discipline. But such pressure from abroad can be constructive in promoting needed adjustment.
The free fall of the dollar in the late 1970s forced the US to tighten monetary policy and address its budget deficits, commencing the correction of double-digit inflation. In the mid-1980s, large current account deficits and a sharp dollar decline helped produce initial cuts in budget deficits. Most importantly, the recent crash came after record imbalances had seen huge capital inflows into the US, keeping monetary conditions loose and interest rates low.
The current system has other big weaknesses. Much of the inflow in recent years has come from the huge build-up in dollar reserves by foreign monetary authorities, especially China. This is a direct consequence of America's reserve currency status, and the US would clearly be better off without the addictive financing inherent in its currency role. This also allows others to set the dollar exchange rate – because China keeps the renminbi greatly undervalued, and thus the dollar overvalued by intervening directly in dollars.
Historically, the dollar-based system evolved as a grand bargain, under which other countries could determine their exchange rates against the US and would finance whatever deficits it ran as a result. Surplus countries, from Germany to Japan to China, have periodically grumbled about their "excessive" build-up of dollars, but have generally kept their part of the deal.
The system was strained when the US decided to adjust rather than finance, and demanded negotiation of large dollar depreciations in the early 1970s (Smithsonian Agreement) and the middle 1980s (Plaza Accord). A similar situation has arrived again.
Now America can terminate its reliance on debt-financed consumer demand, and sustain recovery, only by a big improvement in its trade balance and supportive investment. This requires a substantial decline of the dollar, primarily against the renminbi and a few other undervalued Asian currencies, which the dollar's role impedes.
More generally, the dollar was the world's dominant currency for a century simply because it had no rival. The euro changed that. The eurozone's embrace of "co-ordinated fiscal austerity" and likely issuance of genuine eurobonds suggests it may well restore its currency's appeal in the next few years, especially if the US fails to trim its gargantuan budget deficits.
The share of foreign exchange reserves held in dollars has fallen in the past decade to about 60 per cent. The share in euros has risen to more than 25 per cent. The rise of China implies the renminbi will qualify for global currency status whenever it achieves full convertibility and sheds its protective capital controls. In short, the international monetary system is already becoming bipolar, and may soon be tripolar.
The US should accept this and even promote its acceleration. The goal should be roughly to equate the international positions of the dollar and the euro in the next decade or so, and subsequently to bring the renminbi into the mix along with steady creation of special drawing rights. It should encourage China and others to intervene in euros as well as in dollars. It could intervene in euros itself if the dollar-euro rate became misaligned. It could also overtly discourage dollar build-ups by foreign monetary authorities through countervailing currency intervention and by taxing the income on their dollar holdings. It could support the creation of a Substitution Account at the IMF, as it did in 1979-80, through which foreign authorities could convert some of their dollars into SDRs.
These changes would not resolve all the problems of the international monetary system. They would certainly not absolve the US of the need to get its fiscal house in order. But they would speed up needed rebalancing of the world economy and reduce the risk of future crises.
The writer is director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington DC
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