20国集团(G20)财长们上周末在巴黎开会时，达成的新协议也许不多，但他们解决国际货币体系缺陷的努力值得密切关注。国际经济正在朝一种新的多级格局转变。目前，约一半的全球增长来自发展中经济体，这将改变实力关系。美元仍将是占主导地位的储备货币，但随着时间的推移，世界经济将需要应对一种包括多种主要货币的体系。我们必须实现多边主义的现代化，建立新的货币体系。
金钱代表实力。货币制度的转变预示着新政治秩序的兴起。君主们将自己的头像刻在硬币上决非偶然。但如果改变是为了协作（而非维持主导地位），各方就需要适当的动机来避免旧秩序的缓慢退化。建立一个新框架就能提供这样的动机，起到鼓励全球经济新老参与者的作用：七国集团(G7)发达经济体、主要的新兴市场经济体、国际货币基金组织(IMF)、世界银行(World Bank)和世贸组织(WTO)。
G7发达经济体对建立一项重要的准则很感兴趣：各国不加干预地维护浮动汇率，除非G7同意特殊情况意味着有必要采取行动。过去几年，除少数特例外，该政策一向是一个不成文的准则。现在，G7应发表一项能反映这一协议的声明，并为其它参与者制定一个标准。
多数大型新兴市场都在转向弹性汇率和自主的货币政策，这使它们能够更加独立地操作，专注于稳健的国内经济政策，并避免“以邻为壑”的策略。但有一些国家疲于应对“热钱”流动。G20应向他们伸出援手，支持IMF和世界银行有关“优良实践”的建议，使发展中国家能够在解决这些问题的同时，保持对投资开放。例如，上世纪90年代，智利就利用了依靠价格信号的透明机制。世界银行也在对各国本币债券市场的发展提供帮助，这将有助于新兴市场应对汇率风险和资本流动的波动。随着时间的推移，多数大型新兴经济体应逐渐转向G7准则；较小的经济体可能需要维持灵活性，但这可能是能够安排的——也许借助一套行为准则。
美国、欧元区、日本和英国等国应该与IMF举办一个特别提款权(SDR)论坛，审议货币和汇率问题——这些国家的货币组成了SDR这种储备资产。这些国家应鼓励中国加入论坛，并在采取措施将人民币国际化和逐步开放资本账户后，最终加入SDR。
中国已认识到这种转变的必要性，并承认，作为多边组织的成员国，必须分担规则和义务。就像中国加入WTO推动了国内改革一样，这一论坛可能引发一场有关为人民币国际化做准备的内部辩论。
随着时间的推移，其它主要的国际化货币也可加入SDR篮子和论坛。主要大国不会接受SDR作为一种新的全球储备货币，也不认可IMF是全球央行。但主要储备货币发行国必须开展合作，以支持全球经济的健康发展，或者至少应对分歧。
在这种新的框架下，IMF应该担负起仲裁角色，能够就外部政策的合适程度发出警示，但不会予以处罚。IMF应受命加强对“资本账户”政策的多边审议，将其作为G20新“相互评估程序”(MAP)的一部分。这种审议应该将各国政策与国际信息指标（包括黄金等大宗商品的价格）作对比。拥有187个股东的IMF的参与，为G20带来动机，即获得更大合法性，并得到一个财力雄厚的机构的支持。
最后，G20应敦促IMF和WTO考虑一下WTO关贸总协定(GATT)第15条的影响——该条款实际上建议，各经济体不应利用汇率政策来抵消较低贸易壁垒的好处。援引此条将要求IMF作出裁定。尽管此条从未被援引，对于其具体用法也存在一些模糊性，但G20至少应考虑将它当作一种可能的激励或抑制。
建立一个框架来管理转型中的货币体系，可能不像政权突然更迭那样吸引媒体的关注，但它现实得多。对国际货币事务的管理进行现代化改革，可能会是未来增长的重要促进因素。强权君主的时代已经远去。但当今的领导人仍有机会在未来的货币框架上刻下自己的印记。
注：本文作者为世界银行集团(World Bank Group)行长
译者/陈云飞
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001037073
New agreements may be in short supply when finance ministers of the Group of 20 leading economies meet this weekend in Paris. But their efforts to address the weaknesses of the international monetary system deserve close attention. The international economy is shifting to a new multipolarity. About half of global growth is now from developing economies and this will transform power relations. The US dollar will remain the predominant reserve currency, but over time the world economy will need to manage a system of multiple major currencies. We need to modernise multilateralism to steer towards a new monetary system.
Money is power. Shifts in monetary regimes have signalled the rise of new political orders. It is not accidental that kings stamped their faces on coins. But when change is about co-ordination not domination, sovereigns need incentives to avoid a slow degradation of the old order. A new framework can offer just such incentives to encourage old and new actors in the global economy: the Group of Seven developed economies; the leading emerging market economies; the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; and the World Trade Organisation.
The developed economies of the G7 have an interest in establishing an important norm: to maintain flexible exchange rates, without intervention, unless the group agrees special circumstances warrant action. Over past years, with a few exceptions, this policy has been an unwritten norm. Now the G7 should issue a statement to reflect this agreement and set a standard for others.
Most big emerging markets have been moving towards flexible exchange rates and autonomous monetary policies, enabling them to operate more independently, focusing on sound domestic economic policies and eschewing “beggar thy neighbour” tactics. But a number have struggled with “hot money” flows. The G20 should support them by backing efforts of the IMF and World Bank to suggest “good practices” that enable developing countries to manage these problems while remaining open to investment. For example, Chile used transparent mechanisms in the 1990s that relied on price signals. The World Bank is also assisting in the development of domestic currency bond markets, which help emerging markets manage currency risks and capital flow volatility. Over time, most large emerging economies should move to the G7 norm; smaller economies may need to retain flexibility, but this could be accommodated, perhaps by a code of conduct.
The economies whose currencies constitute the reserve asset known as special drawing rights – the US, the eurozone, Japan and Britain – should meet in an SDR forum with the IMF to review monetary and currency issues. This group should offer China the incentive to join the forum and eventually the SDR after it takes steps to internationalise the renminbi and moves towards an open capital account.
China has recognised the need for this transition, and it has accepted that membership in multilateral bodies requires shared rules and obligations. This forum could stimulate an internal debate about preparations for renminbi internationalisation, just as China’s accession to the WTO prompted domestic reforms.
Over time, other major internationalised currencies could be added to the SDR basket and forum. Leading powers are not going to accept the SDR as a new global reserve currency, nor the IMF as a global central bank. But the guardians of the principal reserve currencies need to co-operate to support a healthy global economy – or at least manage differences.
Within this new framework, the IMF should be a referee, able to blow the whistle on the appropriateness of external policies but not to impose penalties. The IMF should be directed to sharpen the multilateral review of “capital account” policies, as part of the G20’s new mutual assessment process (MAP). This review should compare national policies with international information indicators, including commodity prices such as gold. The IMF’s involvement, with its 187 shareholders, offers the G20 the incentive of greater legitimacy and the support of an institution with financial resources.
Finally, the G20 should urge the IMF and WTO to consider the implications of the WTO’s GATT Article 15, which in effect suggests that economies should not use exchange rate policies to take away the benefits of lower trade barriers. Its use would require a determination by the IMF. Though this article has never been invoked and there are ambiguities about its exact use, the G20 should at least consider it as a possible incentive or disincentive.
A framework to manage a monetary system in transition may be less headline-grabbing than sudden regime change, but it is a lot more realistic. Modernising the management of international monetary affairs could prove an important contribution to future growth. The time of powerful kings is long gone. But today’s leaders still have the chance to stamp their mark on the monetary framework of tomorrow.
The writer is president of the World Bank Group
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