中
国物价涨幅已达两年多以来最高，并引起政府的担忧。虽然官方公布的10月份居民消费价格涨幅是4.4%，但食品价格10%的上涨正给贫困家庭带来巨大冲击。中国国内媒体满是生产者和消费者囤积物品的报道。政府已经采取的应对措施是一次小幅加息和存款准备金率的数次上调，但活期存款利率一点也没有动。还需要采取更多措施。如果下定决心减缓货币供应的增长，就会止住家庭储蓄因通货膨胀而大量流失。这样做还有可能让中国戒除它对投资推动型增长的严重依赖。
和20世纪八九十年代双位数的物价涨幅比起来，最近这轮通货膨胀或许还显得比较温和。但其社会影响可能差不多一样严重。据中国政府一家智囊机构所做的研究，贫困家庭现在面临的通货膨胀是整体通胀率的两倍，因为他们消费篮子的构成主要是食品，而食品价格的上涨又是最快的。所以尽管工资上涨显得强劲，很多家庭的购买力仍旧没有变化甚至是在负增长。
家庭储蓄还因为政府控制存款利率的政策而遭到侵蚀。最近将贷款利率提高0.25个百分点后，活期存款利率并没有变化。即使是在没有通货膨胀的情况下，由于政府禁止银行自己设定存款利率，存款人获得的利息也已经被人为压低。在通胀时代，家庭的存款回报就变为负数，特别是资金主要为活期存款的贫困家庭。
按通胀率调整过后，今天活期存款的回报为负数，实际回报率约为-4%。即使是一年期定期存款，扣除通胀后的回报率也是-2%。与此同时，银行正在赚取大额利差，而中长期企业贷款的借款人往往是国有或受国家控制的公司，它们的借款利率经通货膨胀调整后约为2%。考虑到当前家庭活期存款超过人民币11万亿元（合1.7万亿美元），如果今年全年的通货膨胀率是4%，那么就会有4,000多亿元（合600亿美元）的资金从这些家庭转移到受国家控制的银行和公司借款人。
Associated Press
尽管最近的一些供给冲击也许助长了通货膨胀，但近年来货币供应的快速增长，尤其是去年的贷款狂潮才是通胀的根源。因此，今后对抗通胀的关键一点将是大幅减缓货币供应的增加速度。
以往，中国政府通过坚决对银行实行信贷限额成功地抑制了通胀压力。而今，监管者同样需要密切监控信托产品的增加以及热钱的流入。中国央行和中国银监会拥有一切应对通胀的必要工具。上调利率、实行信贷限额、停止发放信托产品以及切断海外资金流入渠道等多管齐下将平抑通胀预期，使居民储蓄不再受到侵蚀。然而，为了提高这些举措的可信度，中国最高领导层要清晰地传递出其抑制通胀的整体决心。
毋庸置疑，信贷增速的猛然减缓将使一些投资项目面临流动资金短缺，房地产建设也将减缓。不良资产率可能会上升，因为缺少资金的项目将无力支付利息。
但从中期来看，这一政策将会产生积极的效果。可以相信，通过切断大量项目的流动性，宏观经济紧缩不仅给政府带来了低通胀，也让经济逐渐摆脱集约型投资的增长方式。地方政府官员们将意识到，他们无法再主要依靠由银行贷款和发售债券提供融资的新增投资项目来实现增长。
上世纪九十年代中后期，资金不足的地方政府对民营化变得越来越开放，允许民营企业在以往为国有企业垄断的行业中占据主导。因此而产生的竞争对经济而言是有益处的。重复这一过程不是没有痛苦的，但过去的经验说明，坚定的宏观经济紧缩将把中国送上更加健康的增长轨道。
（本文作者是西北大学政治学副教授，著有《中国的派系与金融》一书(剑桥大学出版社，2007年)）
（本文版权归道琼斯公司所有，未经许可不得翻译或转载。）
China is seeing the highest price increases in over two years, and this has officials worried. While the official consumer inflation rate was 4.4% for October, a 10% rise in food prices is having a huge impact on poorer households. The domestic media is filled with stories of hoarding by both producers and consumers.
The government has responded with a small interest-rate increase and some hikes of the reserve requirement, though rates on demand deposits have not budged at all. More action is needed. A resolute drive to slow growth of the money supply will stop the hemorrhaging of household savings due to inflation. As an added bonus, it may also wean China off of its heavy dependence on investment-driven growth.
The recent bout of inflation may seem mild in comparison to the double-digit price rises in the 1980s and '90s. But the social impact may be almost as severe. According to research by a Chinese government think tank, poorer households now face inflation that is twice the overall rate because their consumption basket is dominated by food items, which have seen the most rapid price increases. So even though wage gains seem robust, many households are seeing flat or negative increases in purchasing power.
Household savings have also been eroded by government policies to control deposit interest rates. After the recent 0.25-percentage point lending-rate hike, the rate paid on demand deposits did not budge. Even without inflation, depositors are paid artificially low rates because the government prevents banks from setting their own deposit rates. In times of inflation, households, especially poorer ones with money mainly in demand deposits, suffer negative returns on their savings.
Savings in demand-deposit accounts today yield negative returns after adjusting for inflation, for a real return of about -4%. Even net of inflation, deposits in a one-year time deposit earn -2%. Meanwhile, banks are earning large margins, and borrowers of medium- to long-term corporate loans, which tend to be state-owned or state-dominated firms, are borrowing at an inflation-adjusted rate of about 2%. Given that households currently have more than 11 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion) in demand deposits, an annual inflation rate of 4% this year would in effect see the transfer of over 400 billion yuan ($60 billion) from these households to banks and corporate borrowers, both dominated by the state.
This erosion of poor households' purchasing power goes directly against the goal of 'raising the income of medium and low income urban and rural residents,' as outlined by the Party plenum last month. Given that nominal wages for a large number of households remain relatively flat, continual inflation alone will drive many into destitution. The pressure from negative earnings on savings has driven richer households to speculate in the real estate and stock markets. Rising inflation has further incentivized all households to begin stockpiling food and commodities such as gold. Food hoarding, if sufficiently widespread, can further increase inflationary pressure.
Although inflation might have been boosted by some recent supply shocks, the rapid expansion of the money supply in recent years, especially the spectacular explosion of lending last year, is the root cause. Thus, a key ingredient of future inflation fighting will be to slow down substantially the expansion of money supply.
In the past, the Chinese government has successfully stifled inflationary pressure via the imposition of a resolute credit ceiling on banks. Today, regulators would also need to monitor closely the expansion of trust products and the inflow of hot money. The People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission have all the tools necessary to fight inflation. A combination of interest rate hikes, a credit ceiling, a freeze in trust product issuance and aggressive sterilization of foreign exchange inflows can halt inflationary expectations and stop the erosion of household savings. China's top leadership, however, needs to make clear its collective determination to fight inflation in order to give these measures credibility.
To be sure, the sudden slowdown in credit expansion will cause illiquidity in some investment projects and slowed real-estate construction. Nonperforming loan ratios may rise as cash-starved projects become unable to meet interest payments.
In the medium term, however, the policy will pay benefits. Macroeconomic retrenchment credibly commits the government to both low inflation and a less investment-intensive growth path by cutting off liquidity from a large number of projects. Local authorities will learn that they can no longer pursue growth based mainly on adding new investment projects financed by bank loans and bond issuance.
In the mid- to late-1990s, cash-starved local authorities became much more open to privatization, allowing private firms to dominate sectors previously monopolized by state-owned firms. The competition that resulted was good for the economy. Repeating that process will not be painless, but past experience has shown that resolute macroeconomic retrenchment can put China on a healthier path for growth.
(Mr. Shih is associate professor of political science at Northwestern University and author of 'Factions and Finance in China' (Cambridge University Press, 2007). A related editorial appears today. )
VICTOR SHIH
The government has responded with a small interest-rate increase and some hikes of the reserve requirement, though rates on demand deposits have not budged at all. More action is needed. A resolute drive to slow growth of the money supply will stop the hemorrhaging of household savings due to inflation. As an added bonus, it may also wean China off of its heavy dependence on investment-driven growth.
The recent bout of inflation may seem mild in comparison to the double-digit price rises in the 1980s and '90s. But the social impact may be almost as severe. According to research by a Chinese government think tank, poorer households now face inflation that is twice the overall rate because their consumption basket is dominated by food items, which have seen the most rapid price increases. So even though wage gains seem robust, many households are seeing flat or negative increases in purchasing power.
Household savings have also been eroded by government policies to control deposit interest rates. After the recent 0.25-percentage point lending-rate hike, the rate paid on demand deposits did not budge. Even without inflation, depositors are paid artificially low rates because the government prevents banks from setting their own deposit rates. In times of inflation, households, especially poorer ones with money mainly in demand deposits, suffer negative returns on their savings.
Savings in demand-deposit accounts today yield negative returns after adjusting for inflation, for a real return of about -4%. Even net of inflation, deposits in a one-year time deposit earn -2%. Meanwhile, banks are earning large margins, and borrowers of medium- to long-term corporate loans, which tend to be state-owned or state-dominated firms, are borrowing at an inflation-adjusted rate of about 2%. Given that households currently have more than 11 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion) in demand deposits, an annual inflation rate of 4% this year would in effect see the transfer of over 400 billion yuan ($60 billion) from these households to banks and corporate borrowers, both dominated by the state.
This erosion of poor households' purchasing power goes directly against the goal of 'raising the income of medium and low income urban and rural residents,' as outlined by the Party plenum last month. Given that nominal wages for a large number of households remain relatively flat, continual inflation alone will drive many into destitution. The pressure from negative earnings on savings has driven richer households to speculate in the real estate and stock markets. Rising inflation has further incentivized all households to begin stockpiling food and commodities such as gold. Food hoarding, if sufficiently widespread, can further increase inflationary pressure.
Although inflation might have been boosted by some recent supply shocks, the rapid expansion of the money supply in recent years, especially the spectacular explosion of lending last year, is the root cause. Thus, a key ingredient of future inflation fighting will be to slow down substantially the expansion of money supply.
In the past, the Chinese government has successfully stifled inflationary pressure via the imposition of a resolute credit ceiling on banks. Today, regulators would also need to monitor closely the expansion of trust products and the inflow of hot money. The People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission have all the tools necessary to fight inflation. A combination of interest rate hikes, a credit ceiling, a freeze in trust product issuance and aggressive sterilization of foreign exchange inflows can halt inflationary expectations and stop the erosion of household savings. China's top leadership, however, needs to make clear its collective determination to fight inflation in order to give these measures credibility.
To be sure, the sudden slowdown in credit expansion will cause illiquidity in some investment projects and slowed real-estate construction. Nonperforming loan ratios may rise as cash-starved projects become unable to meet interest payments.
In the medium term, however, the policy will pay benefits. Macroeconomic retrenchment credibly commits the government to both low inflation and a less investment-intensive growth path by cutting off liquidity from a large number of projects. Local authorities will learn that they can no longer pursue growth based mainly on adding new investment projects financed by bank loans and bond issuance.
In the mid- to late-1990s, cash-starved local authorities became much more open to privatization, allowing private firms to dominate sectors previously monopolized by state-owned firms. The competition that resulted was good for the economy. Repeating that process will not be painless, but past experience has shown that resolute macroeconomic retrenchment can put China on a healthier path for growth.
(Mr. Shih is associate professor of political science at Northwestern University and author of 'Factions and Finance in China' (Cambridge University Press, 2007). A related editorial appears today. )
VICTOR SHIH
没有评论:
发表评论